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ABSTRACT
“IT IS A NEW KIND OF MILITANCY”:
MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT, 1941‐1946
MAY 2010
DAVID LUCANDER, B.A., WESTFIELD STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John H. Bracey, Jr.

This study of the March on Washington Movement (MOWM) investigates the
operations of the national office and examines its interactions with local branches,
particularly in St. Louis. As the organization’s president, A. Philip Randolph and
members of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (BSCP) such as Benjamin
McLaurin and T.D. McNeal are important figures in this story. African American
women such as Layle Lane, E. Pauline Myers, and Anna Arnold Hedgeman ran
MOWM’s national office. Of particular importance to this study is Myers’ tenure as
executive secretary. Working out of Harlem, she corresponded with MOWM’s
twenty‐six local chapters, spending considerable time espousing the rationale and
ideology of Non‐Violent Goodwill Direct Action, a trademark protest technique
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developed and implemented alongside Fellowship of Reconciliation members
Bayard Rustin and James Farmer.
As a nationally recognized African American protest organization fighting for
a “Double V” against fascism and racism during the Second World War, MOWM
accrued political capital by the agitation of its local affiliates. In some cases, like in
Washington, D.C., volunteers lacked the ability to forge effective protests. In St.
Louis, however, BSCP official T.D. McNeal led a MOWM branch that was among the
nation’s most active. David Grant, Thelma Maddox, Nita Blackwell, and Leyton
Weston are some of the thousands joining McNeal over a three‐year period to picket
U.S. Cartridge and Carter Carburetor for violating the anti‐discrimination clause in
Executive Order 8802, lobby Southwestern Bell Telephone to expand employment
opportunities for African Americans, stage a summer of sit‐ins at lunch counters in
the city’s largest department stores, and lead a general push for a “Double V” against
fascism and racism.
This study of MOWM demonstrates that the structural dynamics of protest
groups often include a discrepancy between policies laid out by the organization’s
national office and the activity of its local branches. While national officials from
MOWM and National Organization for the Advancement of Colored People had an
ambivalent relationship with each other, inter‐organizational tension was locally
muted as grassroots activists aligned themselves with whichever group appeared
most effective. During the Second World War, this was often MOWM.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
“We, of the Black Labor Movement and long in the struggle of support for Mr.
Randolph do not boast of Ph.D.’s but we know what we know!!!!! We know that the
co‐opting of Mr. Randolph’s contribution, creativity and concern for the Black
masses by ‘younguns’ on the scene with Ph.D.’s and similar degrees must be
combated with all the energy working Black people can generate.”
– John M. Thornton1
A. Philip Randolph’s call for somewhere between 10,000 and 100,000 African
Americans to arrive at the Lincoln Memorial on the National Mall July 1, 1941 is well
known by scholars and students of African American history, the history of social
movements, and grassroots protest.2 Considerably less is known, however, about
the organization Randolph created to facilitate the dramatic protest that, ironically,
never occurred.3 Historians have generally overlooked what the March on
Washington Movement’s national office and local branches did between 1941 and
1946. This is puzzling because MOWM had local branches throughout the country,
some of which were led by individuals who remained involved in racial activism
well beyond the Roosevelt years. One would expect greater scholarly attention to an
organization thriving in a culturally and politically dynamic era that Ella Baker
biographer Barbara Ransby identified as a time that “unsettled the class, gender,
and racial order of the United States, creating a new sense of possibility for women,
working people, and African Americans” and of a movement that at least one scholar
in the 1940s recognized consisted of “many phases” which merited “critical study
and appraisal.”4
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Existing studies of the organization tend to over‐emphasize Randolph’s role
as a national leader and make limited use of archival sources presently available to
scholars. The latter of these criticisms is understandable because source material
and archival holdings utilized by this study were simply not available to previous
generations of historians.5 Unfortunately, relatively few scholars have picked up on
Ella Baker’s observation that, “The work of the National Office is one thing, but the
work of the branches is in the final analysis the life blood of the Association,” and
applied her insights to achieve a more thorough investigation of MOWM’s rapid rise
during the Second World War.6
George Schuyler’s 1942 opinion that “The March‐on‐Washington movement
is A. Philip Randolph” stubbornly continues to influence MOWM historiography.
Schuyler recognized that Randolph had a genuine ability “to appeal to the emotions
of the people,” but his skills were severely limited and “leadership capacity and
executive ability required …is simply not there.” The “Sage of Sugar Hill” attacked
MOWM for having “no organizational set‐up” to keep the upstart civil rights group
“alive and functioning.” Schuyler assailed MOWM for relying on a leader who
depended on “ballyhoo and oratory,” and lacked the “guts” of anti‐colonial crusaders
like Nehru and Gandhi. As if to salve anxious NAACP officials, Schuyler wryly
commented, “The March‐On‐Washington movement is no threat to the NAACP.”
Ever the iconoclast, Schuyler pointed out that he was comparing a fledgling
organization run by a leader with a “Messianic Complex” to a NAACP that, despite
thirty years on the national scene, failed to garner more than 70,000 members out of
13,000,000 African Americans.7
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As part of an attack on MOWM criticizing the organization for being “openly
antagonistic,” the Courier also ran an editorial by Herman Moore, a federal judge in
the Virgin Islands, criticizing MOWM’s leadership for being visionary but only
“succeeding merely in staging a few giant Mass meetings and stirring indignation
and unrest.”8 Even Bayard Rustin, who worked alongside Randolph during MOWM’s
reign as a leading voice of Black protest, commented that, prior to his work with the
organization, MOWM represented “only a partial answer to the present need…it has
no program, educational or otherwise, for meeting the present need.”9
Surely, more was needed in a historical moment described by MOWM
member Lawrence Ervin as “a time of great racial tension and stress…when the
tides of democracy are running very low for the Negro people.”10 Ervin’s prophesy
of a dismal future for African Americans if they did not, as a group, rally to seize the
opportunity to close the chasm of racial inequality speaks to historian Patricia
Sullivan’s analysis of wartime activism half of a century later when she argued, “the
war fueled a national movement for civil rights.”11 Indeed, the march that never
transpired was the first of its kind to force prompt federal action. This was made
possible through the establishment of a precedent for successful protest
demonstrations that used coalitions, large numbers, and explicit confrontation in
order to press for reform.12

Historiography
Any historiography of the March on Washington Movement must begin with
Herbert Garfinkle’s When Negroes March, a book that has been the dominant
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narrative on MOWM for fifty years. When Negroes March is an adequate, if not
exceptional, study of organizational dynamics, relationships between a minority
group’s self‐appointed spokespeople and the federal government, and leadership in
a social movement. Garfinkle established a standard for looking at MOWM as a
transient protest organization with strong but anonymous grassroots support and
no long‐term program beyond the cancelled march on July 1, 1941. Garfinkle stated
that “There can be little doubt that this was a thriving movement” but his study did
not attempt to discover who made it thrive.13
When Negroes March set a precedent for looking at MOWM from the top‐
down and in the context of, in Garfinkle’s words, “the organizational history of the
Negro March on Washington Movement in the genesis of FEPC politics.”14 Since
1959, most narratives of MOWM recognize Randolph’s ability to galvanize the
enthusiasm of incalculable masses for an exclusively Black protest during the
Second World War and end with the leader’s unfortunate inability to keep a national
office together so that the organization could remain relevant throughout the war
years. This reading of MOWM is as simplistic as attributing the 1963 March on
Washington to Martin Luther King’s charisma and oratory.
Limited in scope as a study of leadership within the national office and in
methodology for relying on BSCP papers that severely restricted Garfinkle’s
understanding of MOWM, When Negroes March is as important for what it
accomplishes as for what it leaves out of the story.15 As the original and only book‐
length study of MOWM, When Negroes March set the standard for how other studies
related to this organization interpreted its history as driven almost solely by
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Randolph.16 An example of this is Garfinkle’s conclusion that MOWM rallies in New
York, St. Louis, and Chicago were publicly identified as “Randolph’s show” because
“he was founder and spokesperson” and “the people who were loyal only and
directly to him…bore the major work load. They looked to him for leadership and
direction.”17 With greater sensitivity to ideological trends among African Americans
in various campaigns to increase employment opportunities, Toure Reed’s study of
the National Urban League enriches Garfinkle’s interpretation of top‐down change
by arguing that MOWM was part of a broader impulse towards “calls for state
intervention” to open more job prospects for African Americans.18
As demonstrated by this dissertation, activists in St. Louis MOWM were much
more committed to the very real concepts of Black freedom, economic integration,
and racial equality than to serving a distant but highly respected national
figurehead. Their efforts surely deserve more chronicling than the one sentence
that Garfinkle makes of this vibrant local unit.19 By focusing on the actions of
grassroots activists instead of proclamations by the national office, this dissertation
necessarily complicates the standard chronology of MOWM. In the original study,
“decline” begins immediately after the afore‐mentioned rallies and was precipitated
by supporters from NAACP and Urban League backing away under the threat of
MOWM becoming a permanent organization. Garfinkle is correct in saying that
MOWM was at the height of its national prominence in summer 1942, but this is
when local units like St. Louis MOWM were just beginning their activity.20
Garfinkle’s chronology is adequate for interpreting affairs of the organization’s
national office, but it is insufficient for describing the lifespan of St. Louis MOWM. At
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the same time national leaders like Roy Wilkins and Lester Granger were cautiously
distancing themselves from MOWM and the organization was losing prestige in
highly‐circulated African American newspapers, activists in St. Louis MOWM staged
major marches at Carter Carburetor and U.S. Cartridge, a Prayer Meeting at
Memorial Plaza, successful picketing at Southwestern Bell Telephone, and a summer
of sit‐ins that desegregated eateries in St. Louis. Clearly, St. Louis MOWM did not
collapse after the 1942 Kiel Auditorium rally or disintegrate without Randolph’s
watchful eye in close proximity.
Clarence Lang’s recently published Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics
and Black Freedom Struggle in St. Louis, 193675, offers one of the most detailed
accounts of MOWM activities in a single city. Lang’s account of St. Louis MOWM is
situated within an outstanding longitudinal study of twentieth century African
American protest politics and activism in a border state. With an entire chapter
devoted to MOWM, Grassroots at the Gateway presents the most comprehensive
account of St. Louis MOWM available, prior to this dissertation.21 One of the more
useful aspects of Lang’s work is that readers accrue a full appreciation for the
Depression‐era political schooling that MOWM’s members underwent, as well as the
culturally and politically conservative factors behind their relative silence in the
Truman and Eisenhower years. An important lesson in Grassroots at the Gateway is
that prolonged studies of social and political movements inevitably encounter a
generation gap. Lang demonstrates that the contributions of Roosevelt‐era activists
such as T.D. McNeal and David Grant were either ignored or discounted by later
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generations of African Americans who were active in the civil rights and Black
freedom struggles.22
Lang looks at MOWM as facet of St. Louis’ “vibrant and deeply rooted
traditions of black resistance.”23 He uses MOWM as one of many examples in which
working‐class African Americans organized amongst themselves to address issues
beyond the scope of traditional labor unions. Grassroots at the Gateway sees MOWM
as part of a multi‐generational struggle of “black people working for fair and full
employment, better wages, union protection…racial fairness under law, political
representation, fair housing, education, health care and other social wages,
equitable access to parks and similar public amenities, and urban development
policies geared toward black communal preservation – in short, a minimum
program for full citizenship and self‐determination.”24 As such, Lang effectively
traces the careers of MOWM stalwarts like David Grant and T.D. McNeal. Of
particular interest is his account of their maturation through Depression politics
and their impressions of civil rights‐era protests. This dissertation expands on
Lang’s work by offering a more detailed account of St. Louis MOWM’s operations, as
well as greater insights into the biographical and ideological backgrounds of major
players within this seminal organization. Additionally, by using St. Louis MOWM as
a case study in conflict and cooperation between competing African American
protest organizations, this dissertation situates MOWM within the context of intra‐
and extra‐organizational affairs of groups and individuals aligned with the struggle
for Black equality. Thus, while Lang looks at St. Louis MOWM as part of a study in St.
Louis’ grassroots protest, this dissertation scrutinizes MOWM in the context of
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organizational dynamics that arose between its national office and the daily
activities of local branches.
Unfortunately for scholars and teachers of African American history, Robert
A. Hill was correct when, in 1995, he identified FBI files as “the most detailed
chronicle that exists” on MOWM. Hill’s effort compiling and cross‐referencing FBI
documents to uncover blacked out or deleted sections makes RACON extraordinarily
valuable as a primary source for students of World War II‐era African American
history, techniques of federal surveillance, and problems associated with relying on
FBI documents as primary sources. FBI surveillance of African Americans and Black
protest during the Second World War unintentionally left historians with a record of
the identity and roles of “individuals who participated in the movement’s
meetings.”25 This dissertation attempts to do for contemporary historiography
what Hoover’s G‐men did over fifty years ago – namely, look at MOWM through its
local machinations. Needless to say, the methodology and author’s intent of this
study differs greatly from the FBI’s, and it is hoped that the irony of suspicious
investigators searching for fifth column activity being recognized as an authority on
African American protest through MOWM will be corrected.
John Bracey and August Meier made an important addition to Garfinkle’s
work with the discovery of documentary evidence in the NAACP Papers that this
organization “played a crucial role” in MOWM’s success and its demise.26 NAACP’s
initial enthusiasm for the march resulted in its urging of all branches to help
“organizing marchers, distributing March buttons…and disseminating publicity.”27
Without publicizing their heavy subsidy of Black protest, the NAACP contributed as
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much, and sometimes more, to MOWM’s coffers as the BSCP.28 Even the simplest
interpretation of cooperation between NAACP and MOWM recognized the symbolic
significance of the NAACP wrapping up 1942 by awarding Randolph its highest
honor, the Spingarn medal.29 After this, however, the elder organization’s support
for MOWM declined rapidly when MOWM sought to institutionalize itself and
become a permanent star in the constellation of African American protest and uplift
organizations. NAACP kept its distance from MOWM in the ensuing years and
purposely remained publicly quiet about its position towards MOWM’s
institutionalization.30 Even though local activists in St. Louis remained dedicated to
both organizations, the working relationship between the national offices of NAACP
and MOWM eroded considerably.31
Bracey and Meier’s study outlined “the ambivalent and complex relations
that have historically existed among black leadership and organizations.”32 Their
findings necessarily complicate and enrich the perspective that any localized study
of MOWM must take. Methodologically, this team of scholars proved that a more
complete understanding of MOWM requires the use of papers from organizations
that Randolph’s group cooperated with. For instance, while BSCP rightfully takes a
leading role in historical accounts of MOWM, Bracey and Meier discovered that
Walter White made some of the largest individual contributions to MOWM and that
the NAACP donated as much money as the BSCP towards keeping MOWM afloat.
NAACP’s financial support for MOWM must be understood in the context of how its
leaders perceived Randolph’s vision for MOWM. Even though White was cautious to
not throw the NAACP completely in with MOWM until he and Randolph “met to
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decide and discuss the present status of the MOWM,” White privately and quietly
backed the organization.33 In 1942, the same year that Randolph won the Spingarn
Award, Anna Arnold Hedgeman wrote Randolph reporting that the organization was
“not sending an official delegate to the policy conference because they believe MOW
has gotten away from its original plan” as an umbrella organization through which
attacks against racial inequality could be coordinated.34
Randolph was not unaware that he risked making his organization’s program
too close to that of other established organizations. He was, however, blind to the
fact that some NAACP officials advocated developing “some scheme…whereby we
can work with them, absorb them” and harness MOWM’s energy to entrench NAACP
even more deeply within the ranks of Black institutions.35 Randolph knew that he
shouldn’t step on NAACP’s toes and he frequently played up things that
differentiated MOWM from the elder organization. He also quickly shot down a
proposal from one member for MOWM “to publish a 42‐page monthly magazine,”
that would have certainly been seen as an attempt to nudge aside Crisis.36 It was
difficult enough for MOWM to construct an identity that did not alienate the NAACP
without sponsoring a rival publication to Crisis, and it would have been impossible
had MOWM come out with its own journal. The potential for conflict was written
into MOWM policy, which explicitly identified NAACP and the Urban League as
“established recognized agencies” whose campaigns should not be superseded by
MOWM protest unless the organization was invited to collaborate. At least on
paper, MOWM was careful to emphasize that cooperation was its “fundamental
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policy” for coordinating “a multiple attack on the problem” identified by local
activists.37
Scholarly works on BSCP history often mention the union’s support of
MOWM in passing or offer anecdotes from retired porters claiming that their union
was the engine behind MOWM.38 This body of work, however, makes little attempt
to examine connections between BSCP and MOWM beyond the obvious conclusion
that Randolph led both organizations and that union loyalty inspired an
indeterminate amount of anonymous members to participate in MOWM activity.39
Though overlooked by many, the contributions of BSCP Field Organizers T.D.
McNeal and Benjamin McLaurin to MOWM’s campaigns were, like their efforts in the
union, difficult to understate.40 Beth Bates’ Pullman Porters and the Rise of Black
Protest Politics is by far the most useful study of the BSCP’s connections to MOWM.
In addition to a fresh interpretation of MOWM’s all‐Black membership policy, this
monograph points towards the need for local studies of MOWM to document “cross‐
fertilization between [NAACP and MOWM] at the local level” and remove the
“mystery of the movement at the local level.”41
Only recently has the ferment of grassroots protest coordinated by MOWM
attracted scholarly attention that Mary McLeod Bethune, writing in 1944,
recognized when she pointed out that “in such people’s movements, the real
leadership comes up out of the people themselves.”42 Previous studies, such as
Harvard Sitkoff’s New Deal for Blacks, Patricia Sullivan’s Days of Hope, Philip Foner’s
Organized Labor and the Black Worker, Beth Bates’ Pullman Porters, Philip A. Klinker
and Rogers M. Smith’s The Unsteady March, and John Egerton’s Speak Now Against
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the Day all mention MOWM and E.O. 8802 in passing as components of a broader
study.43 Even then, Randolph, White, and LaGuardia dominated the historical
narrative. Consequentially, these books scarcely mention the local organizers who
gave life to MOWM’s grassroots protests.44 Thorough studies such as Melinda
Chateauvert’s monograph on the BSCP Ladies’ Auxiliary, for instance, only offer a
brief overview of activity in St. Louis led by T.D. and Thelma McNeal. Just a single
page in length, Chateauvert’s recognition of protest in wartime St. Louis is one of the
few instances in which historians even recognized African American grassroots
activism within the context of national organizations during the Second World
War.45 Marching Together offers concrete details about social and political
networks within the mid‐twentieth century Black Left and also suggests that the
depth of MOWM protest in St. Louis was probably equaled in Chicago and possibly
other cities. Chateauvert’s portrayal of the Chicago Ladies’ Auxiliary is the study’s
most lively section. Under the watch of Charles Wesley Burton, strengthened by the
social network of BSCP Women’s Auxiliary president Helena Wilson, and then
reinforced by the combined organizing expertise of Domestic Workers Association
president Neva Ryan and Irene McCoy Gaines, women involved in Chicago’s Ladies’
Auxiliary contributed mightily to MOWM’s operations in the Windy City.46 Gaines,
for example, brought a political and social network into MOWM that she created
while working on previous organizing campaigns. It was Gaines, not Randolph, who
secured parade permits for the “militant and definitely positive Demonstration for
Democracy” that MOWM co‐sponsored alongside 125 other African American
organizations in Chicago.47 Out of this march, Irene Gaines emerged with a plan
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picked up by the Chicago Council of Negro Organizations for a protest trip to
Washington, D.C., to occur in March – a full three months before Randolph’s
proposed national gathering.48 Perhaps even more than St. Louis, Chicago had a
longstanding tradition of African American activism through existing racial
organizations that were familiar with marches, parades, and cooperation in single‐
issue campaigns.49 Added to this, Chicago also had an activism‐oriented NAACP that
picketed outside of defense plants and a well‐endowed BSCP that pumped money
into the local MOWM.50 The combination of MOWM activists with extensive
localized political capital and a city with a tradition for activism was a fruitful recipe
for MOWM in St. Louis and, as evidenced by a November 1941 push for MOWM
members in Chicago, indicates that the Black Metropolis was a scene of MOWM
activity deserving of further research.51
Another example of solid scholarship that addresses MOWM’s local activity
within the context of a larger academic monograph is Cynthia Taylor’s A. Philip
Randolph: The Religious Journey of an African American Labor Leader. This book‐
length study on Randolph’s commitment to Christian humanism includes a
surprising chapter about MOWM activism coordinated under church auspices by
activists in Chicago. Even though this text does not attempt to contextualize
MOWM’s position within the spectrum of Black protest during the Second World
War or explore daily operations within Chicago MOWM, this valuable study outlines
religious networks that Randolph tapped when MOWM adopted non‐violent civil
disobedience as its raison d’être at the 1943 Chicago “We Are American, Too,”
conference. Taylor also gives voice to the cadre of African American women who
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volunteered their organizing prowess and made Chicago MOWM exist. Without
their contributions, Taylor demonstrates, Chicago’s MOWM branch would be
stagnant – leaving the city without grassroots supporters in a location that MOWM
selected to host some of its most important conferences.52
Chicago is a superb case study of collaboration between African American
religious leaders and MOWM but this example cannot be generalized to include St.
Louis, where comparatively few church leaders supported MOWM. Likewise, while
women in Chicago propelled the organization, a recently unemployed lawyer with a
NAACP life membership and an economically independent organizer for the BSCP
are who drove St. Louis MOWM. This is not to discount women’s participation in St.
Louis MOWM, for it was vital to the organization. While David Grant and T.D.
McNeal were running the office, for instance, women were making local headlines
with sit‐ins protesting segregated food service at department stores.
Another historical monograph about a broader topic that is useful for this
study of St. Louis MOWM is Andrew Edmund Kersten’s Race, Jobs, and the War: The
FEPC in the Midwest, 19411946. Kersten’s analysis of how social, economic, and
political conditions impacted FEPC’s overall effectiveness in Midwestern industrial
centers speaks directly to St. Louis MOWM’s successful campaign to establish a
stronger FEPC presence in their city. Even though small factual errors occasionally
occur, Race, Jobs, and War dedicates an entire chapter to studying the FEPC in St.
Louis. By doing so, Kersten pays more attention to MOWM demonstrations in that
city than any available study at the time of its publication. Since Kersten is
interested in studying wartime employment, however, his account understandably
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leaves out aspects of St. Louis MOWM’s activity that does not fit his narrative.
Therefore, while one finds no mention of the 1944 sit‐ins, cooperation between
MOWM and other protest organizations like NAACP and FOR, or the impact of
PMEW on protest rhetoric used by African American activists, this invaluable study
makes good use of FEPC archives to tell the story of how the agency struggled to do
its job and was assisted in its mission by volunteer activists.53
Missouri historiography usually mentions the presence of a vibrant MOWM
chapter, but there is little in‐depth investigation of this important protest
movement.54 Lorenzo J. Greene, Gary R. Kremer, and Antonio F. Holland’s Missouri’s
Black Heritage is a wonderful survey of Black History in Missouri, but the breadth of
this study from slavery through the 1980s necessitates brevity in order to maintain
its status as a single‐volume monograph. Consequentially, this team of scholars
does not even mention the St. Louis MOWM chapter or one of major contributors,
David Grant.55 The fifth volume of Richard Kirkendall’s History of Missouri is an
invaluable resource for contextualizing MOWM activity in that city. Replete with
statistics in defense production, employment percentages, and demographics,
Kirkendall also recognizes the contributions of St. Louis MOWM and he mentions
T.D. McNeal, George Vaughn, and Jordan Chambers several times. As demonstrated
by this dissertation, however, this moment in St. Louis’ history demands more
thorough coverage. Kirkendall is also not familiar with the history of African
American protest movements, and he argues that MOWM “excluded whites,” a
charge that is incorrect when looking at MOWM’s local machinations.56 In fact,
though African Americans were the most important force driving the 1944 sit‐ins
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occurring in that city, this dirt action campaign was inter‐racial. As seen in this
dissertation, racial alliances between MOWM, White elected officials, and religious
activists could sometimes be productive.
The number of historical studies that deal with MOWM in passing or as part
of a chapter within a broader study is augmented by the growing cottage industry of
biographies on A. Philip Randolph. All of these books describe Randolph’s vision for
MOWM and outline his contributions to this seminal vehicle for Black protest.
Together, the biographies on Randolph prove that in MOWM, as in the BSCP,
Randolph was an inspirational force drew people to him through peerless oratory
and personal charisma. This scheme of Randolph’s leadership places an emphasis
on intangibles, making it difficult to develop a nuanced understanding of leadership
that sufficiently explains how Randolph remained relevant throughout his long
career in civil rights activism. Critical readers are left wondering how Randolph’s
“situational charisma,” as one biographer put it, was enough to propel him to the
head of so many movements but somehow could never sustain the very
organizations that he envisioned.57
Andrew Kersten’s recent biography on Randolph, A. Philip Randolph: A Life in
the Vanguard is probably the best available overview of his life but Paula Pfeffer’s A.
Phillip Randolph: A Pioneer of the Civil Rights Movement features a useful chapter on
MOWM’s national office. By utilizing NAACP papers more extensively than
Garfinkle, Pfeffer explains the rift that developed between these two organizations.
Like Garfinkle, Pfeffer has a tendency to overemphasize Randolph’s personality in
her analysis. Still, Pfeffer’s work was the first biography on Randolph that
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incorporated details about how MOWM’s office functioned during Randolph’s
regular and prolonged absences, contextualize MOWM’s ideology within the
framework of Black nationalism, and situate the organization within the context of
the Civil Rights Movement.58 Though Kersten does not introduce new source
material to his discussion of MOWM, he provides a clear and insightful
interpretation of the national organization as part of a chapter on African American
experiences in the Second World War. A Life in the Vanguard depicts MOWM’s all‐
Black membership policy as a pragmatic blending of union experience and racial
activism. After all, Kersten argues, BSCP carved a place for itself because it was an
all‐Black union.59
There are many studies of the BSCP that inform this dissertation’s
interpretation of the union’s civil rights agenda, its importance to Black
communities, and Randolph’s tendencies as a leader. The best among these are
William H. Harris’s Keeping the Faith, Larry Tye’s Rising from the Rails, and Jack
Santino’s oral history, Miles of Smiles, Years of Struggle.60 Although these books do
not intend to discuss MOWM, they give scholars a useful background for
understanding the enthusiasm and ambivalence that members of this union had for
its support of MOWM.
A recent trend in Civil Rights historiography to reappraise the Movement’s
geographic location and challenge conceptions of its chronology has inspired a new
generation of historians to look at MOWM. Attempts to resituate the Civil Rights
Movement’s place on the twentieth century timeline are not, in fact, a recent
phenomenon. In 1968, Richard Dalfiume argued that a sharp increase in incidents
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of Black protest during the Second World War and the confrontational rhetoric used
to challenge racial inequality in this era demonstrated that “the ground was
prepared for the civil rights revolution.”61 Making connections between generations
of activists by their use of a common rhetoric is a difficult task, to be certain, and
caused one labor historian to point out, “rhetoric is not always an accurate gauge of
reality.”62 Dalfiume saw the protests, platforms, and programs of organizations like
MOWM as more than an antecedent to the Civil Rights Movement – instead, these
were the “seeds” that sprouted in the form of mass marches, sit‐ins, and bus
boycotts two decades later.63 Dalfiume’s metaphor was refined and extended in an
influential 1988 article by Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein that more
explicitly made a case for locating the civil rights era’s beginning in the 1940s. It
was during World War II, this team of scholars argues, that African American
activists tried to take advantage of “a time of opportunity, when a high‐wage, high‐
employment economy, rapid unionization, and a pervasive federal presence gave
the black working class remarkable self‐confidence” that it was, to borrow a phrase
from Merl Reed, “seedtime” for the Civil Rights Movement.64
The push to expand historical conceptions of the Civil Rights Movement
through edited volumes like Freedom North provided a forum for Beth Bates to
publish one of the best examinations of local MOWM operations. Bates’ essay,
“Double V Mobilizes Black Detroit,” reveals that the Motor City had much in common
with St. Louis: a tumultuous history of race relations, an increasing African
American population, thousands of jobs in the defense industry, and a MOWM
chapter that drew from long‐established networks of African American institutions
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created as a response to the de jure segregation of twentieth century urban life.
Unique to Detroit, however, was Ford’s paternalism towards Black workers, a major
race riot, and a radical religious tradition of Afro‐Christianity.65 Bates’ essay, which
outlines industrial relations in Detroit and maps the complex terrain of African
American organizations, points towards the need for more detailed studies of local
MOWM chapters – a historiographical gap that this dissertation seeks to fill. It is not
over‐enthusiastic to say that when the project of documenting the personnel and
operations of MOWM’s local branches is complete, competent but inadequately
informed historians will no longer incorrectly refer to MOWM’s staff after the July 1
demonstration was cancelled as “skeletal” or portray the organization’s activities as
declining as the war progressed.66
The most recognizable recent examples of Long Movement scholarship are
Jeanne Theoharis and Komozi Woodard’s pair of edited volumes studying local
manifestations of civil rights campaigns.67 The first of these, Freedom North: Black
Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 19401980 uses local history to challenge what
the editors see as an artificial dichotomy in Civil Rights Movement interpretation
that incorrectly bifurcates the struggle into binaries such as north‐south, violence‐
civil disobedience, and national‐local. Theoharis and Woodard’s repositioning of the
Civil Rights Movement is a clarion call to re‐interpret the geographical scope,
ideological tensions, and chronological bookends of the Civil Rights Movement. It is
the last of these re‐interpretations, the chronological extension of the Civil Rights
Movement into the 1940s, which this dissertation attempts to check. Commentators
during the early 1940s and some of MOWM’s participants interpreted E.O. 8802 as a
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capstone to the New Deal that shattered racial discrimination in employment
practices – not the start of a new phase in the struggle for Black liberation in the
United States. MOWM’s activity was part of a piecemeal struggle to win greater
access to jobs, consumer markets, and public spaces. Arguing that there is no
linkage between racially progressive activism in the Roosevelt era and the 1960s is
obviously unreasonable, and I recognize that numerous activists and political
strategies represent direct bridges between these two phases of the struggle. The
reason that I interpret MOWM as the fulfillment of New Deal policy is simple: that’s
what members of this organization understood themselves as.
The trend in current historiography to recognize the Civil Rights Movement’s
“roots and branches” in popular struggles of the 1930s and 1940s as “not merely a
dress rehearsal but a crucial birthplace and battleground for the mass movement
that flowered in the 1960s,” has, in the appraisal of one team of scholars, “become
hegemonic” throughout the field.68 Even scholars who hold scruples with this
“fourth wave” of Civil Rights Movement historiography should recognize it as, at
best, an unconvincing blessing that enriches and complicates our understanding of
local activism by African Americans in the twentieth century. These studies
reinvigorated historical scholarship about African‐American activism in the
generation before the Civil Rights Movement and shed light on the complex
interplay between grassroots activists and national protest organizations. The
result is a more nuanced mosaic that challenges the image of African‐Americans
marching in lock step around a singular ideology and program for struggle that the
Black press sometimes presented.
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To its credit, the “fourth wave” created a framework for excellent studies like
Martha Biondi’s To Stand and Fight. Biondi demonstrates that in the war’s
aftermath, local people staged sit‐ins to desegregate municipal spaces and public
interstate transportation, organized boycotts to advance consumer’s rights, aligned
with the radical left to secure employment in industries previously closed to Black
workers, waged a publicity campaign through the media to expose police brutality,
and organized voter registration drives.69 The historical experience in post‐war
New York is instructive for this study of wartime St. Louis because it outlines multi‐
faceted campaigns against urban institutional racism that were very similar to those
in the Gateway City. Likewise, in New York and St. Louis, African Americans had a
variety of complimentary and sometimes competing organizational outlets for their
activism.
The worst‐case scenario of taking the line of thought advanced by
proponents of the “Long Civil Rights Movement” school is that otherwise fine
studies of African American history are tarnished by an over‐enthusiasm to make
every aspect of Black protest in the twentieth century part of the Civil Rights
Movement. A case of this “excessive elasticity” that creates a false continuity of
social movements is March Schneider’s We Return Fighting.70 This study of race
relations in the interwar years and struggles for civil rights during the same period
has an interpretive flaw that confuses the “New Negro” with a counter‐factual
consciousness that he or she was part of a wide stream of Black protest that
eventually included the likes of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. Schneider
disregards the usefulness chronological concepts when he argues, “the civil rights
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movement is as old as the first slave’s resistance to an overseer.”71 As Sundiata Cha‐
Jua and Clarence Lang remarked in a particularly incisive diatribe, this “ahistorical
totalizing perspective” serves to “flatten chronological, conceptual, and geographic
differences” in African American history.72 There is increased danger for
interpretive flaws because, as noted by Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, there was “no
singular strategy” to the Civil Rights Movement.73 It seems quite possible, then, for
early manifestations of ideological persuasion and protest tactics popularized in the
Civil Rights Movement to be incorrectly interpreted as early manifestations of the
Movement when, in fact, it was only an antecedent. It is imperative to not allow
similarities in aims, tactics, and rhetoric to obscure the fact that an entire generation
separated the Civil Rights Movement’s vanguard from members of MOWM and other
Black protest groups in the Roosevelt years.74
This dissertation does not attack the traditional bookending of the Civil
Rights Movement but it recognizes the importance of critical appraisal and
investigation to discover the parameters of how social movements begin and
ultimately dissolve.75 It is undeniable that there was a bona fide Civil Rights
Movement in some locales prior to 1954, but MOWM activism in the 1940s was not
one of them.76 MOWM was a prelude to struggles in the ensuing decades – an
interpretation that I hope reminds us of the distinction between struggles for civil
rights and the Civil Rights Movement. It must be remembered that even though the
Roosevelt years were a catalyst for Black protest; they were not the beginning of a
widespread nationally recognizable social movement.77 This dissertation locates
MOWM outside the realm of the Civil Rights Movement and, in the process, re‐
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affirms the importance of African American protest in periods other than the Civil
Rights Movement.
“Fourth wave” scholars might suggest that MOWM was at the Civil Rights
Movement’s foundation, but the people who made history were not conscious of
their role as forbearers to an epoch in the Black Liberation struggle that was two
decades away. Members of St. Louis MOWM saw themselves as placing a capstone
on the New Deal. For example, an editorial in MOWM‐member Henry Wheeler’s St.
Louis American proclaimed, “Everyone knows that the committee on Fair
Employment Practice is a creature of the New Deal.”78 Informed commentators like
Robert C. Weaver and Horace Cayton shared a similar perspective. Weaver and
Cayton both believed that the New Deal demonstrated the federal government’s
enormous capacity to create racial equality through top‐down federal policy.79
In 1974, Baltimore MOWM member John M. Thornton, a self‐proclaimed “life‐long
friend” to Randolph, repudiated the idea that MOWM was part of the modern Civil
Rights Movement. Thornton’s opinion, though not bolstered by academic
credentials, was based on a lifetime of volunteer work as a foot soldier in
progressive groups including MOWM and the CIO union that represented him for
twenty years as a steelworker. Thornton strongly believed that the “history of the
Black struggle cannot be permitted to reflect a continuity of movement…[of] 1941
through the 1963 March‐on‐Washington.”80 Likewise, Phylon identified FEPC and
the federal government’s effort to incorporate more African Americans into defense
works as “part of the administration to apply the New Deal to Negroes.”81 Over a
decade later, Anna Arnold Hedgeman described MOWM in exactly the same terms,
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defining the organization as a response to “discrimination in job opportunities”
dating back to the Depression.82 Andrew Kersten, a historian of the FEPC, defines it
as “a quintessential New Deal agency,” thus implicitly connecting the outcome of
MOWM’s protest with New Deal policy.83 Historian A. Russell Buchanan concluded
that African Americans learned from the Second World War “that they could expect
more from the federal government than local governments.”84 If these analysts are
correct, than it stands to reason that MOWM’s ability to get Roosevelt to
acknowledge the power of Black protest through E.O. 8802 was indeed the capstone
in the long drive to getting the Executive Branch to acknowledge the cost of racial
discrimination.
This dissertation intended to tell the entire organizational history of
MOWM’s national office and most, if not all, of its local chapters. A combination of
naivety and unexpectedly rich sources from one locale, St. Louis, drastically
curtailed this project’s scope. Instead, what follows is a study of MOWM’s national
office and one particularly active and successful chapter that was richly
documented. Chapters two and three focus on MOWM’s national office, telling the
well‐known story of a protest that never took place in greater detail than any other
existing account. By incorporating documentary sources from the Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library, this chapter also provides an insider’s view of how the White
House and associated New Dealers responded to Randolph’s audacious threat. Also
included in the second chapter is a limited sampling of commentary from members
of the African American radical Left that were publicly critical of Randolph’s
decision to cancel the march for what they saw as limited concessions from an
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inherently antagonistic federal government. Chapter three traces the contours of
inter‐organizational cooperation between MOWM and other protest organizations
that were involved in struggles for civil rights and racial equality. Public
demonstrations galvanizing around the slogan “We Are Americans, Too,” MOWM’s
rallying cry shortly after it institutionalized as what it hoped to be a permanent
organization, are investigated because they indicate that numerous grassroots
activists and indigenous institutions like churches and labor unions were involved
in making this organization matter locally. This chapter discusses the rationale of
MOWM’s organizational identity as an all‐Black vehicle for protest that was
dedicated to non‐violent goodwill direct action. It also demonstrates that critical
local chapters like the one in Washington, D.C., were sometimes wracked with
disorganization, rendering them functionally useless. MOWM’s failure to develop
logistically key local chapters was undoubtedly one of the reasons why this
organization ultimately disintegrated.
Chapters four, five, six, and seven recount the activities of St. Louis MOWM.
This particular branch is discussed in such rich detail because its members,
particularly T.D. McNeal and David Grant, maintained and preserved comprehensive
records of the organization and their contributions to it. Chapter four offers a
demographic and historical context for understanding the phenomena of African
American protest in wartime St. Louis. More importantly, it introduces previously
unheralded figures in the history of MOWM’s operations in the Gateway City.
Specifically, T.D. McNeal, David Grant, Sallie Parham, Nita Blackwell, and Jordan
Chambers are established as pioneers of protest in this upstart organization.
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Finally, this chapter discusses the ways that St. Louis MOWM financially eked by on
private donations and support from African American railroad workers. Chapter
five shows how St. Louis MOWM used a major rally to launch a sustained campaign
for the integration of African American workers into St. Louis’ booming wartime
economy. A public prayer demonstration, pickets, and marches were used to
advance the position of Black workers in a number of defense contractors including
U.S. Cartridge, the world’s largest bullet manufacturer. By necessity, St. Louis
MOWM stepped in as an arbiter of workplace dissention at job sites when greater
inclusion of African American workers brought increased racial animosity. In doing
so, this protest organization affirmed its commitment to Black workers and to
maintaining productive order in the arsenal of democracy. Chapter six recounts a
1944 series of sit‐ins waged by a predominantly Black group of women in large
department store lunch counters and a push by this organization to integrate
publicly funded workplaces that were likely to remain productive long after the war.
Integrating the switchboards and local administration of Southwestern Bell
Telephone was a critical step towards securing sustainable employment for a
largely female contingent of working class African Americans desirous of long‐term
white‐collar employment. Integrating, or at least improving, access to food service
at major downtown retailers was an important step in the process of breaking down
elements of Jim Crow segregation in arguably the most significant city in a border
state like Missouri. Finally, chapter seven outlines the ultimate decline of St. Louis
MOWM and the transition of its leadership into the local NAACP in the midst of a
campaign for a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee. Prior to its
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dissolution, St. Louis MOWM played a pivotal role in forcing FEPC to open a branch
in the city. St. Louis’ FEPC office received a record number of employment
discrimination complaints. This is attributable to the presence of widespread racial
exclusion from large defense industries and to St. Louis MOWM’s advocacy of city
residents to complete the necessary paperwork seeking investigation and redress.
The last chapter of this dissertation is an epilogue summarizing MOWM’s
meteoric rise and rapid disintegration. This section includes an appraisal of
MOWM’s local and national activities, as well as an analysis of this organization’s
accomplishments in light of the fact that segregation and racial inequality remained
long after MOWM ceased to exist. This chapter demonstrates that local leadership
in this organization remained active in campaigns for civil rights after their
organizational base of support collapsed. Without MOWM as a source of power for
successful pressure politics, individuals like T.D. McNeal and David Grant simply
lent their leadership skills to the NAACP. This elder organization was
unquestionably a more stable base for organizing and it was receptive to absorbing
activists who honed their skills through campaigns launched with MOWM.

27

CHAPTER 2
MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT 
NATIONAL OFFICE AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

“The thing that did it was the March on Washington. That scared these people like
no other thing. Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, H. Rap Brown, all wrapped together,
never had the power, the real power, and threat that that first March had.”
– Richard Parrish1
A. Philip Randolph claims that he got the idea for MOWM in the Deep South
while on an organizing and speaking trip for the BSCP.2 Less well known is that the
ideal caught on so quickly, in part, because longtime BSCP organizer and soon‐to‐be
St. Louis MOWM chairman T.D. McNeal stayed in each city after Randolph and
McLaurin moved on in order to “work up negroes to come to Washington for this
demonstration.3 Even though MOWM’s most active chapters were in northern and
midwestern urban centers that had expanding populations fueled by African
American migrants from the countryside, consciousness of the upstart protest
organization was nationwide.4 There number of small branches throughout the
country demonstrates MOWM’s national appeal, but the most active chapters were
in major urban areas with sizeable African American populations like Harlem,
Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis.5
MOWM caught on quickly in Harlem, where Milton Webster said that African
Americans with MOWM badges were proudly “wearing them up and down the
streets.” These buttons were widely distributed through a network of pre‐existing
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African‐American social and political institutions and by the initiative of MOWM
supporters. In Harlem, for example, “young ladies on street corners and public
spots” distributed 15,000 buttons throughout the New York metro area.6 New York
MOWM member T.T. Patterson reported that his organization “is making steady
progress [and] is spreading quite definitely.” Patterson was one of the more
enthusiastic MOWM members. This, coupled with a penchant for rhetorical flourish,
influenced him to say, “this is the Movement that will mean more to the Negro of
this country, and, for that matter, of any other country, than any movement of this
century.”7
The enthusiasm of MOWM members in other cities was notable but a bit
more tempered. With a few exceptions, MOWM was not particularly strong in the
South. Senora Lawson ran a very active branch Norfolk, Virginia, that was at the
forefront of planning MOWM’s Non‐Violent Goodwill Direct Action campaign. There
was, of course, a branch in the BSCP hotbed of Jacksonville, and one in Montgomery
spearheaded by a young but no less indefatigable E.D. Nixon.8 Still, this does not
belie that fact that the even though the South was the location of Randolph’s
inspiration for MOWM and that BSCP members supported the idea of marching,
MOWM’s most active branches were concentrated in the industrial midwest.
The most obvious explanation for MOWM’s uneven geographic dispersion is
the well‐known prevalence of racial violence that seemed to be synonymous with
the Deep South. Margaret McLaurin, wife of Benjamin, privately and confidentially
wrote Randolph asking him to keep her husband out of the region. “Please do not
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send Mac into any part of Alabama now,” she wrote, “the tension is just too great
and his life is not worth a nickel.”9
The South was an unlikely place for the birth of an organization relying on
militant rhetoric, dramatic protest, and temporarily seizing control of public space.
Randolph generated interest because of his stature as a leader of the BSCP, a union
that had locals in railroad towns throughout Dixie.10 Randolph’s idea to march on
Washington was well received in Atlanta, Savannah, Jacksonville, Tampa, and
Richmond. His speeches struck a familiar chord because they emphasized
cooperative self‐reliance and racial solidarity. Randolph was certainly not the first
to espouse the message, but his conclusion that “The future of the Negro depends
entirely upon his own action, and the individual cannot act alone” resonated with
audiences who believed that this was a “clarion call” for mass protest politics to
address issues of racial inequality.11 MOWM was certainly Randolph’s “brainchild,”
but it was grassroots activists who energized the organization by using it to tackle
issues in their own communities.12
Benjamin McLauren shared the podium with Randolph on this trip and was
present when the idea to march was first made public in Savannah. While spirits
were high at the event, McLaurin reminisced that Randolph’s proposal “scared some
of them to death…including myself.”13 Still, the moment was ripe for change and
“the plan caught on like fire” among a people who were certain that the war
presented a crisis for a system of segregation and inequality that they bitterly called
Jim Crow.14 The impact of de‐colonization and a shifting global order was not lost
on St. Louis MOWM activist and social worker Elizabeth Grant or national NAACP
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head Walter White. Like many of her generation, Grant thought that “older forms of
social control have lost been almost entirely…and society is in a state of flux, if not
revolution. The common man and the underprivileged are struggling for economic,
political, and social emancipation.” Global instability, according to Grant, drove an
upsurge in “class conflict, minority problems, nationalistic movements…and other
expressions of social unrest.”15 Walter White shared Grant’s perspective. In A
Rising Wind, White reported, “White nations and peoples had vigorously proclaimed
to the world that this war is being fought for freedom, and colored people were
taking them at face value.”16 Throughout the United States, African Americans
interpreted the rhetoric of freedom and equality as signposts directing them
towards achieving racial equality while the nation was at war and politics were in
flux.
Randolph encapsulated the temper of the times when he reflected, “The
Negro masses awakened in 1941.”17 This opinion is verified by historian Robert A.
Hill, who wrote, “African Americans made two important discoveries in World War
II, namely, that the system of white supremacy was not impregnable and that mass
militancy, such as the March on Washington Movement…could effectively challenge
the system and produce results.”18 Hill is backed up by another historian, Robin D.G.
Kelley, who characterizes the general mood of Black America during MOWM’s zenith
as holding a “sense of hope and pessimism, support and detachment, that dominated
a good deal of daily conversation.”19 According to an issue of The Black Worker,
1941 was when African Americans were “seething with interest and activity”
because of the hoopla that MOWM generated.20 This periodical credited MOWM
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with successfully channeling “a wave of bitter resentment, disillusionment and
desperation” caused by “lack of jobs and purchasing power” that created “dead
economic areas” and directing it towards constructive protest politics.21
Bayard Rustin offered a slightly different opinion. In reflections thirty years
after MOWM’s heyday, Rustin remarked that the apex of support for MOWM came
after the march was cancelled. “Once the FEPC order was issued,” Rustin said, “the
real activity began.”22 The purpose of all this protest was unchanged from
Randolph’s original threat to “stun the government, shock business and astonish
organized labor.”23 This was true in St. Louis, where members of local civic and
labor organizations including the NAACP and BSCP answered Randolph’s call to
“stage marches on their city.” African Americans coalesced under the banner of the
March on Washington Movement at a moment of uncertainty when, according to
T.D. McNeal, “the totalitarianism of Hitler and Mussolini and the imperialism of
Japan has brought about a world crisis utterly without precedent.”24
On the domestic front, Robert C. Weaver, a scholar and federal official in the
Office of Production Management, detected a crisis in race relations owing to
“disillusionment of Negroes in New York and elsewhere” that spawned because “the
Negro was only on the sidelines of American industrial life. He seemed to be losing
ground daily.”25 Weaver’s study the African American workforce revealed that in
April 1940 White unemployment was at 17.7 percent, while 22 percent of African
Americans were in the same predicament. Six months later, a busy defense industry
caused White unemployment to drop to 13 percent but the percentage of
unemployed African Americans only changed by a fraction of a percent.26
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It was obvious that African Americans were going to be among the last hired,
if they were integrated into the defense workforce at all. In an essay several years
later, James Baldwin described the emotional response to the frustrating racial
economy that Weaver’s statistics detailed. A young man in Harlem at the time,
Baldwin reflected on the war years with little nostalgia. “The treatment accorded
the Negro during the Second World War,” Baldwin wrote, “marks for me, a turning
point in the Negro’s relation to America. To put it briefly, and somewhat too simply,
a certain hope died, a certain respect for white Americans faded.”27
MOWM’s Executive Secretary E. Pauline Myers framed the organization’s
foray into non‐violent civil disobedience as one of these turning points. Like
Baldwin, Myers saw the war years as a time of widespread change in the
consciousness of African Americans. In her advocacy for a direct action campaign,
Myers argued, “The old method of conferences, round table discussions, pink tea
parties, luncheons and Black Cabinets has been exploded. The patience of Negro
America is sorely tired.” Myers continued, “The Negro has experimented for
seventy‐eight years with the education formula showing the white man why he
should be free. He is not asking for a hand out. The Negro American has come to
maturity and he wants to be free to walk as a man…He is tired of being the white
man’s burden.”28
The Pittsburgh Courier’s wildly popular Double V campaign evidenced the
fact that during the war, “racial solidarity among the American Negroes became
heightened.”29 “The need to confront fascism abroad,” writes Philip A. Klinker and
Rogers M. Smith, “meant needing to face up to Jim Crow at Home.”30 The Second
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World War presented a moment when international affairs combined with the tone
of home front rhetoric to make fertile ground for the NAACP to argue that racial
inequality and segregation was “the acid test of democracy” and Caroline Singer of
the Harlem NACW to conclude that “anti‐Negroism is based upon the concept of a
master race…that is irreconcilable with democracy.”31 On a more militant note, the
Black Worker characterized Double V’s thrust as a movement to “Let us tear the
mask of hypocrisy from America’s Democracy!”32 Randolph characterized the
moment as a time when “Negroes are fighting on two fronts. This is as it should be.
They are fighting for democracy in Europe. They are fighting for democracy in
America. They are trying to stop Hitler over there, and they are determined to stop
Hitlerism over here.”33 This zeitgeist of change inspired African Americans to form
their own unites of MOWM that fought localized battles but envisioned their impact
within the context of a broader national struggle. The fervor and ferment of Black
protest during the war caused the Chicago Defender to proclaim, “These are
Marching days, America.”34

Planning to March on Washington
Even though the spotlight fell on Randolph, Frank Crosswaith, Lester
Granger, Roy Wilkins, and Walter White collaborated extensively with him in
planning the demonstration.35 Randolph was also far removed from coordinating
logistics and rallying support for the protest in Washington, DC. The onus of
organizing in the city of the march fell on Thurman Dodson, a MOWM member
affiliated with the organization for its entire lifespan. Dodson drafted a block plan
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that harnessed local social and political capitol to generate supporters for the highly
anticipated event. In his mind, each block captain would recruit ten or more friends
and acquaintances, swelling numbers to over 5,000 indigenous supporters of the
demonstration.
Even though Randolph had little to do with planning the event, he insisted
that “no disorder will be tolerated” because it would reflect poorly on the image of
Black people and, more presciently, could lead to a racial conflagration.36 Randolph,
with support from members of the original March on Washington committee, also
reserved the right to appoint inspectors, or “march deputies,” to approve of all signs
and banners as well as ensure that nobody had “liquor on their breath.”37 The need
to control a mass demonstration was perceived by others in addition to Randolph.
The original MOW committee, in fact, recommended that the organization devise a
method to control “all slogans, banners, statement of purpose, selection of battalion
chiefs, deputy inspectors at the point of assembly.”38 The committee perceived a
need to manage the demonstration’s public face so that the group would appear
orderly, unified, and within the boundaries of respectability for a public political
protest.39
Eardlie John, a MOWM New York member, had faith that his organization
would eventually follow through with its threat to march on the Capitol. In 1942,
John wrote Randolph raising hypothetical questions and offering solutions to
potential logistical issues ‐ most of which were associated with widespread
segregation in the Capitol. John pointed out that unequal access to resources meant
that problems could be expected in transportation, lodging, food services, and basic
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sanitation. He raised bona fide issues that inhibited a massive demonstration by a
minority group under apartheid during a period of national crisis that restricted
opportunities for travel. Could African Americans expect white proprietors to allow
them use of sanitary facilities? Should African American residents be expected to
open their homes to strangers who could not find their own lodging in the limited
and already overbooked hotels that accepted Black patronage? John went so far as
to calculate that the already crowded rails could only handle 20,000 additional
passengers over a three day period – a number far too small for MOWM to save face
when it called for 100,000 demonstrators. These problems aside, Eardlie John’s
“absolute faith in the rank and file” and vehement disdain for racial inequality led
him to all but demand that an actual march be staged. In John’s words, failure to
sponsor the event that MOWM named itself for would cause the organization to be
seen as another group of “docile, begging, cringing, handkerchief‐head uncle Toms
of yesterday” unworthy of emotional or financial commitment from African
Americans.40

Crisis Control: Roosevelt Administration Responds to the March
The Roosevelt Administration was aware of MOWM’s threatened protest
from the beginning of 1941 but waited until June of that year to address the
organization’s demands. Time in the interim was spent monitoring MOWM’s
activity and gauging the general morale of African Americans throughout the
country. From the beginning, White House officials hoped that establishing an
investigative body would accomplish the complimentary goals of boosting defense
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production, placating Black protest organizations, and keeping African Americans
enthusiastic for the impending war.41 The Roosevelt Administration tried to stay
“just a step ahead of radical organizations” like MOWM by bringing them in
“cooperative coordination with the Government’s defense program.”42 In the words
of historian John Egerton, “Racial segregation hindered the American effort to
mobilize for war,” to such an extent that federal officials could not be unaware of
it.43
The threatened march seized a moment when the combination of an artificial
scarcity of laborers, changing intellectual currents, and important foreign policy
implications joined the ever‐present struggle for Black liberation. This confluence
of events forced Roosevelt to align the White House, at least partially, on the side of
African Americans. Some argued that Roosevelt’s support was an empty check that
had little “teeth” for enforcement, but many commentators saw reason to cheer
Roosevelt’s “almost Lincolnian” order as equivalent to “a Bill of Economic Rights for
Negroes.”44 MOWM’s challenge to Roosevelt, described one team of historians as an
“aggressive use of executive power,” was particularly gutsy, especially considering
the equation of a grassroots protest organization challenging a popular president
while the nation was on the brink or war.45
However one appraises the effectiveness of E.O. 8802, New Dealer Joseph
Rauh’s opinion on Roosevelt’s motivations is incisive. Rauh, and lawyer and author
of E.O. 8802, believed that Roosevelt issued the order out of “pragmatic
concerns…for social stability, rather than concern for black workers.”46 In June
1941, Rauh was working for Wayne Coy in the Lend‐Lease program. Rauh
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remembered that Coy frantically called, ordering him to “Get your ass over here, we
got a problem…Some guy named Randolph is going to march on Washington unless
we put out a fair employment practices order.” Over the next eighteen hours, Rauh
tirelessly composed draft after draft of the law that stopped the march. Even though
Rauh did not know much about Randolph prior to this assignment, he understood
that the threat of a march “had scared the government half to death.”47
Randolph had to consider numerous variables should he proceed to stage the
demonstration, the least of which was unpredictable White reaction to a throng of
African Americans exercising First Amendment rights. There was uncertainty about
whether or not a sufficient amount of attendees would bother to coalesce on the
appointed day, and if they did arrive, there was no guarantee that their presence
could actually reap concessions. There were also questions about precisely when
demands would be fulfilled and the extent of redress that protest of this nature
could secure. With questions such as these in mind, the St. Louis Argus zealously
supported the call to march, but the newspaper cheered E.O. 8802 as a “logical and
sensible…armistice.”48
Randolph knew that the task of assembling such a gaudy number of
protestors in the Capitol for a single day of protest was far‐fetched, or, in his words,
“Herculean.” Writing in the Trotskyist Fourth International just before the march
was cancelled, Albert Parker alleged, “there is no evidence that the masses, even on
the eastern seaboard, have yet been reached and aroused by the organizers of the
march. Most workers haven’t even heard about it.”49 Although some on the Left
downplayed MOWM’s significance to America’s Black proletariat, the federal
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government treated the organization as a legitimate threat. According to Walter
White, “at least three sources in Washington” indicated “that this proposed march is
disturbing the administration more than anything that has happened among Negros
in recent months.” The pressure brought on by the upstart March on Washington
Committee was such that White reported, “We suspect that an effort will be made
shortly to persuade the leaders of this movement to call it off.”50
The sheer difficulty of making the protest happen and the possibility that the
event might not lead to greater rewards strongly influenced Randolph’s choice to
cancel the march even though many of MOWM’s demands were unaddressed by the
executive order. E.O. 8802 only placated the first of six demands presented to
Roosevelt. Randolph saw the prohibition as cash in hand, but he left important
facets of MOWM’s program on the table when cancelling the march. Among these
was the prohibition of discrimination in industrial training courses, the tearing
down of segregation in all aspects of the civilian federal government and armed
forces, and modifying the National Labor Relations Act so that unions could not
exclude African Americans by practice or by constitution. There was also discussion
of a prototype of selective service requiring employers to hire workers in order of
their draft registration number. If passed, this would have challenged the ability of
individual employers to practice discrimination in hiring.51 By calling off the march
with only one major issue addressed, MOWM branches like that of St. Louis had a lot
left to keep fighting for.
Randolph probably inflated the numbers of demonstrators that he expected,
and this certainly contributed to his decision to call off the march in exchange for a
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law that was limited in scope and power.52 It is possible that Roosevelt, like the
Chicago Defender, believed that “It would not be necessary to mobilize 10,000”
because a fifth of that number would get the point across. Randolph’s projection of
somewhere between 10,000 and 100,000 marchers is even more audacious
considering that other Roosevelt‐era protests against Scottsboro, lynching, and the
poll tax never achieved five‐figure numbers.53 The Defender hedged bets as the date
for the protest drew near. Even with smaller than projected attendance, the
Defender argued, “If the March on Washington does nothing else, it will convince
white America that the American black man has decided henceforth and forever to
abandon the timid role of Uncle‐Tomism in his struggle for social justice.”54
The Depression‐Era Bonus Marches created a precedent for assembling in
the Capitol to pressure the government into action, but Randolph was the first to
wrap the demonstration into a single day. He tapped a wellspring of protest
schooled in Depression‐era activism that saw “more blacks than ever,” engaging in
mass action that seized public space in order to demand racial equality.55 Unlike
today when assembling in the Capitol is a political cliché, or as Bayard Rustin’s
biographer put it, a “public spectacle, weekend entertainment posing as politics,” the
idea of marching on the Capitol in the 1940s was still fresh, novel, and with little
precedent.56 According to Benjamin Quarles, Randolph was “a pioneer in the use of
mass‐protest,” even though the march that solidified his place in the pantheon of
African American leaders never took place.57 This pioneer of protest, Beth Bates
points out, found “a new method for lobbying the federal government” through
mass‐based demonstrations.58 This fact was not lost on Randolph when he called off
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the march as a concession to Roosevelt for the President’s support of E.O. 8802.59 It
was widely recognized that “the success of such a parade will be judged by the
numbers,” and that failure to generate sufficient attendance would be a crushing
blow for racial activism.60
In calling off the march, Randolph expressed “appreciation and gratitude” to
Roosevelt for his “statesmanlike” handling of the issue even though all were aware
that MOWM’s demands were only partially met. African American media outlets like
the St. Louis Argus recognized that “this act of the President does not meet the vital
and serious issue of discrimination…in various departments of the federal
government.” Though incomplete, Randolph interpreted E.O. 8802 as a step
towards the larger mission of eradicating racism in federal hiring practices.
Randolph hoped that a second edict would buttress E.O. 8802, fully prohibiting all
racial qualifiers through every level of federal employment including the armed
forces. Randolph closed his explanation for canceling the march with a call that was
well received in St. Louis when he asked the organization’s local branches to
“remain in tact in order to watch and check how industries are observing the
executive order.”61 Indeed, as written by observers of the era, “even with the
executive order, actual changes were slow, and the level of jobs offered to African
Americans varied greatly.”62
Reactions from federal officials ranged from wholesale opposition to
MOWM’s program to sympathy from critics who supported the organization’s goals
but were wary of protest politics. Somewhat simplistically, but certainly accurately,
a 1970s retrospective on Randolph’s life remarked that “Influential people” tried to
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dissuade him from following through with the protest but “he remained strong and
steadfast.”63 Eleanor Roosevelt was the most prominent of these “influential
people.” The First Lady’s progressive credentials were unquestionable, but she was
ultimately a figure who represented the political establishment’s interest.64 Eleanor
Roosevelt warned Randolph that following through with the demonstration could
precipitate a reactionary rollback of unspecified civil rights gains that she attributed
to her husband’s administration.65 In this instance, the President’s “ambassador to
black America,” clearly mirrored her husband’s.66 For his part, Franklin Roosevelt
was strongly opposed to the march, mostly on grounds that it threatened national
security and the stability of his political party. In other words, Roosevelt was
committed to doing as little as possible to have the event canceled because the
threatened protest had the potential to incite a race riot in segregated Washington,
D.C., provoke Dixiecrat outrage upsetting his party’s delicate balance, and be used as
Axis propaganda. Another way of understanding Eleanor Roosevelt’s position on
MOWM can be seen through the opinions of Fiorello LaGuardia. Like the First Lady,
New York’s mayor stood “in opposition to the movement,” and he agreed with
Eleanor Roosevelt “that the President should take some executive action.”67
Walter White ensured that the Roosevelt Administration was in tune with
“the seriousness of the situation…particularly in the industrial phases of the defense
program” through private correspondence and public awareness campaigns.68
White was no stranger to the Roosevelt administration, and he used his familiarity
to urge the President to support legislation in January 1941 that anticipated the
FEPC.69 Though a Southern‐dominated Senate was unlikely to approve of anything
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that checked racial discrimination, Senate Resolution 75 proposed assigning eight
senators to investigate “the participation of Negro citizens in all industrial and other
phases of the national‐defense program.”70 Other than using senators instead of
civilians, Senate Resolution 75 established a precedent for number of investigators
in FEPC (8) and anticipated the agency’s scope as primarily an investigative body
that relied on moral suasion.71
It is debatable whether White led a campaign priming the Roosevelt
Administration to act on racial discrimination or the President manipulated White
and Randolph, and by extension African Americans, into thinking that they actually
shaped public policy. The terse tone of a one‐sentence memo from Aubrey Williams
to Eleanor Roosevelt at the President’s retreat in Campobello, Maine, places the
locus of energy driving E.O. 8802 on MOWM. The entire text of Williams’ telegram is
“executive order concerning the Randolph situation was signed today,” which
indicates that the White House saw the threatened protest as the reason for
presidential intervention in anti‐discrimination employment law.72 Still, it is
unlikely but plausible that Randolph pressured the Oval Office so much that it had to
respond affirmatively, and that it did so through consulting with White instead of
Randolph.
Locating primary agency for the creation of E.O. 8802 is further complicated
when considering that MOWM’s threat to protest corresponded with NAACP’s
wartime campaign to educate the public and the President about the impact of racial
discrimination on African American morale.73 The combination of pressure from
Randolph and White, two of the nation’s two most recognizable African American
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leaders, caused Aubrey Williams and Wayne Coy to invite “a group of us” to confer
in the Capitol to discuss “the very serious situation with respect to employment of
Negroes…for the national defense program.”74 Documents do not indicate if
Randolph was aware that federal officials were already crafting Executive Order
8802, but it is certain that Randolph knew “it [E.O. 8802] never happened until the
March on Washington movement was launched.” As the end product of a threat to
march on Washington, Randolph saw the “FEPC [as] the creature of the struggle of
the Negro masses.”75 Regardless of what he thought could be accomplished by
staging a demonstration, Randolph prepared to go into any meeting with Roosevelt
demanding “an Executive Order at the time of the Conference.” This was imperative
because, in his opinion, “the Solid South” could be counted upon to block similar
legislation even if the President proposed it.76
Delineating singular spheres of power that African American leaders had
within the Roosevelt administration is difficult, if not impossible, because their
programs and personalities complimented each other so well. Randolph’s mass
pressure forced public discourse about racial inequality during the fight against
Fascism while Walter White’s long association with the Roosevelts made him an
obvious bargaining partner with the President. Missing from most discussions of
E.O. 8802’s passage is Mary McLeod Bethune, who was publicly absent during the
negotiations. Still, as evidenced by her appearance at the podium of a MOWM rally
in New York, Bethune at least mildly supported Randolph’s agenda.77 Bethune’s
leadership style was that of an organization builder and institution maintainer who,
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as put Bethune scholars Audrey Thomas McCluskey and Elaine M. Smith, had a
penchant for “fierce and opportunistic patristic partisanship.”78
Mary McLeod Bethune was a notable exception in the Roosevelt
Administration because she publicly supported MOWM since its early days,
speaking at its rallies and lending her powerful image to the organization’s
reputation. Bethune did not indiscriminately seek publicity with every fly‐by‐night
African American protest organization, and her presence at MOWM’s biggest events
gave the organization immediate credibility. Mindful of her insider status with the
Roosevelt administration as head of the NYA and her close friendship with the First
Lady, Bethune functioned as an unaffiliated mediator between MOWM and the
federal government when she wrote Roosevelt praising E.O. 8802 as “a refreshing
shower in a thirsty land.”79 Randolph recognized Bethune’s power and made sure to
stay in her good graces. In one instance, he wrote Bethune thanking her for her
support and to assure that “the meetings which we are holding are not in any way
intended to hinder the war.”80
It seems reasonable that as the highest paid African American in federal
government during the Roosevelt years, Bethune believed in top‐down social
change facilitated through the political system’s established channels.81
Bethune was not present at the meeting where male leadership got together and
discussed ways to prevent the march, but Roosevelt clearly respected her opinion.
In fact, Bethune’s recommendation for the first FEPC appointees strongly influenced
the agency. Despite Randolph’s wishes, it was unlikely that more than one African
American would be appointed to this new federal agency. Randolph also could not
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convince Roosevelt to nominate his first choice for this symbolically important
position, Milton P. Webster.82 For all of the publicity Randolph commanded, the
Roosevelt administration followed Mary McLeod Bethune’s recommendation and
named Chicago alderman, attorney, and Urban League official Earl Dickerson the
first African American to serve on the FEPC.83 Not surprisingly, Randolph and other
MOWM members were “unalterably opposed” to Dickerson’s appointment because
he and other Urban League officials “openly knocked the march.”84 Local MOWM
members like T.D. McNeal joined the chorus of critics, calling Dickerson “a weakling”
who could not be relied upon to stand up to White members of the commission that
was already having its commitment to racial equality questioned.85
The complicated interaction of mass pressure politics, political insider
maneuvering, and top‐down federal manipulation make designating agency in the
struggle for E.O. 8802 difficult. There is possibility for historical revisionism in the
fact that Aubrey Williams and Wayne Coy invited Walter White and “a group of us”
to Washington over three months before Randolph’s threatened march. This could
be interpreted as Washington insiders being involved in negotiating E.O. 8802 long
before Randolph arrived in the Oval Office for the conference with Roosevelt in
which the march was called off.86 Conclusive evidence is lacking but it is not
inconceivable that White, not Randolph, had the upper hand on President Roosevelt.
It is also possibly, though less likely, that White practiced Machiavellian politics in
which Randolph and incalculable African Americans were convinced that their
protests were the driving force behind E.O. 8802 when, in fact, it could have been
written long in advance. The fact that over three months before E.O. 8802 was
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officially drafted, White gave Roosevelt a list of African Americans who should meet
with him in the Capitol could be interpreted in a number of ways, especially since
Randolph’s name heads that list. Even though evidence is inconclusive, it is at least
possible that the historic meeting between African American leaders and members
of the Roosevelt administration was scripted – and everyone but Randolph knew
it.87 Unlikely though it may seem, if this were the case, White was vindicated as an
African American leader with bona fide political power within the Roosevelt
administration – a drastic change from when Stephen Early called him “one of the
worst and most continuous of trouble makers.”88
All accounts of the June 18, 1941 event recognize the presence of Walter
White and Randolph in Roosevelt’s office that afternoon, but reports from the Black
media and the White House visitor’s log expand the list to include Frank Crosswaith,
and Layle Lane as present at the meeting “to open the employment rolls of an
already booming war industry to Negro workers.”89 Other sources also name Rev.
William Lloyd Imes of the St. James Presbyterian Church, Lester Granger of the
Urban League, Richard Parrish of the Association of Negro College Students of New
York, Rayford Logan of nearby Howard University, J. Finley Wilson of the Elks, Adam
Clayton Powell, and New York union men Noah Walters and E.E. Williams as present
at the White House that day.90 These men may have accompanied Randolph, White,
and Lane to the White House or to the Capitol, but they certainly did not attend the
closed‐door meeting. A speech from Randolph provides yet a third account of those
attending. This list includes himself, Stimson, Knox, Knudson, Hillman, LaGuardia,
Anna Rosenberg, Aubrey Williams, Lane, White, and President Roosevelt.91
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Whoever was there, all accounts corroborate that they were joined by Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox, William Knudson and Sidney
Hillman of the Office of Production Management, Aubrey Williams from the National
Youth Administration, and Anna Rosenberg from the Social Security Board – all of
whom supported Roosevelt in urging Randolph to cancel the march.92 In a
telephone discussion with Randolph, Williams even went so far as to advise
Randolph to cancel the march until he met with the President. Randolph, possibly
unaware of efforts within the federal government to thwart MOWM’s protest, wrote
President Roosevelt two days later, defying Aubrey Williams’ “suggestion that I
stop…mobilization for the march, pending conference with you.” It seems that
Randolph thought that federal officials stood in his way but that the President could
be convinced of his cause.93
Strangely, there is no verbatim transcript of this historic meeting in any of
the archival holdings consulted for this project. Unfortunately, historians have long
relied on reminiscences from Randolph and White to piece a narrative of the
proceedings together.94 The problematic result is that historians are left with
accounts of this event that are so melodramatic as to almost be unbelievable. This
historical product is a useful but ultimately unverifiable myth that, if nothing else,
correctly portrays E.O. 8802 as wrested from the hands of a reluctant Roosevelt. It
speaks to the fear that federal officials had of the consequences, both in terms of
public image and the potential for violence, that were worst possible outcomes of
the march. The lack of corresponding documentary evidence from the Roosevelt
Administration leaves open the possibility of speculation that the event was staged
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to depict the ritual of an oppressed minority appealing to the executive branch to
redress an injustice that clearly hampered the country’s ability to prepare for and
execute a war.
The only White House record of a meeting between Randolph and Roosevelt
during the time frame of Randolph’s proposed march is for June 18, 1941. While
there is discrepancy about who was present, it is reasonably certain that the historic
forty‐five minute meeting at which the executive order was hashed out was
preceded by an extended discussion between LaGuardia and Roosevelt in the
President’s office earlier that day. There is no documentary evidence of what they
convened about, but Randolph’s ability to stage the threatened rally is a likely topic.
Earlier that month the President’s Secretary Stephen Early sought Wayne Coy, Office
of Emergency Management, for help getting LaGuardia “to exercise his persuasive
powers to stop it (the proposed March).”95 Early identified LaGuardia because he
has “great influence with New York Negroes” and could “convince them that there is
a better means of presenting their case…than the proposed march on
Washington.”96 With only two weeks to go before the scheduled protest, LaGuardia
was quickly “at work in an effort to prevent the march.”97
From the standpoint of a Roosevelt Administration that wanted to get the
march cancelled with as few consolations as possible so that Southern Democrats
would not be alienated, involving LaGuardia was brilliant.98 It was LaGuardia, for
instance, who recommended that Roosevelt, Stimson, Knox, Knudson, and Hillman
meet with White and Randolph “to thresh it out right then and there” and advised
that only affirmative action from the President could get the march cancelled.99
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Although Wayne Coy’s assessment that “I may be overly optimistic” about the
chances of placating MOWM with an investigating committee, he was convinced that
“if we could give assurances that this resolution could be passed and the committee
set up, that we might be able to prevent the march on Washington scheduled for July
1.”100 As someone who “kept closely in touch with the negro problem since…they
became troublesome in connection with the Army and Selective Service,” Coy
believed that he could get the march cancelled with minimal concessions. Coy was
convinced that an OPM circular distributed amongst defense contractors and a letter
from the President to the NAACP for distribution at their annual convention would
do “a good deal to eliminate the urgency behind the proposed march.”101 With this
in mind, Coy advised Roosevelt, “the Barbour Resolution (S.R. 75) is the only thing
which they could hope to gain.”102 If MOWM’s demonstration occurred, Coy’s
correspondence with other high‐ranking officials would only be slightly relevant
idle talk among bureaucrats and the power elite. This is, of course, not the case,
because the Barbour Resolution (Sen. Res. 75) was used a model for E.O. 8802. The
only significant difference between this failed legislation and E.O. 8802 was that
civilian appointees, not senators, served as investigators.103
LaGuardia succeeded at his task and he left behind the most convincing
evidence that E.O. 8802 was hashed out weeks before Randolph and White’s official
meeting with Roosevelt and his officials. LaGuardia was one party of a meeting
among White House insiders who met to find a way to placate MOWM without
upsetting the status quo. The remaining roster for this meeting also included
Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary Stimson, Mr. Hillman, Mr. Knudson, Aubrey
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Williams, and Anna Rosenberg. As a whole, they believed that gesturing towards
integrating the armed forces was impractical because “little, if anything could be
done…to change existing conditions.” The committee recommended that Roosevelt
issue an Executive Order attaching a “no discrimination clause” is included “in all
future contracts or extensions, renewals, or modifications of existing contracts.”
They advised the President that a “Grievance Committee” be established that had
investigative resources and remedial resources at its disposal.104 Roosevelt’s
advisors on the issue urged him to eschew modifying the military’s racial policy but
encouraged him to exert federal influence in private industry.
Predictably, representatives from the military opposed the platitudes that
became E.O. 8802 with the argument that the law was unenforceable. The War
Department shaped the content of E.O. 8802 as much as MOWM forced the law’s
conception. Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Under Secretary of Navy
James Forrestal, “While…in sympathy with the policy,” opposed it on grounds that it
was unenforceable in the South, that labor unions sometimes presented as much of
a barrier to employment as management, and that “It would be most unwise to
cancel contracts for munitions urgently needed because of a breach of this clause.”
Thus, the War Department influenced E.O. 8802 and FEPC by advising the President
that “Any board set up to hear grievances should not have the power to direct
cancellation of any defense contract.”105 Their position was crucial in the
conception of an executive order that some critics said was “toothless” and that
blatantly avoided meddling in the military’s notorious racial policies.106
Nevertheless, the FEPC’s lifespan correlated with rises in the number of African
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Americans employed with defense contractors. More impressively, the war years
also witnessed the number of African American civil servants triple.107 While one
may write this off as chronological coincidence, it is likely that FEPC’s presence was
a factor in this increase.
Aside from the President, opposition came from other New Dealers.108 In
1942, for instance, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes denied MOWM’s
application to use grounds surrounding the Lincoln Memorial for a protest.109 Ickes’
decision made it illegal for MOWM to assemble anywhere near the National Mall.
His lack of support was undoubtedly a factor in Randolph’s decision to cancel yet
another MOWM rally in the Capitol the following year, and partially explains why
the organization was weak in the city where it mattered most. Randolph was
surprised by his inability to secure a permit for his organization to use public lands.
As noted by the African American press, only three years earlier Ickes allowed
contralto Marian Anderson to sing on the Lincoln Memorial’s steps when the
Daughters of the American Revolution refused to let her use their concert hall.110
Ickes’ divergent responses to a symbolically important African American concert
and a proposed mass protest during sensitive war years illustrate how officials tied
to Roosevelt were often in congruence with the President’s wishes.
Randolph and White had a history of working as a team in high‐level talks
before their collaborations with MOWM. They previous year, they, along with T.
Arnold Hill, met with Roosevelt to explore greater opportunities for African
Americans in national defense. This ultimately unfruitful discussion resulted in a
promise from Roosevelt to investigate the problem.111 Worse, in the tandem’s eyes,
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was that the White House bungled media relations about the event, sparking
outrage from NAACP, Randolph, and the African American press.112 White and
Randolph advocated complete integration of the U.S. military without limitations.
They called for more African American officers and specialized personnel, as well as
greater representation of African American women as nurses and Red Cross
employees.113 Patterson claimed that this was “an experiment worth trying and one
which might be made a success,” but Knox argued that close living quarters aboard
naval vessels rendered integrating African Americans impractical. Roosevelt
prodded Knox along and convinced him “to look into the possibilities.” White and
Randolph’s case of equal opportunity and a more efficient fighting force failed to win
Knox over, but he was open to Roosevelt’s suggestion that African American bands
be used as “an opening...since it would accustom white sailors to the presence of
Negroes on ships.”114 The 1940 discussions about integrating America’s fighting
forces created a climate of distrust between African American leaders and the
federal government that shaped MOWM’s program the following year. Without
popular support and the threat of disruptive political action, they went into hardball
negotiations armed with little than moral capital and they walked away from the
fiasco with only the experience gained in dealing with the Roosevelt administration.
Regardless of how much federal officials meddled in authoring E.O 8802, it
seems that Randolph extracted the greatest possible yield from the threatened
march. The confluence of a wartime crisis in international relations, Roosevelt’s
political need to solidify his standing among Black voters, the possibility of racial
violence in the Capitol’s streets, and the likelihood that at least one side of the
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struggle was aware that the march could be cancelled by creating a small,
understaffed federal agency all contributed to MOWM’s meteoric rise and success.
As pointed out by Benjamin Quarles, another factor behind MOWM’s rapid ascent
into the constellation of Black protest organizations was that MOWM and Randolph
tapped into a century‐long tradition of African American protest that utilized strong
rhetoric and the threat of disrupting public life to compensate for operating out of a
politically weak power base.115 In the context of relatively weak traditional political
power, MOWM was in the vanguard of a wartime trend in which the number of
African Americans in defense industries rose from 8.4 percent to 12.5 percent.
Randolph and others recognized that E.O. 8802 and FEPC were far from adequate
implements to annihilate racial inequality, but it was understood that this was the
most Roosevelt was prepared to offer.116
The meeting on June 18, 1941, established that neither Roosevelt nor
military leadership was ready to capitulate on the issue of integrating the armed
forces. Even though Randolph frequently lashed out publicly against the hypocrisy
of segregating the military, he knew that the issue was unlikely to make any
progress because it was so strongly opposed by the military’s top brass.117 Evidence
that Roosevelt’s concessions in 1941 were the limit of what he thought he could give
is the fact that he rejected subsequent requests for another meeting by individuals
who were involved in MOWM. In September 1942, Randolph, Walter White,
Channing Tobias, and J. Finley Wilson failed to get an audience at the White House.
Their snubbing was probably due to the fact that the President saw nothing else that
he could offer or they could gain by a meeting.118 Their failure to even get the
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President to sit with them drove a weekly Defender columnist to write, “The Bukra
in the big house have decided the darklings were bluffing all along about that
March‐on‐Washington.”119 In just over a year, MOWM’s political capitol plummeted
to the point where the organization was unable to solicit a sympathetic ear from
federal officials. Additional research is needed to more firmly establish why
Roosevelt chose to not meet with a small crowd of men whom he was all familiar
with, but it is reasonable to surmise that Roosevelt believed an unproductive
meeting was worse than no meeting at all. Rather than risk being seen as
unresponsive to demands from national African American leaders, he elected to
appear unaware.

Dissent Within the Ranks
The FBI reported that “The Left attacked Randolph” when MOWM went on
record affirming its all‐Black membership policy.120 The Daily Worker led the attack
criticizing MOWM as a group of “Negro Social Democrats and reformists” who had
reasonable complaints but espoused misguided and poorly directed programs.
Instead of working towards a genuine worker’s state, MOWM was criticized for
unwisely fighting to integrate Black Americans into “the bidding of the very wealthy
jimcrow interests…responsible for the whole system of national oppression.”121 The
campaign continued for over a year with Black Communist James Ford acting as the
most vocal critic of MOWM and Randolph’s anti‐communism, which alleged that
“the Communist Party seeks only to rule or ruin a movement…Communists
constitute a pestilence, menace, and nuisance to the Negro people.”122 Albert Parker
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was another African American critic from the Left. Like Ford, he used words as
weapons, authoring a pamphlet‐length critical assessment of MOWM.123 It is worth
noting that even though Randolph’s vehement anti‐communism drew ire from some
of the Left, it satisfied the FBI and convinced the agency to desist its investigation of
the minutia in Randolph’s daily life because “he has been outspoken in his anti‐
Communist opinions.”124
The NNC was strongly opposed to Randolph‘s decision to call off the march
and it was the most vocal organizational voice of dissent to Randolph’s top‐down
leadership in MOWM’s formative days.125 NNC’s oppositional stance towards
Randolph is understandable considering that he recently left the organization, citing
too strong a Communist influence for him to remain its leader. Randolph burned his
bridges on the way out, criticizing the NNC as “not a true Negro Congress.”126 The
NNC condemned E.O. 8802 as “weasel words” amounting to a “meaningless gesture
that will not result in getting a single skilled Negro worker a job…in Jim Crow
defense industries” and denounced Roosevelt’s light handling of industrialists who
violated the order as “polite phrases which fool nobody.”127 NNC leadership was
intrigued with the idea of marching on the capitol, but it did not want Randolph
credited for leading the demonstration.128 NNC’s attempt to upstage Randolph and
MOWM was their retaliation towards him for making it well known among readers
of the Black press that Communists were not welcome in his new organization,
denouncing them as “a definite menace, pestilence and nuisance,” who “will be
promptly marched out” of any MOWM branch that they tried to join.129
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The pamphlet that perhaps best expresses the critical support that African
American radicals had for MOWM is Henry Pelham’s “On to Washington for Negro
Rights.” Published by the Workers Party, Pelham’s writing is peppered with quotes
from Marx and demands an inter‐racial workers struggle. Pelham argued that Black
and White Americans should support the demonstration but cautiously “watch A.
Philip Randolph” and make sure that he does not steer the organization into
Democratic partisan loyalty. Pelham was also afraid that demonstrating in the
Capitol could be interpreted by some as “loyalty of Negroes…anxious to die for Jim‐
Crow democracy.” This blind loyalty was not to be confused with commitment to
“express our love and admiration for the New Deal” or to “want to go to war to pull
Britain’s chestnuts out of the fire.”130
Fissures developed within MOWM because some members, particularly the
youth division, took exception to Randolph unilaterally canceling the march.131
Everett Thomas, Hope Williams, and Richard Parrish were all members of the
NAACP and MOWM. They represented a faction of young activists who were
disappointed because “The March heightened the ambitions and pent‐up emotions
of the Negro masses as never before.” Their frustration is understandable. After all,
people like Thomas, William, and Parrish dedicated time to generate enthusiasm for
an event that was suddenly indefinitely postponed. They took issue with Randolph
and the national committee for not “consulting the Negro masses through their local
committees as to whether or not the March should have been postponed.”132
Randolph, a member of the NAACP Youth Committee, responded to their criticism
with an attack of his own.133 He accused them of being more committed to
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theoretical and academic questions about protest than of facilitating an effective
demonstration.134 Bayard Rustin and Richard Parrish, both of whom worked closely
with Randolph, were vocal in their opinion that the march should have been
postponed for ninety days instead of being called of. According to some historical
accounts, they “accused Randolph of selling out to Roosevelt.”135 It is worth
mentioning that even though Rustin disagreed with Randolph on this matter,
MOWM marked the beginning of a productive working relationship between the two
that lasted three decades. According to his biographer, Rustin even called his
activism during the Second World War, “one of the most important things I ever
did.”136
Youth and radicals were not Randolph’s only critics. Prominent NAACP
members including Charles Hamilton Houston and Roy Wilkins were staunchly
opposed to racial qualifiers in MOWM’s membership policy.137 As Jerry
Gershenhorn demonstrated, many Black media outlets turned on MOWM after
Randolph cancelled the march.138 When not publishing outright criticism of the
organization, they simply kept the organization out of headlines. Through most of
1942, information about MOWM was difficult to find in many of the most widely
circulated African American newspapers. Their silence was shaken by the 1943
riots in Detroit and Harlem. That same summer, Chicago hosted MOWM’s “We Are
Americans, Too,” conference, at which the idea of a massive civil disobedience
campaign attacking racial segregation and inequality was introduced. One study of
African American newspapers demonstrated that major print media sources in
Norfolk and Pittsburgh attacked Randolph’s plan as unwise, untimely, and not worth
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the risk of instigating a wave of racial violence.139 Even George McCray, the
Defender’s labor columnist, jumped on the swelling bandwagon. He ridiculed
Randolph and Webster as embittered aging men who “find joy in just plain mischief
making” by advocating potentially destructive protest tactics.140 In a less
antagonistic but still unfavorable review of MOWM’s Chicago rally in 1942, McCray
identified two flaws with the organization– it overemphasized racial problems in
America at the cost of not condemning the Axis menace and it downplayed the
presence of sympathetic liberal Whites when discussions of “crackerism” came
up.141 Even when MOWM shifted its attention towards sponsoring smaller local
protests, some writers criticized the organization’s core belief that public protest
could check wartime racism as a program that “would invite disaster.”142
Albert Parker, George McCray, and Henry Pelham were minority voices of
dissent. Indeed, most African American columnists and writers supported MOWM,
especially in its early years. Washington Tribune columnist M. Beaunorus Tolson,
for instance, wanted to throw “moral sissies and black judases...Sambos and Aunt
Hagars” into the Potomac River for not supporting MOWM.143 With less partisan
rhetoric, historian Melinda Chateauvert concluded that “to African Americans, the
Executive Order symbolized the President’s willingness to act on issues of racial
justice.” Her opinion echoes Louis Ruchames, who argued that E.O. 8802 gave
African Americans “cause to believe in democracy in America.”144
Randolph simply could find no way to please or appease everybody. He
knew that “many of [his] followers were disappointed at the postponement” and he
understood that they worked hard to drum up support for the demonstration.145

59

As a racial leader with strong grassroots connections, Randolph was in tune with his
ideological impulses among politically engaged African Americans. He addressed
their concerns though a series of essays in the Chicago Defender called “A Reply to
My Critics.” Although columnists from the Defender sometimes challenged
Randolph, the paper was generally supportive. In fact, the six‐part “Reply To My
Critics” series was proposed by the Defender in response to an assault by the Courier
calling Randolph’s proposal for massive civil disobedience “suicidal.”146 Randolph’s
“Reply To My Critics” essays ridiculed the Courier and its supporters as “petty black
bourgeoisie” who failed to recognize the significance of mass meetings as vehicles of
raising consciousness that ultimately inspired action. Randolph used his soapbox to
defend his philosophy of self‐help, mass mobilization, and non‐partisan political
pressure exerted through public demonstrations. He emphasized intangible but
important accomplishments. Instead of crediting his organization’s role in creating
the much‐maligned FEPC, Randolph fell back on the immeasurable but no less
important argument that MOWM fostered a profound existential change in many
African Americans who were inspired by his organization’s call to “shake up Official
Washington.”147 Randolph explained that MOWM empowered “the voiceless and
helpless” by forming them into a collective body. To him, the presence of “the
forgotten black man” who came to “meeting after meeting” to tell “an earnest and
eager crowd about jobs he sought but never got…how he had gone to the gates of
defense plants only to be kept out while white workers walked in” represented an
important shift in the values of Black communities. By drawing attention away from
an FEPC that Randolph’s critics thought was useless, he redirected the spotlight
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onto how MOWM created a place where “little men can tell their story their own
way.”148

1942: Institutionalizing the Movement
MOWM’s self‐proclaimed “monster mass meeting” at the Madison Square
Garden on June 16, 1942 was the first in a series of three major rallies that also took
place in Chicago and St. Louis.149 Attended by a cumulative total of over 30,000
people, some saw these rallies as creating a united community of energetic African
American activists while others interpreted the rallies as a way to blow off steam
and satisfy activists with theatrical protest.150 To Benjamin McLaurin, an officer in
both MOWM and BSCP, these rallies were “a warning and lesson to white America
that Negroes are not going to take a licking from Jim Crow lying down.”151 Though
well‐attended enough to make it “the first public expression of approval” for
MOWM’s program, the event was somewhat of a let down because the number of
speakers on the program made the event last close over five hours ‐ leaving
Randolph’s keynote without sufficient time to address the crowd.152
As coordinator of the Madison Square Garden Rally, Hedgeman slotted
Randolph to take the stage no later than 10:30. Randolph’s keynote was scheduled
to come immediately after Dick Campbell’s playlet starring Lorenzo Tucker,
“Watchword is Forward.”153 Tucker’s appearance that evening did not garner many
headlines even though New York MOWM leader Lawrence Ervin congratulated him
for playing a lead role “carried out to perfection the main objective of that Mass
meeting.” Tucker’s performance and Randolph’s silence took a back seat in accounts
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of the event to Adam Clayton Powell’s long‐winded oration in which he announced
his candidacy for a hotly contested Congressional seat.154 The Chicago Defender
noted that the event was “kept as completely Negro in makeup as possible,” with no
White speakers on the program and few in the audience.155 Even without a stirring
oration from Randolph, the Madison Square Garden rally introduced a new African
American legislator and demonstrated that there was still zeal for mass protest
politics.
Randolph thought that the high attendance at rallies in Harlem and Chicago
indicated that MOWM was “ready to consider the next step in terms of policy.”156
Even though the NAACP warned Randolph that it could not be counted on to back
“another permanent dues‐paying, duplicating organization,” Randolph was
confident that enough people were enthusiastic about MOWM to give the upstart
organization a chance.157 The question of whether or not MOWM could maintain an
independent personality from the NAACP remained to be seen.158
It had been over a year since the initial march was called off and the national
organization accomplished little since it first made headlines. Randolph called a
policy convention in Detroit to take place in September 1942. The first order of
business was “to draft a constitution and by‐laws” establishing an institutional
bureaucracy.159 The event was intentionally kept small so that the most dedicated
members from MOWM’s two dozen local chapters cold draft and adopt an
organizational constitution.160 The conference was not designed to host large
crowds or send delegates home amped for agitating. Its function was to create an
organizational framework and define MOWM’s goals and tactics. The delegates
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adopted a broad program outlined by more than thirty resolutions which included
an affirmation of the organization’s opposition to accepting “donations from any
people except Negroes,” a repudiation of communism, and an agreement of all locals
to act together and coordinate a national protest at the behest of A. Philip
Randolph.161 The end result of the conference, according to a small column in the
Defender, was a the creation of “a program of action…for progressive steps in the
fight to break down jim‐crowism in the government, armed forces, and industry.”162
St. Louis MOWM members T.D. McNeal, David Grant, Thelma Grant, Harold Ross,
Joseph McLemore, Jordan Chambers, and Boyd Wilson made sure that the Gateway
City was well‐represented in Detroit to shape the fledgling organization’s policy and
guide its institutionalization.163 Local activists such as those listed above were
MOWM’s lifeblood from then on. While Randolph could be criticized for heavy‐
handed leadership when the march was cancelled in 1941, the organization was
subsequently driven by the demands and energy of its individual chapters.
The Detroit conference was a turning point in MOWM’s relationship with
NAACP’s national office. Though entrenched in the ranks of Black protest for over
three decades, the elder organization handled MOWM cautiously while it made the
transition from “a coalition of agencies cooperating during the war emergency” into
a permanent and potentially rival member‐supported organization. NAACP’s board
of directors believed that MOWM’s existence threatened to undercut its own
membership base. NAACP saw its organizational identity at stake, as much of
MOWM’s eight‐point program “duplicates existing organizations.” Detroit marked,
therefore, the decisive moment when NAACP withdrew its financial and
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organizational support, such as assigning paid staff to assist MOWM’s campaigns.164
NAACP kept this “growing breech” out of the public eye but careful observers
noticed the change.165 Prior to MOWM’s institutionalization, Walter White and A.
Philip Randolph appeared together often. After the Detroit conference, the most
common interaction between national figures was occasional correspondence
between offices. NAACP distanced itself from MOWM so much that by the time of
MOWM’s 1943 “We Are Americans, Too” conference in Chicago, Roy Wilkins
stopped in not as an invited speaker or as a distinguished visitor, but as a veritable
spy who was gauging MOWM’s ability to present a long‐term threat to NAACP.166
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CHAPTER 3
1943: “WE ARE AMERICANS, TOO” AND THE FORMULATION OF
NONVIOLENT GOODWILL DIRECT ACTION
“If present conditions continue, we will have to march on Washington whether we
like it or not.”
– T.D. McNeal, 19431
By mid‐war, many African‐American newspapers turned on MOWM and
distanced themselves from Randolph.2 Even Defender columnist Charlie Cherokee, a
longtime MOWM booster, called the organization “fat and flabby” after the network
of organizational support fled MOWM.3 MOWM’s push for institutionalization
alienated groups like the NAACP, but there was additional rumbling from unnamed
sources that MOWM’s highly publicized all‐Black membership policy was
unacceptable to many of the organization’s members.4 The latter criticism is
questionable in light of the fact that MOWM’s membership voted overwhelmingly
for a racially exclusive policy the previous year, but it is worth noting that only a
portion of its members made the trek to what one resident called “the northernmost
southern city” to serve as delegates.5 An attitude of racial militancy was in the air,
prompting one Motor City member to complain, “In plain unvarnished language a
large group of these stiff shirts and so called Negro aristocracy are afraid to develop
a movement…solely controlled by and for Negroes.”6 Given the tendency for
disparity between national office policy and local practice that played out several
times in St. Louis MOWM’s history, it is very likely that softer racial rhetoric and
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more lenient adherence to organizational policy occurred in a number of the
organization’s twenty‐six branches.
Randolph articulated MOWM’s racial membership policy with a blend of anti‐
Communism and guarded Black nationalism. He used the rhetoric of “self‐reliance”
to argue that exclusively Black organizations were needed to confront the “slave
psychology and inferiority complex in Negroes” that he said pushed him out of the
National Negro Congress.7 Organizations like the FOR, which were still friendly
towards MOWM, criticized its decision to restrict membership to African Americans.
Bayard Rustin, then a young admirer of Randolph, warned the elder activist against
trending towards a dangerous and unsustainable “black nationalism” that reflected
“the average Negro’s [loss of] faith in middle‐class whites” and disillusion with
gradual reform programs.8 Langston Hughes, a dues‐paying MOWM member
himself, provided a different brand of criticism. Even though he financially and
morally supported the fledgling organization, his Chicago Defender column
enumerated “two things against it…they do not admit white people, and their leader,
A. Philip Randolph, is always attacking Russia.”9 Charles Hamilton Houston
privately criticized MOWM on similar grounds. He wrote Randolph “to record the
fact I oppose the exclusion of all white people” from MOWM’s membership and
operations. Houston appreciated that MOWM had to avoid being labeled as a
Communist front but he pointed out “that there are Negro Communists” who will
not be thwarted by adopting controversial racial criteria.10 It should be pointed out
that there was sometimes discrepancy between MOWM’s national policy and it’s
local implementation. In one particularly poignant instance, BSCP official and
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MOWM officer Bennie Smith reported that Detroit MOWM believed that “not a great
deal can be done in a movement of this nature without white people’s participation”
and thus accepted “two white people, man and woman” as members.11

“We Are Americans, Too”
The following year was a busy season for conferences. In June, the NAACP
held an “Emergency Conference on the Status of the Negro in the War.” That same
summer, MOWM chose Chicago as a host for its national conference, “We Are
Americans, Too.”12 Advertisements for the event, its program, and the resolutions
passed emphasized claims to full citizenship as it was understood within the context
of race and national identity at that time.13 Even the title of the conference, “We Are
Americans, Too,” was a radical act in a country where the term “American” was long
synonymous with “white.”14 Randolph wanted to use the conference to discuss
methods of fighting segregation in the military, outline MOWM’s protest tactics, and
conduct business pertinent to the organization’s national affairs. To some extent, all
of this occurred, but delegates spent a considerable amount of time debating the
role of Whites in the organization and learning about non‐violent to direct action.15
The presence of delegates and the type of discussions they fomented affirmed that
the previous year’s policy conference in Detroit was significant and that the
organization intended to join the ranks of permanent African American protest
organizations. African American reporters covered the proceedings thoroughly, but
they paid less attention to the fact that this marked a decisive and final rupture in
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MOWM’s tenuous coalition with NAACP’s national office and National Urban
League.16
Randolph described non‐violent civil disobedience as a
“revolutionary…methodology and technique” of theatrical protest that capitalized
on being “unusual, extraordinary, dramatic, and drastic.” This remarkable measure
was necessary because other programs proved unsuccessful in the push to shape
public opinion and transform perceptions of race.17 Because “the unusual attracts”
and size matters, Randolph repeatedly called for “huge demonstrations because the
world is used to big dramatic affairs.”18 To this end, Bayard Rustin and J. Holmes
Smith from the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a secular pacifist organization, were
invited to give lengthy presentations outlining the philosophy and practice of non‐
violent direct action.19 Their performance that evening satisfied the audience, and
all 104 credentialed delegates supported MOWM’s foray into this protest
methodology.20
MOWM’s advocacy of widespread non‐violent civil disobedience had little
precedent in African American history and, according to historian Gerald Gill,
probably did not resonate strongly with a generation of African Americans living “in
an era of continued white violence directed against blacks.”21 Unlike Gandhi’s battle
to overthrow a colonizer, MOWM saw itself as essentially reformist. Rather than
overthrow the existing order, MOWM wanted to “maintain American civil
government because wherever it ceases to function; mob law reigns and Negroes
become victims.”22 Thus, MOWM’s case for “a broad national program based on
non‐violent civil disobedience and non‐cooperation” was modeled on Gandhi’s
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struggle, but the rationale was expressed in more familiar rhetoric “that a citizen is
morally obligated to disobey an unjust law.”23 In short, MOWM hoped that civil
disobedience could force the government to uphold existing laws. Historian
Melinda Chateauvert characterized this moment as “the first national nonviolent
action to demand an end to job discrimination and race segregation.”24 This
dissertation agrees with Marching Together, and recognizes that MOWM was not
wholly committed to non‐violence at its inception. Instead, MOWM’s dedication to
this protest tactic was part of a historical trajectory that my own archival research
dates back to at least January 1943.25
Even though an estimated 2,000 people attended the “We Are Americans,
Too” conference, Milton Webster privately called it “the biggest piece of bunk that
has ever happened around here.”26 Webster complained that “too many bossy
dames around here” hindered preparations for the event, a comment historian
Cynthia Taylor used as evidence that there was “considerable friction” along
gendered fault lines in African American organizations.27 Longtime BSCP Women’s
Auxiliary officer Rosina Tucker testified about the seminal role played by African
American women in mixed‐gender institutions. With over three decades of
experience working alongside the BSCP and supporting Randolph’s various civil
rights campaigns, Tucker told a Washington Post reporter that “Very few men can do
much without women.”28 With a reputation as an abrasive personality, Webster is
not the most credible critic of fissures in Chicago MOWM, but he was not alone in
complaining about the event. Roy Wilkins expressed concern that “We Are
Americans, Too” was sloppily organized, with sessions running over time after
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starting late and panels that did not address topics that the program announced.29
Wilkins was also disturbed by the breadth of resolutions, which he thought made
the organization lose focus, and by the high number of porters in attendance –
which he interpreted to suggest that loyalty to Randolph was what drove MOWM.30
As someone who attended the conference to check up on a rival institution, Wilkins
must have rested a little easier when he learned from an anonymous informant that
MOWM’s disorganization undercut its own bottom line. At the convention
“everybody was handling money…everybody was selling programs” and some
unscrupulous individuals “got away” with sizable portions of the revenue.31
Seventeen resolutions were passed at “We Are Americans, Too.” These
included the usual declarations of patriotic support for the war effort coupled with
disapproval of the segregated military, but there were also resolutions urging
President Roosevelt “to call upon Prime Minister Churchill to give independence and
freedom to the Indian peoples” and “grant suffrage throughout the British West
Indies” as well as condemnations of anti‐Catholicism and anti‐Semitism for being
“undemocratic, unsound and a dangerous form of religious bigotry.”32 While
certainly productive, the We Are Americans, Too conference was not the caliber of
event that Horace Cayton and others thought necessary to salvage MOWM’s
reputation for not following through on “hokus pokus about marching.”33
Critical patriotism was the core of MOWM’s politics and rhetoric, a position
that informed the decision to have the conference’s closing ceremonies occur on the
Forth of July. That 2,000 individuals attended is attributable to the wartime fervor
for activism in Chicago and to the fact that local activist and MOWM member Ethyl
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Payne was paid $500 to organize the event.34 Webster’s opinion aside, Payne was
an excellent choice for the job because she had a deep network of contacts that
included other well‐connected African American women like Neva Ryan and Irene
Gaines, as well as porters like Charles Wesley Burton and a score of African
American ministers.35 Despite her network of socially and politically engaged
residents of the Black metropolis, Webster took issue with Payne for being “all
hopped up” for the program but “she has not the slightest idea of how to go about
getting the money” to make the event happen.36 A balanced depiction of Payne’s
prowess as an organizer based on sources consulted for this study places her in a
role comparable to Randolph because she had little appreciation for financing a
struggle but she was deeply respected by the people who mattered and she could
get individuals to lend their bodies or talents to her programs.37
MOWM’s strong following in the upper Midwest and the relative ease of rail
access to Detroit and Chicago are major reasons why the organization chose those
cities for two of its most important national conferences. The decision also indicates
that the organization tried increase its visibility in places that had a politically active
African American community and an array of large employers with whom battles
could be fought to gain greater job opportunities. St. Louis was one of the best
represented locals at both conferences. Representatives from the Gateway City
brought a dozen activists to the 1943 national convention – a number rivaled only
by New York and Chicago MOWM, who each brought twenty delegates.38 As with
any event requiring travel, attendees enjoyed time with friends and colleagues
converging from across the country but, as one reporter noted, “the assembled
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delegates and their leaders are not here in a holiday mood…they are here on cold
business,” with demands full recognition as citizens dominating every speech and
peppering private conversations throughout the four‐day convention.39
The Metropolitan Community Church, a Southside religious institution,
hosted “We Are Americans, Too.”40 This marked the first time that MOWM used
sacred space for a major event. The choice was fitting because church was an
appropriate place “to ponder and discuss the use of Non‐Violent Civil Disobedience
as a technique for liberation.”41 Subcommittees addressed employment, lynching,
and applications of non‐violent direct action while nationally recognizable figures
led discussions.42 A list of speakers reads like a who’s who of African American
protest in the Roosevelt era that included hometown activist hero Charles Wesley
Burton, T.D. McNeal of St. Louis, Senora Lawson of Richmond, and New Yorkers
Lawrence Reddick and Lawrence Ervin.43 Randolph invited E. Stanley Jones, a White
missionary, to expound on non‐violent civil disobedience. His presence prompted
discussion of forming a place for White MOWM supporters called Friends of March
on Washington Movement.44
Discussing Non‐Violent Goodwill Direct Action was a major focus of the
Chicago conference because MOWM’s national office wanted it to be a distinguishing
feature that stood out from other groups like the NAACP, NUL, and NNC.45 About six
months before the conference, Pauline Myers issued a press release describing the
new protest tactic with the hope that it could shift attention away from a march that
never happened. This was part of an effort to emphasize MOWM’s new mission of
constructing a politically charged block of African American activists ready to take
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over public space and challenge racial discrimination. MOWM’s foray into non‐
violent civil disobedience also reflected the organization’s recognition that White
liberals could be incorporated into a battle that, in part, intended to alter White
public opinion about race relations. Myers hoped that Non‐Violent Goodwill Direct
Action was a vehicle through which these goals could be realized.
In the early 1940s, Non‐Violent Goodwill Direct Action sounded to some like
a foreign ideology, and its roots in India certainly reinforced this perception. Along
with Quaker missionary E. Stanley Jones and James Farmer, Myers tried to
reinterpret the locus of Black responses to racial inequality and segregation since
Reconstruction within the context of non‐violent protest.46 For instance, Myers
argued that the Great Migration was a perfect example of what MOWM was trying to
accomplish –namely, the concerted action of thousands of African Americans across
the country taking steps to dramatize racial problems in the United States.47
Ultimately, conferees in Chicago hoped that the idea of applying nonviolent protest
could energize African Americans for a march that, once again in 1943, was seen as
necessary and imminent in the “protest against the rising tide of anti‐Negro
pressure in the Country and for the abolition of Jim Crow.”48
In a speech at a 1942 MOWM rally, Randolph told the audience a message
that remained constant throughout MOWM’s existence, “Negroes made the blunder
of closing ranks and forgetting their grievances in the last war.”49 A young radical
who took issue with Du Bois’ position during the First World War, Randolph wanted
to make sure that MOWM carried the torch of protest through the present conflict.
Pauline Myers saw critical patriotism during wartime in a similar light. “If America
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is sincere about the freedom of the world,” Myers argued, “she must grant that
freedom at home.” For Myers, and undoubtedly for many of MOWM’s members, the
“hour of crisis” was conducive to progressive change in America’s racial landscape.
America’s increasing importance in international affairs saw “the eyes of India and
China” gazing towards the United States to see if the country’s standing as moral
leader of the free world was merited. Myers believed that observers would notice
thirteen million African Americans with “patience” growing “sorely tired” about
“being the white man’s burden,” and she hoped that White Americans would share
her opinion that racial discrimination was the seminal problem in American society.
As the war raged on, MOWM’s operations recognized that sympathetic but silent
White Americans were useful additions to the chorus of change. Under Myers’ lead,
the organization shifted some of its resources towards a campaign to “shape public
opinion by letting the world know that the Negro is outraged by the hypocrisy” of
American egalitarian ideals curtailed by the practice of Herrenvolk democracy.50
African‐American leftist James Rorty hoped “white liberalism” would have “enough
vitality” to recognize the justice of equal citizenship and respond favorably to
programs led by MOWM and similar organizations.51
MOWM proposed a national one‐week boycott of “schools and institutions
that have jim crow laws and patterns” to expedite the transformation of White
opinions about race.52 Though this week of boycotts never attained the scale that
Randolph and Myers dreamed of, it did inspire some local activists to take action. In
St. Louis, MOWM’s protracted protests extended well beyond a weeklong time span.
During the course of the war, African Americans in that city were ideal practitioners
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of the discipline, dignity, and non‐confrontational manners that MOWM’s national
office knew was needed for effective dramatic protest. Still, local activism was not
widespread enough for MOWM to achieve its aim to “harness the flow of rising
resentment and indignation of the part of Negro Americans” and transform it “into a
deep spiritual force for constructive social action.” Indeed, structural racism and
racial discrimination would take more generations of struggle to dismantle. Still,
MOWM’s national office, largely through the “We Are Americans, Too” conference
brought the discourse of organized non‐violent civil disobedience into broader
conversation among Black American activists. Sometimes, as it did in St. Louis,
discussions led to practice – which in turn led to progress.53
Resolutions formulated in Chicago regarding finances had a lasting impact
the national office. Using logic that “there is no instance of any people…winning
freedom who did not have the will to pay for it in treasure, blood, and tears, and
since who pays the fiddler practically always calls the time,” the resolutions
committee adopted a policy of economic self‐reliance. MOWM went “on record as
opposed to soliciting or accepting any donations from any people except Negroes.”
This was seen as necessary because outside financial contributions would “weaken
the Negro to depend upon some other race to pay for his own rights.”54 Explicitly
rejecting money coming from predominantly White sources was a good way to
insulate MOWM from charges of Communist meddling. It also fit within a traditional
ideological impulse that emphasized African American self‐help.55 In the end,
however, it proved economically unviable. Within a year, the national office was
nearly bankrupt and it had to terminate Pauline Myers’ position, in part, because
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MOWM could not afford to pay her. MOWM was accustomed to running on a
shoestring, and finances must have been in complete shambles when the
organization folded. In late 1942, Randolph confessed to St. Louis MOWM chairman
T.D. McNeal, “the National March on Washington Movement hasn’t got a quarter.”56
The reality of a relatively flat economic structure among African Americans in the
mid‐twentieth century meant that there was not much available philanthropy to
sustain yet another Black protest and racial uplift group. Membership dollars were
NAACP’s lifeblood, but there was simply not enough money to support numerous
national organizations that, as Wilkins pointed out, overlapped in their objectives.
Restricting the organization’s funding to Black coffers may have doomed
MOWM’s own pocketbook, but the resolution to organize local marches on centers
of government and defense production was a boon in cities like St. Louis, Chicago,
and Detroit. Still, it was not enough to captivate the attention of America’s larger
Black media outlets. This was disastrous for an organization relying on the media to
publicize what amounted to dramatic street theatre. Without marching on the
Capitol, a place Randolph called “the head…and nerve center of the world,” protests
simply could not generate enough publicity to give them credibility.57 Although St.
Louis, Chicago, Richmond, Detroit, and New York had active local leadership who
maintained interest in the organization, most MOWM branches were unable to
generate excitement for relatively small demonstrations that did not live up to
Randolph’s promise of “a national disciplined and non‐violent march of Negroes to
demand action of our national government.”58
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Randolph justified cancelling the original March on Washington in 1941 with
the argument that the organization got what it demanded. Promises that MOWM
had not “abandoned the March itself” were lost on most listeners even though
Randolph made a genuine effort to explain himself and his organization through a
syndicated essay.59 A top‐down demand by MOWM delegates for African Americans
to participate in local demonstrations simply did not inspire the grassroots ferment
that was necessary to revive the organization’s stature. As David Coolidge of Labor
Action noted, “We Are Americans, Too” focused on expounding on non‐violent
protest techniques and recommending what critics such as himself saw as an
unrealistic program.60 Randolph’s recalcitrance towards following through with the
march frustrated MOWM members such as David Grant and T.D. McNeal, both of
who strongly urged the organization to follow through with its namesake march.
Their experience heading St. Louis MOWM is an example of committed local leaders
taking action and acting as a vanguard ahead of MOWM’s national office.61
Randolph brought MOWM back to Chicago’s Metropolitan Community
Church once more in 1944. This time, the occasion was a “National Non‐Partisan
Political Conference for Negroes” that was attended by a small number of
representatives from African American religious, labor, fraternal, educational, and
political institutions. Sponsored by MOWM, the conference sought to “mobilize the
maximum political power of the Negro people” so that African American voters
could make an impact in the highly contested election between Roosevelt and
Wendell Willkie.62 As was usual at most MOWM events, all of the speakers were
African American. Ideology was certainly a factor behind Randolph’s suggestion to
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have the program reflect the intended audience’s racial composition, but the
absence of White speakers also reflected the fact that Randolph failed to get
President Roosevelt, George Wallace, John Dewey, or Wendell Willkie to attend.63 St.
Louis MOWM stalwarts David Grant and T.D. McNeal were on the program, along
with Thurman Dodson, Layle Lane, and Anna Arnold Hedgeman.64
A year prior, Randolph dedicated the sixth and final installment of his “Reply
to my Critics” column in the Defender to advocating a national block of unaffiliated
African American voters. Mincing no words in this essay, he outlined problems with
the American party system as one in which “Negroes as Democrats are not very
strong. Negroes as Republicans are not so strong. Negroes as Socialists or
Communists are helpless.”65 Randolph criticized the two‐party system because, in
his opinion, “there is no fundamental difference between Democrats and
Republicans, they are like two peas in a pod, two souls in a single thought‐
tweedledee and tweedledum.”66 After observing machine politics, he believed that
neither party would “put bait on a hook for fish is has already caught.”67

Carrying the Double Burden: Women’s Work in MOWM
Just as grassroots activists made MOWM relevant in their communities,
woman workers in MOWM’s national office kept the organization alive by handling
correspondence, writing press releases, and implementing policy. Women such as
E. Pauline Myers, Anna Arnold Hedgeman, and Eugenie Settles worked directly
under Randolph – and none of them lasted much longer than a year. High turnover
was attributable to economic distress, job dissatisfaction, and Randolph’s
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notoriously poor managerial skills. Disorganization and an inability to pay the bills
created a revolving door of MOWM secretaries that plagued the organization.68
Unlike the BSCP, which had a talented and dedicated second tier of leaders to handle
administrative affairs, Randolph’s tendency to have “little interest in administrative
work or grasp of its content” impaired MOWM’s national operations beyond the
point where MOWM’s small staff could compensate.69 Even the indefatigable Anna
Arnold Hedgeman tired somewhat quickly from her stint with another organization
headed by Randolph, the Committee for a Permanent FEPC.70 From the beginning of
her employment with MOWM’s national office in December 1942, E. Pauline Myers
openly discussed being “swamped with work.” At the onset of her employment,
Myers was responsible for locating and establishing a permanent national office,
planning and facilitating mass meetings, lobbying for fair employment enforcement,
fundraising, and coordinating affairs of New York’s MOWM branch.71 Myers’ tenure
lasted less than a calendar year, surely not enough time for her to accomplish the
mission of consolidating “five million Negroes into one great mass of pressure for
freedom and democracy.”72
Randolph’s disinterest with managing an office and his inability to follow
through with implementation of innovative ideas is illustrated by the experience of
New York MOWM. At Randolph’s behest, the chapter responded to Odell Waller’s
execution with a silent parade that connected his experience to the twin evils of poll
taxes and systematic racial violence.73 Randolph came up with the idea and
appointed Pauli Murray in charge of the program. Against Murray’s advise, he took
off to an NAACP convention in Los Angeles that removed him from planning or
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attending the July 25, 1942 demonstration. His absence was pronounced because it
came on the heels of a meeting attended by over 200 the previous month and it was
MOWM’s first public event in New York since a rally at Madison Square Garden.74
Randolph’s absence that day was disastrous. While certainly capable orators
and respected members of the community, Anna Hedgeman and Lawrence Ervin
could not generate the audience or publicity that Randolph could. Murray and
Ashley Totten all but begged him to appear, with Murray reporting that “thousands
in New York” were “disappointed” with his absence. Likewise, Totten warned that
the demonstration faced “collapse unless assured you will speak.”75 In a big city
with a long history of African American protest, it takes the presence of a giant to
get noticed – and without Randolph around, the memorial parade of 500 in Odell
Waller’s honor fell on deaf ears.76 Modest attendance figures in a city renowned for
large turnouts at public protests are attributable more to Randolph’s inability to
follow through with programs than to Murray’s lack of organizing expertise.
Organizing the silent parade required all of Murray’s deep resources that
were built in 1940 when she coordinated an inter‐racial effort by the Worker’s
Defense League to recognize National Sharecroppers Week.77 With little support
from the national office, Murray spent much of her time giving speeches in the
streets to raise awareness about the parade.78 Pulling off this latest event meant
that Murray had to utilize a network of African American woman activists centered
on the YWCA.79 This band of sisters included social studies teacher and union
leader Layle Lane, NACW member and director of the Brooklyn YWCA Anna Arnold
Hedgeman, ILGWU organizer Maida Springer, and a soon to be published novelist by
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the name of Ann Petry.80 If not for her extensive connections in Harlem’s Black left
that networked through the YWCA, it is likely that MOWM would not have been able
to respond at all to Waller’s execution. This network of leftist and radical African
American women pre‐existed and outlasted MOWM.81 Most notably, Springer
worked as chief campaign strategist in Murray’s successful bid for a seat in Brooklyn
City Council in 1949.82 In MOWM, as in the NAACP, “women were indispensible but
underappreciated.”83
Myers’ final campaign for MOWM was in Washington, D.C. Benjamin
McLauren visited that city’s branch several months prior, reorganizing its officer
corps around Thurman Dodson, Lillian Speight, Judge Houston, and Jeanetta Welch.
Even with revamped leadership, McLauren disparaged the branch as “everything
but organized,” and explained to Randolph that “I am not at all pleased” with the
paucity of protest that members of this geographically important branch
generated.84 Indeed, rebuilding DC MOWM would be a difficult job for Myers. The
first two weeks saw little progress and she complained of having “practically no
cooperation” from local activists who remained disillusioned with MOWM for
cancelling the initial march. MOWM’s most faithful member in the city, Thurman
Dodson, was a committed but ineffective activist who failed to get Capitol residents
to coalesce under MOWM’s banner. In Myers’ eyes, Dodson’s integrity was
unquestionable, but he “lacks the ingenuity and initiative to get the real job done.”
Her visit to the Capitol revealed that under Dodson’s leadership “that there are
exactly no members in the Washington unit…not one single individual.” Faced with
the task of literally building something out of nothing, Myers suggested that MOWM
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either cut its losses in the Capitol and focus on sustaining momentum in more
receptive locales or invest in “a tremendous educational campaign [and]
membership crusade.” To accomplish the latter of these ends, she met with Porters,
ministers, and governing bodies of civic organizations. The crux of Myers’ problem
was that she appealed to leaders of other organizations to convince them to lend
their credibility to her organization even though it had little political or social
capitol in the area. Myers was disturbed by a pattern that developed in which
important individuals seemed interested in MOWM’s plans but were reluctant to
align themselves with a floundering protest organization that had little to offer in
return.85
Only two weeks after her bleak analysis of MOWM’s prospects in
Washington, DC, Myers’ assessment was much more favorable. In the interim, she
secured temporary office space for DC MOWM from an accountant who donated the
front of his office on a busy thoroughfare. Additional progress was seen in the
endorsement gained by an alliance of Baptist and Methodist ministers, and by Ralph
Matthews of the Baltimore AfroAmerican pledging his support as Publicity
Chairman for the DC‐area. Myers was most excited that “people from all walks of
life including students, domestics, trade unionists, business men, church men and
government workers are signing up for recruiting members.” Myers convinced
wary DC‐residents of MOWM’s merits through her busy speaking schedule, with up
to three appointments daily. She was ecstatic that “Washington is really waking up”
as “a brand new group of people…are enlisting in the campaign,” making it possible
that she could foresee “getting at least 5000 members by December 1.”86
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Myers’ next correspondence reveals how shocked she was to receive
notification from the Steering Committee regarding her imminent dismissal. Rather
than linger as a lame duck for the next month, Myers opted to stay on duty for a
week. She severed her ties to MOWM immediately after satisfying a commitment to
speak with an upstart but enthusiastic MOWM chapter in Buffalo.87 Myers’ solid
character as an individual who did not carry grudges into the public sphere is
evident in her performance during that final official act. Even with her career in
crisis, Myers delivered two speeches and apparently never let anyone in Buffalo
know that the organization was in the midst of transition. Jesse Taylor, a member of
Buffalo MOWM’s Executive Board, enthusiastically wrote Randolph with news of
MOWM’s recent progress. Taylor called the Sunday mass meeting “the greatest
affair of its kind ever held in Buffalo” and congratulated Myers for captivating the
audience by perfectly articulating MOWM’s platform over the course of a ninety‐
minute speech. Taylor’s letter to Randolph ends on an ironic note, “we’re looking
forward to her early return to Buffalo.” Taylor’s impression of Myers indicates that
she was an ideal spokesperson who effectively interpreted her organization’s
message to a captive audience. It also speaks to her character as an organizer, for
she never made her career troubles public even though she was recently dismissed
from duty in the middle of an unprecedented and promising campaign.88
Myers’ year with MOWM was a time of organizational transition. Even if the
organization had trouble covering her $200 monthly salary, her presence as full‐
time paid staff indicated that MOWM was making strides as a permanent
organization. MOWM’s national office furnished locals with advice on setting up
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effective and visible branches. MOWM’s literature included the expected dictation
of organization hierarchy and rules for electing officers that one would expect from
any bureaucracy but it also recommended each branch to have its own Executive
Board subdivided into the following committees: Winfred Lynn Case, Non‐Violent
Goodwill Direct Action, Non‐Partisan Political Action, Western Hemispheric
Conference of Free Negroes, National March on Washington, Finance, Membership,
Program, Publicity, and Advisory Committee on FEPC.89 There appears to be little
follow up, and MOWM’s local chapters tended to choose issues that hit closest to
home.90
In New York, Myers had the MOWM branch “agog” with her proposal to
borrow $2,000 from local people so that MOWM could underwrite a finance
campaign expected to net $25,000. She was enthusiastic, but McLauren was
skeptical of “the physical ability to carry through such a program.”91 McLauren’s
quiet feud resurfaced the following year, when he placed blame for the poor
performance of the Capitol branch on her, commenting to Randolph that “only a
miracle will make possible the success of the campaign.” McLauren made the issue
personal, privately writing Randolph, “I am more and more discouraged about the
things I hear relating to our good friend Pauline.”92 A couple weeks later, MOWM’s
Steering Committee called for Myers’ resignation effective January 1944.
Myers’ year with the organization as a full‐time paid staff member was
fraught with conflict, especially with McLauren, who told Randolph that Myers was
“a great failure” with so little credibility that she could not “even win the support of
the people she must rely upon.”93 Anna Hedgeman briefly stepped in and
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temporarily filled the position. Hedgeman impressed even the most critical of
observers and got “nothing but praise” during her first few days at MOWM’s office.94
Myers quickly moved on to a more lucrative position as administrative assistant in
the Fraternal Order of Negro Churches. She was ambivalent towards her new
employer, whom she worked for “in abeyance because of my sincere loyalty to the
March on Washington Movement.”95 Instead of authoring treatises on Non‐Violent
Goodwill Direct Action and speaking to primarily African American audiences on
MOWM’s behalf, Myers’ now found herself lobbying Congressmen for anti‐
discrimination policy.96 As with many jobs in Myers’ career, this one was short‐
lived, and within a couple of years she left to work as J. Finley Wilson’s assistant.
The pattern repeated again, and she was “dropped from Elkdom on the ground that I
created too much jealousy on the part of the women of the order.”97 According to
her old friend Pauli Murray, Myers then picked up work with what became the
United Negro College Fund, a position that she held until the mid‐1950s.98
Myers’ short but busy tenure coincided with MOWM adopting non‐violent
direct action as its distinguishing feature. Without marching on Washington,
MOWM had to do something to merit its existence, and she was primarily
responsible for communicating the organization’s message to the broadest possible
audience. Championing this protest tactic and tackling single‐issues like Winfred
Lynn’s challenge to conscription into the segregated military became the
organization’s raison d’être.99 The work required during MOWM’s transition took its
toll on Myers, who missed the “We Are Americans, Too” conference due to a two‐
week hospitalization with high blood sugar requiring insulin.100 Physical ailments
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did not detract from her commitment to fighting America’s racial status quo. She
remained connected to issues of race, equality, and social justice for the rest of her
career.
Myers’ persistent employment in progressive organizations after separating
from MOWM challenges Nancy and Dwight MacDonald’s lackluster appraisal of the
organization’s office under her direction as “the most tremendous waste of time and
energy” because it lacked central planning and did not generate a reliable
publication to keep membership informed about the organization’s happenings.101
Largely because MOWM’s paid staff was so small, Myers was integral to its daily
operations. Ironically, her absence was most strongly felt by Randolph’s close
friend, “the capable and hardworking” Benjamin McLaurin, on whom the burden of
doing Myers’ work fell.102 Presumably, McLaurin did not mind the extra work. Even
though McLaurin had to pick up most of the slack in Myers’ absence, his signature
joined that of Aldrich Turner, Lawrence Ervin, and Layle Lane on a memorandum
criticizing Myers for being “not as successful as had been hoped and expected.”103
Indeed, there were high hopes for this young organizer from Richmond, Virginia.
This “courageous, efficient, and dynamic” activist with experience working on issues
of peace and justice was brought on board to work on a severely limited budget for
an organization with little capacity to develop sustainable revenue.104 Finances
were in such disarray towards the end of Myers’ tenure that Randolph resorted to
asking all twenty‐two members of MOWM’s Executive Committee for a loan to
establish “a sound financial basis.”105 MOWM’s financial disarray was due to more
to poor implementation than lack of planning. MOWM’s Executive Committee drew
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up an elaborate fund raising scheme that tapped existing African American
institutions for financial help. This included asking pastors to have an “after
collection” during their Sunday services for MOWM. This plan also included
identifying and soliciting donations from professional men and women, pursuing
special gifts from targeted individuals, and directing appeals to politically active
Elks lodges and unions.106 In general, revenue from membership was a small part of
MOWM’s overall finances. Voluntary collections at MOWM events reinforced the
organizational and personal donations that barely kept the national office financially
solvent.107

A Lost Cause: Maintaining a Local Chapter in Washington DC
The disastrous experience of MOWM’s branch in Washington, D.C., is a useful
example for illuminating the problems of praxis that MOWM officials like Myers
experienced when they compensated for poor local leadership and tried to organize
chapters from the top‐down. Thurman Dodson headed MOWM’s symbolically
important Washington, D.C. chapter. Dodson faced unfavorable circumstances that
hamstrung his efforts to create a movement in the city that was supposed to host the
march. Dodson also worked alone. Unlike in other locales, Washington’s NAACP
branch openly refuted MOWM, refusing to assist with any planning or logistics for
the demonstration. As illustrated later in this dissertation, the organizational fault
line in Washington was a stark contrast to cities like St. Louis, where the most
enthusiastic activists maintained membership in NAACP and MOWM. Even though
the march never happened, the issue was more than a moot point because the local
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NAACP remained hostile during the next couple of years. NAACP DC’s wrath
towards MOWM flared up in response to MOWM’s exclusively Black membership
policy, and “refused to endorse the march.” One of the loudest critics was Gertrude
Stone, a White activist who was an officer in the local NAACP.108 Animosity flowed
both ways, with Dodson doubting the NAACP’s “ultimate sincerity in any cause.”
Like George Schuyler in the satirical novel Black No More, he alleged that the NAACP
was overly concerned with securing permanent funding for professional agitators
than actually getting important legislation passed. Without citing much evidence,
Dodson charged that “the NAACP has become infiltrated with outright Communists
and fellow travelers,” especially in the Capitol branch.109 Whether for ideological or
political reasons, MOWM’s hard and fast adherence to its all‐Black policy sometimes
caused the organization to lose support of important allies in a crucial city to its
success. The rupture between NAACP and MOWM in Washington, D.C., persisted
through a change of the guard in local NAACP leadership and dogged MOWM’s
efforts to organize in that city.110 Membership statistics best illustrate MOWM’s
inability to capture the imaginations and gain recruitments in the most symbolically
important city that the fledgling organization tried to bring its operations. 1943 FBI
reports place membership at DC MOWM at a paltry twenty. In comparison, this
same source identified 2,500‐7,000 members in Chicago and 4,000 in St. Louis.111
In summer of 1941, Ralph Bunche, Rayford Logan, Rosina Tucker, Mary
Church Terrell, and Jeanetta Welch joined Dodson to help make the march occur.
These clubwomen, members of the labor movement, and the Black intelligentsia
coalesced less than two months before the July marching date to hash out a plan for
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mobilizing African Americans in the D.C. metro area. This involved placing a “key
person” in charge of each of the city’s quadrants. In every quadrant, there were 10
block captains who, in turn, recruited 10 members. With simple math, this plan
should bring at least 1,000 marchers from every quadrant, with the exception of the
Northwest, which had all of its figures doubled.112 Without an event occurring to
gauge their success, it is impossible to definitively measure the impact of their
efforts. It is possible, though not necessarily likely, that the Washington Committee
on Negro Protest had the capacity to get somewhere between 5,000 and 15,000
residents out supporting the march.113 This opinion is based on the fact that little to
nothing seems to have happened in the following year and the city’s MOWM branch
was virtually non‐existent by the time Pauline Myers’ abortive 1943 attempt to
revive it.
Even after the July 1941 demonstration was anti‐climactically cancelled,
Dodson had trouble finding a place to legally demonstrate. Bureaucratic roadblocks
combined with a general lack of local enthusiasm, making it difficult for Randolph to
call for another march on Washington during the ensuing war years. The opposition
that Dodson and others faced to getting permits for demonstrations suggests that
the federal government was opposed allowing MOWM to march in the capitol at any
point in the organization’s life. In November 1942, red tape prohibited Dodson from
leading a picket outside of the Senate. Complying with regulations meant that
demonstrators could not encroach a specific distance of the building. This meant
that instead of a couple hundred picketers making a visually impressive
demonstration, the picket line would need 500‐1000 demonstrators who could
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surround the necessary one‐mile circumference of the United States’ highest
legislative body.114
MOWM had trouble acquiring appropriate permits even when events were
far away from the National Mall. In 1942, Washington was supposed to join Chicago
and New York as sites of major MOWM rallies. Inability to secure a baseball stadium
used by the MLB franchise Washington Senators forced Randolph to reconsider, and
the third major rally was, perhaps propitiously, relocated to St. Louis.115 Decades
later, in correspondence between Randolph and historian Herbert Garfinkle,
MOWM’s national leader attributed his organization’s disappointing record in the
Capitol to “the conservative climate of Washington, among both white and colored
people.”116 Randolph glossed over racial divisions and bureaucratic aggression from
government officials, but his reminiscences complete the explanation for why one of
MOWM’s weakest branches was in Washington. With greater support in this
important strategic and symbolic city, MOWM and Randolph would have been
insulated from the charge of being paper tigers.
If DC MOWM ever had support from the local community, it was during the
summer of 1941 when the organization was fresh and its message new. 2,000
people came out for a reception at the Watergate Hotel celebrating MOWM’s success
with the passing of E.O. 8802.117 Orators that evening included Jeanetta Welch from
the AKA Sorority, Walter White from the NAACP, Mayor LaGuardia, and, of course, a
keynote address by Randolph.118 Press accounts that evening remarked that
LaGuardia praised E.O. 8802 but did not consider it “a complete victory.” Otherwise,
this was an “ideal night and an ideal setting” for a celebration of what was arguably
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an anti‐racist capstone on the New Deal.119 Attendance that evening suggests that
MOWM’s ironically weak Washington chapter was the result of grassroots
disillusion with Randolph’s leadership after the march that they enthusiastically
supported was unilaterally cancelled.
Although MOWM never actually led a march on Washington and its branch in
that city was ineffective, the organization had other chapters that coordinated
locally‐sensitive campaigns within the broad framework of Black‐led struggles
against racial inequality during the Second World War. In Chicago, this impulse
gave MOWM a large membership base that was ultimately crippled by internal
divisions that hindered effective organizing. Likewise, in Denver there was a small
but active cadre of members who tried to attack employment discrimination in
public utilities, while in New York, long a hub of Black protest in the United States,
MOWM confronted issues ranging from police brutality and violence against
African‐American GIs to employment discrimination by insurance companies.
Finally, in St. Louis, this translated into a vigilant attack against racial discrimination
in the hiring practices of defense plants and a sit‐in campaign at area restaurants.120
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CHAPTER 4
WARTIME ST. LOUIS AND THE
GENESIS OF MOWM IN THE GATEWAY CITY

“Winning Democracy for the Negro is Winning the War for Democracy.”
‐ MOWM Slogan1

In June 1942, a group of NAACP members and clubwomen in St. Louis staged
public demonstrations outside of manufacturing plants that filled defense contracts
but openly violated E.O. 8802 by not offering equal employment opportunity.
Calling themselves the “March on Washington Movement, St. Louis unit,” this “little
band of Spartans” was spearheaded T.D. McNeal, David and Thelma Grant, Nita
Blackwell, Ruth and Henry Wheeler, Pearl Maddux, and Leyton Weston.2 Over the
course of three years, St. Louis MOWM’s pickets and protests reliably brought out
150‐500 demonstrators. The diligence of activists and community support for
MOWM campaigns propelled the upstart organization, in the words of historian
Clarence Lang, to “the center of black St. Louis militancy during the war.” Their
presence gave authority to McNeal and Grant, who functioned as ambassadors to St.
Louis’ economic and political power structures.3 African Americans in St. Louis who
agitated through MOWM were certainly not among what George Schuyler identified
as the “many embittered, bewildered black folk” passively waiting for ephemeral
leaders to galvanize movements with proclamations and platitudes.4 St. Louis’
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African American newspapers cheered St. Louis MOWM for “its ability to hold the
continued interest of a cross‐section of the local citizenry,” and for its ability to
transform this interest into action.5 United by their opposition to racism and their
commitment to “faith…in a working democracy,” members of St. Louis MOWM
challenged just about every element of racism in their city – and sometimes they
won.6 Their efforts to “crack” St. Louis, a city some alleged “by comparison with
other cities is the seat of undemocratic and reactionary labor policies,” hastened the
economic integration of over 10,000 African Americans into defense industries and
eventually contributed to the desegregation of public consumer spaces.7
MOWM dove into a strong current of protest in St. Louis that, in an easy
tautology, indicated the presence of problematic racial conditions. With two strong
African American newspapers and an active NAACP, MOWM was hardly the first
“militant” African American protest organization on the scene.8 Even before
MOWM’s arrival, St. Louis was “the main center of black protest in Missouri.”9 In
1942, the year that the St. Louis MOWM branch was chartered, the local NAACP
drafted and distributed a “Creed of the American Negro” that African American
newspapers in the area reprinted. Opening with a salvo that “I am an American
citizen. My countrymen call me Negro. But no matter what I am called, the fact
remains that I am a citizen of the United States of America, native born.” Arguing
that African Americans had a history of loyalty to the United States proven by
sacrifice on battlefields dating back to Revolutionary War hero Crispus Attucks, the
“Creed of the American Negro” outlined racially inequitable issues culminating with
“nine millions of me to be denied the right to vote for the very sheriff who may stand
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between me and the mob that would lynch me.” The NAACP publicized an image of
a racial landscape in which segregated “slum ghettos” and marginalization from the
“employment feast” proceeded unabated by “fruitless investigations.” Race in
America, according to the St. Louis NAACP, was the ultimate “test of democracy…
[the] test of my country’s integrity of soul, her honesty of purpose” and a general
litmus of the nation’s legitimacy as the leader of the free world.10
Rhetoric emanating from St. Louis’ NAACP and MOWM chapters was
unquestionably patriotic. Members of these organizations believed that their
critique of current affairs was part of an effort to bring the United States closer to
their understanding of American ideals and equality of citizenship.11 Their analysis
was consistent with a wartime trend in which African American protest rhetoric
juxtaposed the loyalty of Black citizens against unabated racial discrimination to
argue for immediate dismantling of the structures and unequal power relations
characterizing White supremacy.12 Many African Americans of that era adhered to
an expansive definition of “democracy” that was synonymous with racial
egalitarianism. Emphasizing lofty ideals articulated in the Declaration of
Independence allowed them to make racial equality an American ideal that equated
democracy with human rights. For example, MOWM member Lawrence Ervin
defined democracy as a political system that valued “the long‐term interest of the
welfare, and happiness of all the people…it respects the personality of every
individual; it seeks to develop in him a sense of belongingness…It encourages and
directs him to respect himself and to make the best of his natural gifts, to develop
his own unique personality.”13
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MOWM’s local activity flourished where BSCP organizers were schooled in
longstanding battles against racism.14 Fighting for civil rights and confronting
issues beyond traditional labor struggles was deeply rooted in BSCP practice
because men and women who were affiliated with the union saw it as “not a Labor
Union but a way of life.”15 In Chicago and St. Louis, for instance, BSCP organizers
Charles Wesley Burton and T.D. McNeal were integral towards galvanizing their
communities and transforming ferment into political activism.16 As with most of the
union’s chapters, BSCP members in St. Louis were pillars of the local community
who believed in racial uplift and supported mutual benefit programs.17 Small deeds
solidified solidarity among union members and ultimately created greater support
for the union throughout the city’s African American community. On holidays, the
union made it a habit to visit families of infirm members with gift baskets, and
occasionally, cash to help through difficult times.18 T.D. McNeal, E.J. Bradley, and
Leyton Weston brought these kind of values to activism that they hoped would
bring “St. Louis a little nearer to the democratic ideal by the time our boys come
back from the wars where they are placing their very lives on an altar of sacrifice in
the name of democracy.”19
Through the efforts of devoted local activists, MOWM captured enough
headlines in the early 1940s to be mentioned alongside the NAACP and NUL as
leading organizations fighting racism.20 Though overlooked by many historians,
MOWM’s reputation as an uncompromising defender of African American political
and economic rights was largely attributable to the ability of its local chapters to
address issues pertinent in a particular community. As what one sociologist labeled
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a “conflict group” that relied on creating and exploiting social tension, St. Louis
MOWM coordinated a series of protests during the Second World War that made a
considerable dent in the city’s maintenance of segregated public spaces and created
more employment opportunities for Black workers.21
Enthusiasm for MOWM in the Gateway City was so high that it even surprised
Randolph.22 The quantity and zeal of MOWM activists caused an FBI agent in the St.
Louis field division to dryly report that “Negroes are restless and are pressing
demands for equal opportunities with white people in industry.”23 The brief period
that MOWM dominated Black activism in St. Louis corresponded with the
conception of “a new dimension to the concept of civil rights” in which campaigns
for desegregating public space combined with advocacy for equal access to
employment in industries feeding the transitory but lucrative arsenal of
democracy.24 St. Louis MOWM embodied a trend in labor activism dating back to
the Depression in which “local black organizations used the tactics of organized
labor” to fight both management and existing workers in order to secure equal
employment opportunity for African Americans.25 Nationally, this cracked the
fortress of exclusion that impeded African Americans from fully participating in
America’s economic life. In St. Louis, MOWM’s appropriation of the tactics and
language used by labor radicals in the 1930s helped open thousands of jobs to Black
workers, 60% of whom were looking for work during the Depression.26 Layle Lane
accurately summarized this facet of MOWM’s work as part of “our struggle to be
fully integrated into American democracy so that we may use our labor power and
skill to help in the defense of our country.”27
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Like many African Americans at that time, St. Louis MOWM activists
identified the United States as “a strong‐hold of democracy” and pledged their
support for an Allied victory.28 Their rhetoric was congruent with MOWM’s national
office, which consistently affirmed that African Americans, as “part of the warp and
woof of these United States,” were “vitally concerned” with an American victory in
the war and “in the triumph of the expressed aims of the war” as outlined in
Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms and the eight‐point Atlantic Charter. This interpretation
of the war emphasized human dignity, racial equality, and the sovereignty of both
individuals and nation‐states so long as human rights were not trampled upon.29
MOWM’s patriotism was far from blind, and it was certainly not unconditional. As a
spokesperson and recognized leader of the fledgling organization, McNeal
connected civil rights with military conquest on grounds that America’s stated
democratic objectives “can’t be reached so long as democracy is denied to the Negro
or any other segment of our population.”30
MOWM generated political capital by relying on grassroots support from a
cross‐section of African Americans in St. Louis. At least rhetorically, the image of
being truly representative qualified the organization to speak for the city’s Black
population. MOWM’s efforts were so successful that one participant, reflecting
decades later, called it “the most significant grassroots movement for new job
opportunities” during the Second World War.31 St. Louis MOWM cooperated with
pre‐existing protest organizations, most notably the NAACP, but also the Fellowship
of Reconciliation and, to a lesser extent, the St. Louis Urban League.32 This
represented a best‐case scenario for what MOWM’s national office saw itself as – an
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umbrella organization that coordinated the efforts of racially progressive activists
affiliated with other groups. At least on paper, MOWM’s tendency for cooperation is
consistent with a historical trend in another organization affiliated with Randolph,
the BSCP. This union built an organizational base through the support of various
African American institutions such as fraternities, lodges, women’s clubs, and
business leagues. These seemingly disparate groups coalesced to mobilize support
for what became the cream of Black America’s non‐professional male crop.33 Fervor
for protest was high in St. Louis well before MOWM established a branch there. Led
by Sidney Redmond, the St. Louis County NAACP branch supported Randolph’s call
to march on the capitol and prepared to send 110 members to Washington, D.C.34
St. Louis MOWM’s emphasis on gaining jobs in war industries meant that it worked
for many of the same ends as the local Urban League.35 The obvious connection
between the ultimate mission of securing jobs for African American workers
perhaps best evidenced by the fact that John T. Clark was director of the St. Louis
Urban League and, though his tenure was short‐lived, St. Louis MOWM’s first
chairman.36
St. Louis MOWM activists tapped a moment that they thought was ripe for
progress. African Americans in St. Louis developed a “deep resentment…just prior
to the outbreak of the war” germinating from unfulfilled promises by major
employers and persistent segregation in a city that was becoming increasingly
“southern.” According to one observer with an interesting strand of regional
nativism, St. Louis was being overrun by “ignorant hicks” whose complexion
allowed them to step ahead of presumably urbane and respectable African
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Americans for jobs in retail and industrial businesses.37 In McNeal’s words, if
African Americans could not secure lucrative employment during the war, “what
chance will we ever have to get in when the mad scramble for the few available jobs
starts after the emergency?”38 Across the nation, Walter White, a fair and perceptive
observer of racial discrimination, noticed that skilled African Americans in the
building trades were “victims of collusion” between the AFL union chapters and
prospective employers, the end result of which was Black workers being shut out of
jobs filling lucrative defense contracts.39
The FBI and the African American press outside the city recognized that St.
Louis was one of MOWM’s most active locales.40 Uniquely situated at the northern
territory of Jim Crow and at the gateway to the American west, St. Louis’ geography
made it important tactically and symbolically. “The anomaly of our geographic
position,” noted a daily newspaper as “neither south, north, east nor west,” made it a
dynamic place that was targeted by wartime migrants. This self‐proclaimed
“crossroads city” was populated by “elements reflecting the sentiments” of the
entire nation, creating a demographic mixture that some thought made St. Louis “in
the past, in the matter of race relations, more than a level‐headed town.”41 Modern
historians contest this image of St. Louis as a city too diverse to fight, and they
depict St. Louis as a fully segregated southern‐style city comparable to Cincinnati.42
Competing images of St. Louis’ character is best seen in contradictory accounts from
the White and Black press. To the St. Louis Post Dispatch, a White‐owned daily, “St.
Louis has a long and admirable record of broad‐minded tolerance…this city has
been for years one of the nation’s leaders in maintenance of civil liberties.”43 One
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year earlier, the Chicago Defender offered a different perspective, portraying the city
as “one of the largest defense materials manufacturing sections of the nation, and
one in which members of this racial group are most grossly victimized.”44
Racial inequality in St. Louis was not as pervasive as in other southern cities
such as Birmingham and Jackson, but it was, according to one of the city’s African
American newspapers, a city “pock‐marked with little jim crows.”45 There was
room for an organization like MOWM to make progress because, unlike the isolated
dungeons in the Deep South, discrimination was at least debatable.46 The
parameters of urban segregation meant that African Americans in St. Louis
maintained strong Black institutions and had a long history of organized social and
political life. MOWM tapped this tradition and briefly become the city’s leading
voice of militant protest during the Second World War.47
As in most mid‐twentieth century United States cities, African Americans
were residentially clustered by custom and remained in place by collusion from the
Real Estate Exchange. St. Louis’ 108,765 African Americans overwhelmingly resided
in segregated areas plagued by the typical list of conditions that came along with
urbanized inequality.48 As members of an urban working class, African Americans
in St. Louis generally faced high population density, poor street lighting, flagrant
violations of building codes, inadequate plumbing, and unreliable garbage
disposal.49 There were areas of progress, most notably through the 1937 slum
clearance program. In less than five years, the U.S. Housing Authority oversaw the
construction of more than 120,000 new homes in St. Louis, and African Americans
resided in a third of them. In one predominantly Black area, 459 residents on
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“several blocks of one of the worst slum districts in St. Louis” saw their
neighborhood razed and replaced with “new and modern buildings” with room for
658 families in “clean, standard dwelling units.”50 Still, environmental issues in the
city’s predominantly African American neighborhoods remained problems through
the war years.
The presence of 2,500 African American soldiers at Fort Leonard Wood’s
Jefferson Barracks, recently constructed in 1940 on the outskirts of town, added
another layer to St. Louis’ complicated and often contradictory race relations.51 As
in nearly all United States military posts during World War II, African‐American
soldiers stationed at Fort Leonard Wood served in segregated units under uniformly
White officers. St. Louis was not unique in the fact that the presence of Black
enlisted men incited fear from White residents surrounding the base. Without
referencing any specific incident, an FBI report noted that “Allegations have been
spread that Negroes, presumably soldiers, have molested white families and as a
result anti‐Negro sentiment is at a high pitch.52
African American men in uniform did not participate in St. Louis MOWM’s
protests, but their image was conscripted to dramatize similarities between racial
discrimination in the United States and the extremism of Nazi Germany.53 African
Americans at Jefferson Barracks did not have to protest in the streets to be
symbolically important. Their status as enlisted men in uniform who were prepared
to make the typical sacrifices of soldiers was enough to invest their presence with
meaning. Indeed, the first all‐Black parade in Jefferson Barracks’ history brought
out local celebrities including T.D. McNeal, fellow MOWM member and Pine Street
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YMCA director James Cook, and Mayor William Becker.54 The experience of African
American soldiers serving in segregated units like Jefferson Barracks was, according
to one historian, “an important symbol,” because “if one could not participate fully in
the defense of his country, he could not lay claim to the rights of a full‐fledged
citizen.”55 The African American media played up this image through the Double V
campaign, which was a rhetorical movement that inspired soldiers and citizens
alike.56 One of these African American soldiers was St. Louis MOWM member
Roscoe MeCrary, who was stationed “deep in the heart of Texas” at Camp Swift.
MeCrary occasionally wrote home requesting minutes from weekly meetings or to
“tell the members I said hello and continue the fight of right” in what, for him, was a
personal battle against racism within ranks.57
St. Louis MOWM identified unequal access to employment opportunity as the
greatest racial injustice facing African Americans during the war. Black and White
dominated the discourse of race and jobs in St. Louis because the city had little other
racial or ethnic diversity.58 St. Louis’ racial demographics were literally a black and
white issue which the St. Louis Argus defined as “the chief question among our
people has been what part are we to play in the…industries which are engaging in
production of the things that are needed for National Defense.”59 Speaking with the
authority of two decades in the labor movement, MOWM chairman T.D. McNeal
reached a similar conclusion when he identified “the chief crisis of the Negro
people” during the Second World War as the “crisis of the Negro worker.”60 David
Grant echoed McNeal’s sentiments the following year. At a weekend‐long seminar
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about race relations in St. Louis, Grant spoke with a sense of urgency because “If we
are excluded now, where will we work when the war emergency is over?”61
African Americans faced the problem of carving a niche for themselves in the
wartime economy “because the Negro people have no great captains of industry, no
landed aristocrats, no powerful financers. We are just working people.”62 St. Louis’
diversified manufacturing base meant that the city made just about everything
during the war including ordnances, aircraft, combat boots, medical supplies,
electric generators, and steel helmets.63 African Americans were abysmally
underrepresented in nearly all of the city’s largest employers and they “did the
meanest work at the lowest pay” while being concentrated “into generally janitorial
capacities” throughout the roughly 200 defense plants in the area that, combined,
represented 82% of defense contracts in Missouri.64 The fact that these
manufacturers operated with public funding in the wake of E.O. 8802 suggested to
the city’s Black residents that their economic woes could only be addressed by
aggressive action.
As one of the city’s major organs of Black opinion, the St. Louis American was
“Perturbed and disappointed because local defense plants still refuse to employ
Negro skilled workers,” creating a situation that prompted some to migrate as far as
Washington, D.C., in search of jobs.65 Nationally, the combination of increased
demand for industrial laborers coupled with a shortage of able‐bodied White males
to hasten the proportional increase of African Americans working in defense
industries from 5.8 percent to 8.2 percent.66 In St. Louis, increased opportunity did
not occur through free market machinations, and E.O. 8802 meant little until
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activists forced the issue and pressed defense contractors to hire qualified African
American workers. St. Louis MOWM chairman T.D. McNeal saw the Reconstruction
Amendments as precedent for the issues he faced because they taught him that “we
must keep in mind the fact that laws and executive orders confer rights, but
organization is the source of power.” In the American system, this meant that
political power developed when pressure politics of public protest, letter writing,
and mass mobilization supplemented voting.67 As critical patriots dedicated to
achieving racial equality in the United States, members of St. Louis MOWM hoped
that they could bring the United States closer to democratic ideals.68
St. Louis MOWM addressed many of the typical indignities faced by Black
communities in the Jim Crow American South, but forcing change at companies
openly violating E.O. 8802 was the organization’s primary issue.69 In the words of
historian Ronald Takaki, “The Arsenal of Democracy was not democratic: defense
jobs were not open to all regardless of race.”70 Nationally, the upswing in defense
production eventually ended massive unemployment that plagued the country for
over a decade. Early indicators from elsewhere in Missouri revealed that defense
plants would shy away from hiring in African American workers. In Kansas City, for
instance, several companies excused their racially exclusive workforce by blaming
White workers for refusing to work alongside African Americans.71 Those that did
hire African Americans tended to pigeonhole them into menial labor in completely
segregated divisions, a problem that was endemic in many industries and was
publicized through anecdotes in the African American press.72 St. Louis MOWM
volunteers addressed the situation by investigating employment conditions and
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compiling statistics at defense plants, ultimately turning over their findings to the
FEPC in 1944. These investigations gave empirical backing to stories circulating
throughout the city about African Americans who had been employed with
companies for nearly a decade without a promotion, of Black workers not being
considered as serious applicants for positions with rapidly expanding companies,
and of the marginalization of African Americans in the military as poorly trained
“boot blacks.”73 A composite of findings from St. Louis MOWM turned into FEPC
revealed that African Americans were disproportionately under‐represented in all
of the major defense plants. As seen in Table 2, even though the African American
population in St. Louis hovered around 12‐13% prior to the Second World War, they
comprised a less than a quarter of that proportion among the ranks of employees at
the investigated plants.74 Though incomplete, these figures depict widespread
exclusion or marginalization of African American workers throughout St. Louis’
defense production force.
It seemed obvious that “discrimination hurts production,” and some
observers even feared that American democracy might implode under the weight of
White supremacy.75 David Grant saw racism as both unpatriotic and unpractical, for
it created an artificial scarcity of workers available for national defense and
impeded the development of positive morale among disaffected African
Americans.76 St. Louis MOWM’s investigation found that most African American
defense workers were clustered into a small set of plants, which means that many
employers simply refused to hire them at all.77 An early 1941 study by the National
Urban League forecasted the shortage of trained defense workers, a problem that
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was even more pronounced among young African American women.78 By 1945, the
national picture of Black employment was, in the words of one scholar, “relatively
easy to describe…because the overwhelming weight of evidence shows that Negroes
are concentrated disproportionately in unskilled, menial jobs…and occupy skilled
jobs mainly in Negro communities.”79 As indicated in Table 2, St. Louis defense
contractors practiced widespread racial discrimination.80 The scarcity of
employment opportunities for African American workers in a temporary but rapidly
expanding industrial sector prompted St. Louis MOWM’s outrage, making securing
jobs in businesses operating with public funds the organization’s greatest concern.81
Like the national office, St. Louis MOWM was founded as an umbrella
organization coordinating protest activity “to secure complete integration of Negro
workers in war industries.”82 Direct action was seen as necessary because a distant
FEPC gave recalcitrant defense contractors “little to fear.”83 McNeal’s personal
response to a small donation demonstrates two things: his commitment to
cooperation with existing Black institutions and the importance of their support for
the fledgling organization. In his reply, McNeal thanked the Booklover’s Club, and
added that “The greatest fear of the oppressor is the unity of the oppressed.”84 Since
St. Louis MOWM literally started from the ground up, its members often contributed
their time and talents through their affiliation with other civic organizations, labor
unions, and social clubs.
Cross‐membership between St. Louis MOWM and other African American
organizations was strongly pronounced, especially in its early months. Individuals
identified themselves as MOWM members only after the organization made a name
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for itself in St. Louis protest politics. For example, when St. Louis MOWM staged its
first public demonstration at U.S. Cartridge on May 5, 1942, reporters noted that
attendees came from Business and Professional Women’s organizations and “Negro
Trade Union Auxiliaries” such as the St. Louis chapter of the Brotherhood of
Sleeping Car Porters.85 St. Louis MOWM’s penchant for collaboration is also seen in
its work alongside the Missouri State Association of Negro Teachers on a campaign
to level the pay of African American educators with that of their White counterparts.
From its inception, St. Louis MOWM appealed to the spectrum of African American
organizations by attacking issues that attracted a broad audience. In the instance of
the teacher’s salary campaign, St. Louis MOWM cooperated with local chapters of
the NAACP and Elks Lodge as well as the Mound City Bar Association.86 Cross‐
membership and organizational cooperation does not appear to have deleteriously
affected or undercut any of the civic, trade, and fraternal groups that St. Louis
MOWM collaborated with.87 This is evidenced by the fact that none of MOWM’s
members renounced her or his previous organizational affiliation. St. Louis MOWM
added to the richness of the city’s African American institutions because it
developed leadership amongst its more committed members and it did not cause
the membership base of existing groups to decline. People joined MOWM because it
offered an exciting program that reflected the general mood of Black St. Louis in the
Second World War. This mood, according to one editorial, was “impatient” as a “pig
whose neck is under a fence rail.”88
Much of St. Louis MOWM’s success is attributable to the character of the
individuals who joined it. The organization was driven by individuals who were
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familiar with social or political activities and who liked to be involved with planning
or participating in group operations. The ethos of supporting and participating in
Black institutions was strong in St. Louis, and MOWM advantageously tapped these
ethics. In A. Philip Randolph’s words, MOWM attracted “loyal, patriotic Negro
Americans. We love our country. We love our race. We love the human race. We
have no use for Nazis, Communists or Fascists or their works.”89 Randolph’s
caricature of his organization’s membership might be simplified, but it suggests that
MOWM courted African Americans from the mainstream of Black protest and
energized them by emphasizing direct action. These were the kind of people whom
Mary McLeod Bethune thought indicated “a New Negro has arisen in America,” that
was “militant in spirit” and whose contributions to the struggle for racial equality
would “save America from itself.”90
As in the NAACP, MOWM’s local branches had considerable autonomy from
the parent organization. Beyond borrowing its organizational structure and
enthusiasm for protest politics, St. Louis MOWM conducted its affairs with little
prompting from the national office.91 Discrepancy between the national office’s
platform and St. Louis MOWM’s programs offers a glaring example of the
disjuncture between national policy and local practice. In 1943, just about the only
thing that united national and local programs was the extensive resources expended
by MOWM’s headquarters to school activists in the techniques of Non‐Violent
Goodwill Direct Action.92 Grassroots autonomy should not be interpreted as disdain
for MOWM’s national office. In fact, the opposite was true, as Randolph’s presence
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in the city usually corresponded with a measurable increase in attendance at
MOWM sponsored events.93
An exception to this generalization about the relationship of grassroots
protest to MOWM’s official bureaucracy is the 1942 Poona Jail cablegram, which was
an overseas telegram supportive of Gandhi’s leadership. Prior to a major MOWM
rally at Kiel Municipal Auditorium, Randolph wrote McNeal instructing him to “find
out the cost…and let me know so that the March on Washington Movement of St.
Louis may send it.” Randolph took it upon himself to “suggest” McNeal offer
supportive comments on India’s anti‐colonial struggle in his discussions with local
Black newspapers.94 Though signed by St. Louis MOWM, the Poona Jail Cablegram
came verbatim from the national office. While its sincerity in solidarity with
Gandhi’s struggle against imperialism is unquestionable, the lack of local
enthusiasm beyond presenting it as a resolution at a rally indicates that members of
St. Louis MOWM identified more strongly with issues that hit closer to home.95
Gandhi’s anti‐colonial struggles were important to Randolph, who believed that “the
patterns of oppression and exploitation are brutally similar throughout the world,”
and thus followed global affairs closely in search of ways to confront racism in the
United States.96 Randolph’s internationalism was not necessarily a product of his
own. In a letter to the MOWM figurehead just days before the Kiel Auditorium rally,
Pauli Murray took time from a summer vacation on Martha’s Vineyard to urge him
that MOWM get involved in Indian decolonization. Not surprisingly, Murray advised
that the scope of MOWM’s involvement should include a telegram “to Gandhi at the
prison” informing the leader of African American support for his cause.97 In this
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example, Murray undeniably influenced Randolph’s directive, which was, in turn,
the only one of its kind pertaining to St. Louis MOWM.98
The above‐mentioned exception aside, St. Louis MOWM was directed and
driven by issues defined by local membership.99 This is not to say that MOWM’s
chapters existed independently from the national office. If this were the case,
MOWM would hardly be worthy of being called an organization. MOWM’s national
office kept its distance from the St. Louis chapter, only getting involved in local
affairs when national events necessitated an immediate response.100 In St. Louis,
and possibly in other cities, local activists borrowed a framework from the national
organization to guide their political responses to racial inequality. Members of St.
Louis MOWM like T.D. McNeal, David Grant, and Pearl Maddox were, to appropriate
the poetics used by one team of scholars writing about the seminal importance of
grassroots activism to African American protest politics, among the innumerable
“local people [who] drove the Black Freedom movement: they organized it,
imagined it, mobilized and cultivated it, they did the daily work that made the
struggle possible and endured the drudgery and retaliation, fear and anticipation,
joy and comradeship that building a movement entails.”101

Portraits of St. Louis MOWM Members
Once the national march was cancelled, organic leaders emerged from a
vernal pool of local activists whose germination kept MOWM alive during the war
years. African Americans brought the march into their own communities through
pickets, demonstrations, and rallies. In St. Louis, African Americans used MOWM to
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respond to racial inequality almost a full year before MOWM policy urged, “local
marches on city and government buildings be held by local chapters.”102 One can
speculate as to whether the individuals driving St Louis MOWM could have found an
outlet for their activism in the city’s NAACP, Urban League, or UNIA branches, but
the fact is that they coalesced around the namesake of a march that never occurred.
These working class people were unlikely to ever trek across the country to register
protest, but they were energized by an organization headed by individuals who
accrued political and social capitol through decades of involvement in the city’s
Black community.
MOWM’s national affairs deeply affected David Grant, prompting him to
rethink his approach to activism and leadership. After attending the “We Are
Americans, Too” conference in Chicago, Grant thought about ways to transform
issues and tactics discussed during the previous several days into focused and
effective protest. First, Grant identified the need for criteria to establish when a
demonstration could be organized and what causes should justify reaction. Second,
he thought it beneficial for local units to have a set of operating guidelines directing
the “preparation, discipline, and techniques of marching” so that local activism was
consistent throughout the movement. Grant believed that it was expedient to march
on every war plant and public utility that discriminated against African American
workers. Government offices and the postal service were not immune to his
expansive criteria for institutions subject to MOWM demonstrations, as were other
non‐specified “unique and unpredictable local situations” pending approval from
the national office. Not surprisingly, outright systematic denial of African American
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job applicants was a problem, but, if we can trust Grant’s nuanced account, defense
industries, public schools, and utility companies that did have African American
employees overwhelmingly clustered them in menial positions with little
opportunity for advancement. In general, St. Louis’ expanding workforce had little
room for African American women. Companies that did hire Black workers tended
to pay them lower wages than White counterparts. Finally, African Americans were
disproportionately dismissed whenever production stalled or there was a need to
scale back payroll.103 Grant’s observations as a citizen strongly influenced his
opinions as an organizer. Since the problem was widespread, he thought, the
solution needed to cover the breadth of issues that marginalized African American
workers.
As a new addition to the St. Louis scene, MOWM created more institutional
space for African American leadership to grow. The roll call of individuals willing to
“fight, sacrifice, & pay” for racial equality in wartime St. Louis seems endless.104 As
it did throughout the nation, MOWM could “draw from the little people” who were
inclined towards leadership and were “intelligent, thoughtful people…but who are
not considered generally in their communities.”105 Those who surface at points in
this study include T.D. McNeal, David Grant, Sallie Parham, Juanita Blackwell, Leyton
Weston, Thelma Maddox, Rev. James Bracy, Henry and Ruth Wheeler, Jordan
Chambers, and James Cook.
Before speaking on MOWM’s platform at Kiel Auditorium in 1942, Sallie
Parham established herself as one of the most prominent African American women
in the Gateway City. Parham directed the Pine Street YWCA and she spent her
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extracurricular time presiding over the local chapter of National Council of Business
and Professional Women. Parham’s strongest connection to MOWM came from her
status as a founding member of St. Louis’ BSCP Ladies’ Auxiliary. Parham
inexplicably disappeared from the spotlight after her 1942 speech, and she
remained out of public activism for the rest of the war. It is possible that gendered
limitations impeded her opportunity to assume a more responsible role in MOWM.
It is also possible, and probably more likely, that Parham was completely occupied
with a successful career and that she was comfortable with her leadership in two
other organizations.106
Nita Blackwell was among the many African Americans who refined
leadership skills while contributing to St. Louis MOWM. As the organization’s first
secretary, her work was an “especially valuable” asset at the outset of MOWM’s
“militant program.”107 Blackwell planned and facilitated weekly meetings at the
Pine Street YMCA, an outreach program that became a staple of MOWM’s
operations. Under MOWM member James E. Cook’s leadership, this institution often
provided low‐cost or free space for civic and political groups to conduct business
and host events.108 Unlike public rallies, which were mixed, nearly all of the
attendees frequenting the Pine Street YMCA meetings were women. The same
phenomenon happened in Chicago, prompting Milton Webster to complain, “There
are too many women mixed up in this thing anyhow.”109 Attendees used the weekly
meetings to plan public demonstrations, freely discuss local racial conditions,
disseminate information about employment opportunity, and, as Mrs. Marie
Harding Pace and Thelma McNeal did, share “an interesting article from Negro
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Reader’s Digest on Liberia” or offer readings from The Races of Man.110 Blackwell
“demonstrated a spirit of eternal vigilance” at these meetings, and she did not
hesitate to turn her wrath inward with challenges to MOWM’s male leaders when
their opinions diverged. In one such example, MOWM Treasurer Jordan Chambers
downplayed the FEPC’s importance in comparison to “other social gains.” Blackwell
contested Chambers with an “impromptu two minute speech” affirming MOWM’s
need to “be vigilant” and “constantly protest against injustice…Ku Klux Klanism and
Nazism,” with or without federal law on their side. This “brilliant young Fiskite”
energized St. Louis MOWM with her talent as a secretary and her diligence in
struggle prior to the 1944 sit‐ins.111 During lulls in high‐profile activity, these
weekly meetings maintained a venue through which St. Louis’ leading African
American figures rubbed elbows with each other and with less recognizable
members of the community. This strengthened relationships that, in terms more
familiar to activism, translated to greater solidarity among St. Louis MOWM’s
members.112
Blackwell relocated in autumn 1943 to Los Angeles for more comfortable and
stable work with the USO.113 Her departure came just as St. Louis MOWM began
cooperating with the Fellowship of Reconciliation on a project to train its members
in non‐violent direct action campaigns.114 Her absence was filled by other young
college‐trained African American women including “the winsome” Mrs. Marie
Harding Pace, Thelma Grant, and Thelma McNeal.115 These “Race women,” as a
Defender columnist noted, faced a triple burden – fighting “for her race, for her sex
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and she has to fight within her group to arouse to dormant, satisfied women” into a
motivated and socially conscious group of activists.116
Perhaps more than anyone else at the time, T.D. McNeal stands out as a
“fighting crusader” in St. Louis MOWM. His stature within the community and his
long record of representing the BSCP helped McNeal influence MOWM’s national
policy.117 McNeal only worked one year as a porter, but remained with the union as
an International Field Organizer for over a decade. McNeal earned Randolph’s trust,
which led to his appointment for a full‐time position with the BSCP in 1937.118 In
the course of two decades spent fighting for racially progressive cases, McNeal
gained the confidence of St. Louis’ African American residents, many of whom
recognized him for his leadership of the BSCP and participation in fund‐raising and
membership drives by the local NAACP.119 McNeal’s connection to the BSCP
financially sustained St. Louis MOWM from its inception, when the union donated
the initial $50 that started the new organization’s budget.120 For three years,
McNeal was at the head of a MOWM unit that was so well organized that even the
hypercritical Roy Wilkins commented favorably on their work.121
Born and educated in Arkansas, McNeal resided in St. Louis for twenty years ‐
by the time he organized the city’s MOWM unit.122 Incidentally, McNeal never
planned on relocating to or settling in St. Louis. He stopped by to summer with an
aunt en route to attending college in Washington. McNeal decided to remain there
because he “became interested in a girl” and he thought “blacks with a college
degree were not getting employment commensurate with their education.”123 As
the local leader of the most respected African American labor union, McNeal was an
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ideal candidate to bring a national movement to his adopted home city. The rhetoric
McNeal used and issues he fought for in the 1940s resurfaced two decades later in
campaign literature for his 1966 re‐election bid to the Missouri Senate, which
highlighted the activist‐turned politician’s “unity of purpose, moral discipline and
political independence.”124 Historians recognize McNeal as outstanding among his
generation, “one of the few Brotherhood officials to consistently fight for wider
employment opportunities for African American women,” a characteristic that
played a part in St. Louis MOWM’s embrace of women’s activism during the sit‐
ins.125
McNeal’s activist experience situated him squarely in the labor movement,
but he maintained cordial working relationships and longstanding friendships with
leaders of other African American civic organizations. The best example of this is
the twenty‐year long friendship between McNeal and local attorney, NAACP leader,
and MOWM supporter David Grant. At the beginning of their collaboration in what
could loosely be called a Double V campaign, Grant praised McNeal’s “meritorious
and unselfish services.” Two decades later, Grant stated that he “never worked with
a more courageous, fearless, and dedicated person than T.D. McNeal. He was a
tower of strength” who dedicated his life to what he saw as the inter‐related goals of
civil rights and economic opportunity.126 The political capital that McNeal built over
the course of what amounted to a career in struggle influenced the development of
“a political personality that redeems the faith of a community in the arts and
practices of politics.”127
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McNeal transformed his belief that civil rights and economic integration were
intertwined into activism with MOWM, a praxis that ultimately helped over 10,000
African Americans join St. Louis’ industrial labor force.128 McNeal saw each of these
workers as symbols of democracy in action, as people who fulfilled the American
promise and gave the United States moral credibility in the post‐war world.129 Like
many African Americans in the war years, McNeal interpreted the crisis of conflict as
an opportunity to make significant improvements in the daily lives of racial
minorities in the United States. He genuinely believed in “the hope and possibility”
that the war against Hitler’s Fascist extremes would usher in “a new order of
democracy and humanitarian enlightenment” throughout the United States and the
Western world.130 As an activist, the “wide awake” McNeal relied on boundless
energy to routinely work 12‐16 hour days. As a politician decades later, McNeal’s
power came from a different source: he represented the 80% Black Fourth District
of St. Louis in the Missouri congress.131 Bursting onto the state political scene in
1960, in only five years McNeal parleyed his status as a pillar of the local Black
community into a seat on both the Ways and Means Committee and the
Appropriations Committee.132 His career demonstrated that power in protest
politics comes from respect within the community, while power in politics
germinates from mobilizing voters.
McNeal was reviled by a segment of St. Louis’ population that was
emotionally and politically devoted to White supremacy.133 In an article of hate mail
postmarked August 20, 1942, an anonymous writer warned McNeal to “remember
East St. Louis it will happen here.” Though the post‐World War I riot was terrible,
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McNeal refused to back down to those who thought that every “nigger” should “stay
in your place.”134 Another reactionary voice came from the Atlanta‐based Vigilantes,
Inc. In a letter from the anonymous President of this White Supremacist
organization, McNeal was notified, in no uncertain terms, that “The traditions of the
South… the tradition of Supremacy of the WHITE RACE” was spreading nationally as
“real white people in the North realize that social equality with the negro in this
country is a mistake.”135 Undeterred by the threat of violent opposition, McNeal led
St. Louis MOWM through one of the most active periods of progressive racial protest
in St. Louis’ tumultuous history.
Harassment from local Communists and constant monitoring from both the
FBI and Army Intelligence came along with McNeal’s involvement in MOWM.136
Members of the Communist Party tried to disrupt St. Louis MOWM’s demonstrations
by passing out leaflets that hinted at violent retaliation and warned that protest
politics impeded the war effort.137 Of all these, McNeal thought that the worst form
of harassment was anonymous “threats on the telephone late at night.” McNeal
never notified the press or authorities, but he would get called “a lot of obscene
names” and was told on several occasions that his residence was going to explode.
McNeal claimed that the threats never caused him to consider stepping away from
his un‐elected position as a leader in Black St. Louis, but he acknowledged that the
late night phone calls “didn’t make me feel any more comfortable.”138 McNeal dealt
with the possibility of hate crimes directed at him and his family by practicing as a
target shooter. He took first prize, finishing just ahead of his son Ted and
BSCP/MOWM member E.J. Bradley, at several competitions in and around St. Louis.
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McNeal was not shy about advertising his prowess with firearms, and his
photograph standing with a rifle and three shooting trophies in the background was
published in the St. Louis Argus.139
The closest threat to impeding McNeal’s activism with MOWM was induction
into the military. McNeal’s work with the porters earned him an occupational
classification that let him avoid conscription, but the deferment barely made it on
time. Many porters received this deferment because their work on the rails heavily
traveled by military personnel was seen as essential. According to McNeal and
Randolph, increased troop movements resulted in porters’ workweeks being as long
as one hundred hours. The two argued that McNeal’s skill as a field organizer kept
porters from slacking off or getting surly because of the increased workload.
McNeal thought that his work was important to the war effort, but the draft board
had other plans for him. According to McNeal, one hostile member confronted him,
saying, “We understand that you like to march. So, we’re gonna put you in, and let
you do some real marching.” McNeal narrowly avoided military service by drinking
heavily the evening before induction and oversleeping the next day, causing him to
miss his appointment to report at Jefferson Barracks. Later that day, McNeal found
a letter from General Hershey granting deferment in the afternoon mail.
Unprocessed at the time of his scheduled induction, McNeal’s occupational
deferment eventually went through. He believed that this twist of fate could not
have saved him had he arrived at Jefferson Barracks on the appointed hour.140
McNeal’s work with St. Louis MOWM refined his leadership skills and
solidified his position as a force to be reckoned with in the community. McNeal’s
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activism put him in situations where friendships meant solidarity, which
undoubtedly insulated him from the pressure of harassment like that mentioned
above. The relationships that McNeal built in the 1940s were seminal to his
Senatorial campaigns 1960s, when the same cadre of men who ran St. Louis MOWM
directed his political campaign.141 His expertise as a labor and community organizer
undoubtedly shaped McNeal into a legislator who “probably accomplishes more for
those he represents” than his electoral peers. McNeal’s political personality was
“inevitably calm…Quiet. Dignified. Superb speaker, relying on logic, organization
and subject matter rather than rhetoric.”142 In his own reflections on time spent
working alongside Randolph in the BSCP and MOWM, McNeal said that he learned
about “the thinking, motivations, aspirations and fears” of Americans, Black and
White alike.143 McNeal thought of his role as leader of an African American protest
organization and representative of a labor union as two sides of one coin because, in
his words, “Negro people are essentially a working class of people.”144 McNeal saw
his work was one of the many streams pouring into the river of Black protest during
the mid‐twentieth century in which thousands of African Americans were “on the
march, fighting to complete the structure of their economic, social and political
citizenship” that tragically incomplete since Reconstruction’s collapse. McNeal
believed that freedom meant more than the negation of physical bondage and
chattel slavery ‐ freedom was understood holistically, with equal parts of civil rights
and economic opportunity. McNeal’s version of freedom required “the unabridged
right to vote, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of movement in the
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community, the free public school system and above all, the right to employment
and service on the basis of equality.145
A native son of St. Louis, David Grant was probably the most publicly
recognizable MOWM member in the city, taking visible leadership on a number of
issues after he “sacrificed a $4000 position” as Assistant Circuit Attorney to open a
private practice.146 Grant devoted himself to “fight on all fronts” for “Negro rights
and equality before law.” Together with McNeal, the tandem formed what
amounted to twin pillars of St. Louis MOWM, with Grant’s oratorical ability making
him MOWM’s public face and McNeal’s organizational skills fitting him perfectly to
oversee St. Louis MOWM’s operations.147 A supervisor named Henry Morris pushed
Grant out of the previously mentioned Assistant Circuit Attorney position in 1942 as
retaliation for his participation in NAACP activities following the Sikeston lynching.
As a public figure and member of the Democratic machine since 1936, it was
difficult for Grant not to cross professional and personal boundaries. In particular,
Morris thought that Grant inappropriately brought his office into “controversial
issues” about the “abuses and inequalities visited upon the Negro people.”148 An
archetypical “race man,” and life member of the NAACP, Grant believed that “No
Negro who is honest with himself and sincere in his attitude towards his people can
labor happily under a superior who insists that he lay aside his interests in public
matters affecting the welfare of the Negro people, in order to keep his job.”149
Grant’s participation on an NAACP investigative committee that looked into Sikeston
openly defied his supervisor’s heavy‐handed edict. With a choice between “a forty‐
two hundred dollar job and the respect and confidence of two hundred thousand or
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three hundred thousand of my people,” Grant stood at a professional junction that
he thought was a mutually exclusive crossroads between professional success and
personal dignity. For him, “the choice was not hard to make.” David Grant walked
away from his last steady job in over a decade, remaining financially solvent by
representing area African Americans in what amounted to small legal cases.150
Grant’s reputation within the city grew to almost mythical proportions as he
made the transformation from a child reared in a working‐class Black neighborhood
to progressive lawyer, and ultimately, to a highly visible activist. Grant’s work with
St. Louis MOWM solidified his standing as an advocate for civil rights and equal
access to employment.151 A cartoon in the St. Louis Argus reveals Grant’s standing as
a champion in the fight against White supremacy. It features an illustration of a
powerful dark‐skinned forearm with a clenched fist smashing two White men
labeled “Southern Race Baiters.” The fist is emblazoned with the name “David
Grant.”152 A St. Louis native since birth in 1903, Grant left in his twenties to work as
a musician and waiter on excursion steamers traveling along the Mississippi River
and Great Lakes. Grant “sort of knocked around” during the inter‐war years,
breaking up what amounted to travel as a migrant worker to attend but not
complete studies at the University of Michigan. Personal circumstances and
unstable finances always seemed to lure Grant out of higher education until
enrolling in and finishing a three year course of study at Howard University Law
School.153 Grant was admitted to the Missouri Bar immediately after his 1930
graduation and he opened a private practice in his hometown that same year.154
Grant was evidentially successful, gaining admission to the Federal Bar in 1938. His
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professional development was no small accomplishment for a man who spent his
teens and twenties as a marginal worker who operated a crane in a Detroit ice
house, ran a drill press, and traveled the resort circuit through Arkansas Hot Springs
and West Palm Beach, Florida, as a porter, waiter, and jazz musician.155 Grant’s
connections to everyday people in St. Louis and experiences in insecure blue‐collar
work informed his nearly half‐century long practice as an attorney that was
described by a colleague as “calm, deliberative and careful service to the cause of
civil rights and justice.”156 Grant’s personal history as a disposable laborer gave him
an unflappable solidarity with the working class that guided his long involvement in
local Democratic politics.157 This is evidenced by Grant’s participation in MOWM,
which saw him organize pickets outside of lunch counters protesting separate and
unequal food service, give free advise to Pearl Maddox and others who participated
in sit‐ins, and take an oppositional voice to the “Jim Crow Lincoln University Law
School” that was one of St. Louis MOWM’s final campaigns.158
As a young African American professional with a private practice that catered
to an economically marginalized and segregated Black population, Grant believed
that his financial fate was inextricably tied to that of his clients. Grant’s
understanding of linkages between civil rights and economic rights was shaped by
the Great Depression, which, in the appraisal of one historian, “brought employment
discrimination to the fore as a civil rights issue.”159 Grant was motivated by causes
more pragmatic than idealistic Talented Tenth style uplift; he was convinced that it
was in the best interest of upwardly mobile African Americans to act on behalf of
less fortunate members of their race. After all, Grant argued, how could an African
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American doctor or lawyer “whose clients were economically dispossessed earn
respectable income when these same customers cold not adequately pay for
professional services?” Grant believed that “those who are fortunate enough to get
training…and make a living off of their peers,” had it in their best interest to “do
everything they could to improve the economic condition of those they are going to
serve.”160
As mentioned earlier, Grant re‐settled in St. Louis shortly after finishing law
school. He immediately became involved in Democratic politics, where he first met
Joseph McLemore and George Vashon, both of whom would participate in MOWM
campaigns in the ensuing decade. Grant and other early Black Democrats joined the
party out of “resentment” that the Republican Party elicited an “emotional response
to a false premise that the Republican Party was formed for their freedom.” Until
the Roosevelt years, Republicans counted on nearly unanimous support from
African American voters but offered little more than “mops, brooms, and garbage
cans” as patronage in return for their votes. Republicans dominated St. Louis’ local
government for almost three decades from 1904 through 1933. St. Louis’ Black
Democrats swam against a strong political tide, because “emotionally no man in the
world would love the Democratic party if you are black because it was the party of
the south and that was the party of the Ku Klux Klan and that was where the
lynching was.” The thin ranks of African American Democrats in St. Louis swelled
after Roosevelt’s 1932 election. Since African Americans associated the Democratic
Party with “Lynchocrats,” Grant recruited individuals to the Party by “preaching the
Doctrine of the Divided Vote.” He pointed out that the Republican Party took nearly
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unanimous support from Black voters for granted and offered little in the way of
promises or presents to the city’s African American population.161 This was the
worst‐case scenario of two‐party politics, and Grant wanted to change it through the
Negro Central Democratic Organization.162 This partisan body gave a forum for
dissatisfied African American voters and contributed to MOWM’s operations by
participating in negotiations with reluctant employers.
Totalitarianism’s rise and the urgency of war influenced Grant’s perception
that his generation was experiencing a historical moment comparable to that of “the
collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, the rise of Charlemagne, the Crusades, and the
French Revolution.”163 Grant envisioned his legal work as part of a battle countering
the “complete emasculation” of Reconstruction Amendments that were
dismembered in an era of reactionary “cancerous” white supremacy.164 History
informed Grant’s observation’s on E.O. 8802, which he called “the second
emancipation declaration.” He saw “history repeating itself” because the new law
was undermined by “avoidance, subterfuge, and emasculation.”165 In his senior
years, Grant reflected on this trend in American history, concluding, “this is a racism
country.”166
Grant was involved with St. Louis MOWM from the organization’s 1942
inception and engaged in activism for over a decade prior.167 He saw his
professional status as something that reinforced his position as a community leader
who was responsible for improving the lives of African Americans in his hometown
and beyond.168 Professionally trained and somewhat well off, Grant always seemed
to have time and a little bit of money to give to the cause.169 Grant’s most important
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professional contribution to the dismantling of racial inequality was his counsel in
the six‐year campaign to equalize salaries for educators and opportunities for
students. Underwritten by the Missouri State Association of Negro Teachers, Emma
Jane Lee v. Board of Education of Festus legally closed the racial gap in salaries of
educators throughout Missouri. Grant accomplished the victory through legal
prowess and public relations acumen that included soliciting and screening
documentation proving racially‐determined unequal wages throughout the state,
consulting with Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP, and speaking at fundraising
events hosted by the Pine Street YMCA.170 Grant deflected praise for his work,
preferring to give credit to “fearless people” like Emma Jane Lee and other teachers
who risked professional standing to file complaints about Missouri’s wages. It was
people like them, said to Grant, who gave reason for “hope as a racial group for the
ultimate achievement of democracy.”171
Grant believed that “economic equality” and the right to work was
synonymous with the right to live, and that the federal government was responsible
for safeguarding equal access to employment. Especially in his youth, Grant thought
that “the solution to the racial things that we suffered were finances and we were
poor…I believed this business of money until Hitler came on the scene” and proved
to him that race and unequal power relations were also factors in the oppression of
Black people in the United States.172 Grant’s understanding of economics as central
to what many of his time called “the race problem” was in step with the St. Louis
Argus, which featured an editorial on the plight of African American small business
owners catering to an economically marginalized group of customer. In this
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example, the Argus launched into a Jeremiad that “To deny one employment is a
blow at his very existence and at his life… When the head of a family is denied
employment solely because of race, creed or national origin…it makes a beggar of
his wife, or possibly a prostitute, and thieves of his children.”173 Grant’s association
with St. Louis MOWM was deeply informed by his belief that civil rights, human
rights, and worker’s rights were all interconnected. He saw the systematic denial of
jobs to African Americans as a form of racial violence more vile than lynching
“Because when I am lynched, that is all they can do to me; I am dead; I am gone.”
Long‐term income, however, created generational upward mobility and could crack
the concrete ceiling on African American advancement. As Grant said on the floor of
Congress, the problem was that “when I am unable to work, I cannot train my
daughters, I cannot train my sons, and I am in a position where I feel that the man
who deprives me of my right to work makes prostitutes of my daughters and
criminals of my sons.”174
Economics were central to Grant’s understanding of American race relations
and integral to his vision of racial uplift, which included making a “Negro Fifth
Column” to turn pressure inwards on African Americans in order to have greater
economic autonomy. He looked forward to the day when “we control a handsome
portion of our local economic life” and no longer “remain at the mercy of those who
live by the profits of the money we spend.” Grant was inspired by how relatively
small minority groups in Europe gained tremendous political power, and he hoped
that African Americans could be tightly knit and disciplined enough to “rip the
covers off of the backside” of backsliders who supported White merchants and

127

professionals when a choice to do otherwise was available. He advocated “a
rigorous discipline” that manifested in “quarantine, social ostracism and general
abuse, physical where invited, but always verbal” to keep the community cohesive
on vital issues.175
Like McNeal, Grant was very aware of the opposition that he faced as an
archetypical “race man” in the mid‐twentieth century. Though no one physically
threatened Grant’s life or family, he deftly faced bureaucratic recalcitrance did his
best to discount hate mail that always seemed to come after his biggest speeches.176
Grant’s dedication to struggle during the war years was deeply appreciated by Black
residents of St. Louis, who were his veritable constituents.177 Grant was active in
local racial politics for twenty years beyond St. Louis MOWM’s life. In 1946, just
after the organization disbanded, Grant replaced long‐time NAACP president Sidney
Redmond as President of the St. Louis Chapter. His first major campaign involved
calling for the resignation of a White patrolman who killed an African American
civilian. Shortly after, he organized a successful picket of the American Theatre to
open more jobs for African American motion picture projector operators.178

Founding and Financing the March on Washington Movement, St. Louis Unit
As one could expect from a local protest organization staffed by common
working people, the St. Louis unit’s office paperwork often lagged behind their
activity. St. Louis MOWM did not bother drafting a formal founding document until
October 28, 1942 – a full two months after locals acted in the March on Washington
Movement’s name to plan the 9,000‐12,000 person Kiel Auditorium rally and four
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months after the organization launched its appeal for membership. St. Louis MOWM
used its office space at the People’s Finance Building on 11 Jefferson Avenue, which
was paid for by the BSCP, in conjunction with accessible public space at the Pine
Street YMCA and Wheatley YWCA to plan protests and conduct weekly meetings
that kept membership interested in the organization. Having this space available
was critical to St. Louis MOWM’s success. The YMCA and YWCA were two of the
more frequented institutions in Black St. Louis, and having rooms available there
made MOWM’s weekly meetings accessible to the community. More important was
the vibrancy of People’s Finance Building in the 1940’s, which housed MOWM, BSCP,
and a variety of African American professionals. In an editorial reminiscence from
the 1970s, one writer mentioned that “the People’s Finance Building” housed “most
of the prominent Negro doctors, lawyers, and businessmen…It was a custom to visit
in each others office to exchange views.” Among these visitors were T.D. McNeal
and Leyton Weston of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Black Democrat N.A.
Sweets, attorney N.B. Young, Sydney R. Redmond, chief counsel in the fight to have
Lloyd Gaines admitted to the University of Missouri; attorney George L. Vaughn who
was later to lead the fight against residential discrimination; and attorney Joseph
McLemore, who was “the first Negro in this area to run for Congress.” 179
Emphasis on local activism was embedded in St. Louis MOWM’s belated
founding statement, which squarely situated the organization in local politics and
sought to make national policy like Executive Order 8802 have real meaning to
ordinary citizens. McNeal’s background with the BSCP taught him that time and
effort from dedicated grassroots members was often more valuable than money. St.
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Louis MOWM rarely had much in its coffers but it could count on a respectable turn
out at public protests and a high level of civic engagement by its members and
supporters. In McNeal’s words, “The program of the MOW does not require a lot of
money, because all of those who do work in the movement contribute their time in
addition to their money.”180 The organization’s unusually engaged membership
base benefited from being well managed. Everyone had reasonable and identifiable
goals because they volunteered for a specific job under a variety of committees
including the Speaker’s Bureau, Publicity Committee, and Complaints Committee.181
By regimenting organizational tasks and focusing the energy of members on specific
goals, St. Louis MOWM extracted the most possible work out of its more active
members – a group that was already predisposed to volunteerism and activism. The
downside of St. Louis MOWM’s organizational structure is that recruitment and
retention of volunteers was difficult because the organization demanded a
considerable personal investment from members. Even if they were strongly
dedicated to MOWM’s program, one could expect that the most zealous members
could lose enthusiasm and eventually burn out.182 Unlike the NAACP, which
requested little of members beyond annual dues, African American protest
organizations like MOWM and CORE were driven by small, tightly knit groups of
dedicated activists – and these were the kind of people who could eventually weary
of their commitments and get distracted from the movement by employment and
family responsibilities.183
Literature from MOWM’s national office outlined how and why places like St.
Louis could and should form a unit of the March on Washington. Of the national
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office’s four stated objectives, St. Louis MOWM excelled at operating “by means of
mass maneuvers and demonstrations.”184 MOWM’s national office was self‐
consciously ambitious when stating that local chapters “should be organized in
every city, county, township, ward, legislative district or political sub‐division” that
can compile “ten to twenty members” to coordinate joint efforts between existing
community institutions such as clergy groups, trade unions, and farmer’s
organizations.185 It was recommended that the Executive Board of each branch
meet weekly “to study the philosophy of the Movement and to map out a close‐knit
program of action” and that at least monthly an open meeting for all branch
members be held.186 This was advise that St. Louis MOWM did not heed, choosing
instead to hold weekly meetings at the Pine Street YMCA that were open to
everybody including members and the community at large. St. Louis MOWM
followed recommended procedure and had a local conference to elect officers,
establish a constitution, and outline specific goals in conformity with MOWM’s
broad national objectives. Literature from the national office recommended local
branches inflate its ranks by appealing to existing organizations, asking for their
entire membership join MOWM at a rate of ten cents per person. MOWM’s low dues
were made possible, in part, by extensive volunteer labor, but the price eventually
rose to two dollars per annum. It was hoped that affordable membership would
make it easy to draw rank‐and‐file African Americans into the organization so that it
could be “truly representative of the Negro citizens of the St. Louis community.”187
The national office advised the fledgling chapter to recruit members through a Block
Plan that divided the city into “districts of not more than ten square blocks.” From

131

this grid, MOWM members could recruit people within their geographic community
through casual conversation that raised awareness about MOWM’s tactics and
platform.188 By getting respected community figures to build its organization from
the ground up, MOWM functioned in a way that should, in theory, strengthen the
bonds of every African American neighborhood in which it operated, thus creating
the Black voting bloc that Randolph championed throughout the 1940s.
Like the national organization, St. Louis MOWM “was set up for the purpose
of fighting discrimination against Negroes in national defense work.”189 St. Louis
MOWM identified federal power as an ally in the struggle against White supremacy
and racial inequality. The organization devoted considerable energy towards
getting existing laws enforced even though their closest ally, the FEPC, was plagued
by what one historian called “serious innate weaknesses.”190 St. Louis MOWM
helped FEPC by urging “all negroes who have been denied jobs…to go in person to
the local headquarters…and give the facts in their cases to the committee.”191
When they finally got around to putting their organization on paper, activists
in St. Louis MOWM dedicated the upstart organization to “the Negro people of St.
Louis, Missouri” and outlined a vision of MOWM fulfilling the American promise
with an unwavering “faith in the ultimate achievability of a working democracy.”192
MOWM wanted to have a broader and more representative membership than other
existing Black civic organizations in the city, including the NAACP and Urban
League. To accomplish this, St. Louis MOWM originally charged no annual dues.
This unprofitable arrangement quickly changed to a dime per year and, as
previously mentioned, capped at two dollars.193 Like the national organization, the
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St. Louis unit kept its ranks open to “any Negro person” living in “St. Louis or its
environs.” Also like the national MOWM office, St. Louis MOWM was not opposed to
cooperating with the city’s predominantly White liberal groups. Drawing on the
energy of Afro‐Christianity and reflecting the cultural norms of mainstream African
American protest groups of their day, the St. Louis unit of the March on Washington
Movement also opened and closed each meeting with song a and prayer.194
Geographically distant from the nation’s capitol, wartime activists in St. Louis
found ways to connect their local issues to the national movement of their
namesake.195 This was not difficult to accomplish, as racial conditions in St. Louis
mirrored that of the nation and African Americans were victimized by employment
discrimination, residential segregation, and curtailed civil rights. Instead of
marching on Washington, they marched on arms manufacturing plants, sponsored
prayer meetings outside of city hall, and picketed utility companies. St. Louis
MOWM kept itself in the public eye by staging rallies and sponsoring sit‐ins at
restaurants that refused to serve African American customers. The organization
remained vibrant by constantly protesting in public space and imposing no limits to
who could join. To diehard MOWM stalwarts, organizing for the struggle against
employment discrimination could and should take place “in the pool room, on the
street corner, in the church,” and anywhere else that race women and men would
find themselves.196
The promise of racial egalitarianism amidst rising totalitarianism influenced
the guarded optimism of St. Louis MOWM’s leadership, which T.D. McNeal
characterized as a time of “hope and possibility.”197 If the people who supported
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and participated in MOWM protests and pickets had much in common, one can
presume that faith in the American promise and disillusion with the realities of race
in the 1940s was widespread. The contradiction of racially inclusive democracy and
the disparity between the American reality of poll taxes, literacy examinations,
segregation, and limited economic opportunity did not stop St. Louis MOWM from
marching in back of the American flag and frequently expressing their allegiance to
the United States in print, word, and deed.198 These ethos are exemplified by Henry
Wheeler, a St. Louis MOWM member and St. Louis American columnist, who wrote
“We are 100 per cent back of our President in all of his efforts to defeat the Axis
Nations. We will follow the stars and stripes to Hades, if it is necessary to preserve
our liberty.”199 Rhetorical hyper‐patriotism did not translate to advocacy of closing
ranks and muting protest to abet the war effort.200 Their fervent patriotism in
wartime did not translate to jingoism or the passive acceptance of injustice at home.
Witness T.D. McNeal, who went out of his way to solicit trouble because “Negroes
are already having trouble and a little more won’t hurt.”201 His actions and words
resembled that of Randolph, who also had a sense of urgency that “the Negro must
fight for his democratic rights now, for after the war it may be too late.”202
Whatever its limitations, causing “trouble” proved effective at times, and
McNeal was rallying St. Louis MOWM members “to begin raising some more hell to
get some jobs for Colored women” well into 1944.203 Although its finances were in
disarray and the volume of its national membership paled to that of the NAACP, St.
Louis MOWM’s members had an impressive faith in America’s electorate and they
were convinced that a disfranchised minority group work could work through the
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political system that ultimately marginalized them in order to rectify existing
problems. This impulse is encapsulated in McNeal’s words at an Emancipation Day
celebration, “we, the Negro masses in the March on Washington Movement, dedicate
our spirit and pledge our lives never to grow faint by the wayside, never to
compromise with truth, never to falter or fail in our fight for a truly democratic
America.”204 The similarity of messages between local leadership and nationally
recognizable figures reinforced each other. At the same event, for example, William
Hastie urged listeners “to get off of their comfortable chairs and use their energy
and ingenuity” to “struggle for basic human rights.”205
In just one year from its inception, St. Louis MOWM claimed responsibility
for 14,000 African Americans securing “jobs on war plants…a large percentage” of
which were for skilled or semi‐skilled labor. According to the organization’s
“conservative” calculations, this amounted to an additional $450,000 earned weekly
by Black workers in the St. Louis metro area, “largely through the efforts of the
MOW.”206 In one fundraising appeal, McNeal asked for the “nominal sum” of $3,500
from the public to buttress financial support already committed by other local
groups and “professional people.”207 St. Louis MOWM relied on tapping the existing
Black institutions and the African American social elite in order to raise money and
cover its relatively inexpensive operating budget.208 St. Louis’ African American
press was a frequent accomplice in MOWM fundraising, urging readers to contribute
at least one dollar for membership and consider giving more to the organization for
“its just wages” in the struggle for equal employment opportunity.209
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A sympathetic media and support from the city’s leading African American
citizens certainly helped, but this did not translate into adequate financial support
for MOWM. Even though the organization claimed credit for the thousands of jobs
African Americans took in defense industries through the “concerted and intelligent
pressure exerted by Negroes themselves,” its treasury was in shambles.210 MOWM
lamented that its activities were “expensive” even though it had no paid staff and its
operations were partially underwritten by other African American organizations.211
St. Louis MOWM tried to reinforce institutional support by getting leaders and
dignitaries from the YMCA, churches, labor unions, and social life to rally their
constituents into MOWM’s ranks. James E. Cook, Executive Secretary of the Pine
Street YMCA, drafted plans for a pyramid scheme that broke down official
fundraisers into four divisions. David Grant coordinated the activities of E.J. Bradley
from the BSCP, prominent civic leader Mrs. Oliver Thornton, religious leader Dr. J.M.
Bracy, and MOWM pioneer Mrs. R.C. Goins. Each of these division leaders was
responsible for five “teams” that, according to plans, would deliver donations from a
broad cross‐section of St. Louis’ African American community.212 This cadre of
Black leaders in St. Louis were united in their belief that “now is the time when we
must strike relentlessly” for Black people to be “free…as first class American
citizens.”213
Like any grassroots organization, St. Louis MOWM appealed for funds
throughout its life. 1944, however, marked the first time a campaign crystallized
around a single issue. While Randolph concerned himself with devising a way for
African Americans to use the “crucial and decisive” upcoming Presidential election
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to get African Americans to vote together as a racial bloc, St. Louis MOWM members
acted on issues more pertinent to their political reality and were shifting the focus
of protests towards the impending reality of negotiating a post‐war world. 214 With
upwards of 1,400 members in its ranks, St. Louis MOWM prepared for what
amounted to its final year in struggle.215 It’s most visible, and arguably most
effective campaign was a summer blizzard of sit‐ins at department store lunch
counters. Led by Pearl Maddox, Ruth Wheeler, and Thelma McNeal, this “interesting
side‐light” departed from MOWM’s traditional tactics of picketing outside of defense
contractors and soliciting an FEPC presence in their city.216 St. Louis MOWM
launched what was ultimately its final major fundraising appeal as the sit‐ins were
in planning, and it raised over $1,000 through membership renewals and large
donations.217 Although considerable, this was still well short of the $3,500 goal –
itself a modest budget for an organization claiming to be “recognized as the agency
which has done more than any other to force industry and government in St. Louis
to give Negro citizens a greater degree of justice in matter of jobs.”218 Even though
MOWM portrayed itself as a mass organization, and indeed its events were attended
by a broad spectrum of African Americans, it failed to generate a comparable
membership or financial base to the NAACP. This is partially attributable to the fact
that St. Louis MOWM did not need to raise as much money as the NAACP because it
had few paid staff. Conversely, it also meant that all of MOWM’s branches existed
without the benefit of professional full‐time Field Secretaries like Daisy Lampkin
and Ella Baker, both of whom were significant factors in NAACP’s wartime explosion
in membership and seminal to the organization’s grassroots credibility.219
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BSCP members contributed heavily to St. Louis MOWM’s 1944 fundraising
campaign.220 There is little reason to not suspect that this was the case in previous
years as well. In 1943, E.J. Bradley, head of the union’s St. Louis local, warned, “We
have been seriously concerned about the upkeep of the movement here in St. Louis.”
Bradley and the porters felt “compelled to support it” and were “100% behind the
March Movement” out of loyalty to Randolph and faith in his vision for protest
politics.221 Randolph came to the fundraiser’s closing rally, which was described as,
“without a doubt…the most interesting and educational meeting held in St. Louis
since the mammoth mass meeting held at the Auditorium some time ago.”222
Though his attendance was symbolically important and his oration that evening was
noteworthy, MOWM must be understood beyond A. Philip Randolph. One can begin
by examining the list of individuals who gave twenty‐five dollars to St. Louis MOWM
that year. The list of donors investing in an upstart protest organization reads like a
who’s who of Black St. Louis. It includes NAACP members Bige Wyatt and physician
Thos J. Center as well as BSCP representatives and porters such as Leyton Weston,
E.J. Bradley, and T.D. McNeal.223 It is arguable that Pullman Porters affiliated with
the BSCP sustained St. Louis MOWM. The union itself made several contributions
that kept the struggling organization financially solvent. Added to this is the fact
that the union’s members made individual contributions through membership dues
and additional donations. Though unquantifiable due to inadequate documentary
sources, it is likely that this union was St. Louis MOWM’s financial lifeblood.
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CHAPTER 5
PICKETS, PROTESTS, AND PRAYERS:
ST. LOUIS MOWM’S CAMPAIGN TO INTEGRATE THE DEFENSE WORKFORCE
“It is a new type of militancy.”
Anonymous FBI investigator1

Making the Kiel Municipal Auditorium rally successful with a shoestring
budget took support from the city’s African American media, a program that would
draw crowds, and the fury of St. Louis’ Black population.2 MOWM hoped that the
rally could build on the organization’s success at U.S. Cartridge earlier that summer.
St. Louis MOWM used a demonstration and negotiation campaign to win higher
wages for African American porters, increase employment of African American
women, and get a promise for prospective Black workers to begin participating in
federally‐funded training programs that would qualify them for more lucrative
positions on the production line. Harold Ross, chairman of St. Louis MOWM’s
Finance Committee, solicited all of the major civic, professional, and fraternal
groups in the city to help pay for the rally. “We believe,” Ross appealed, “that you
are willing to share the responsibilities and opportunities for service to the race to
be found within the movement.” Citing a small victory at U.S. Cartridge
accomplished despite “a minimum amount of support,” leadership of this upstart
organization used the familiar argument that African Americans bore a
responsibility to assist members of the race in obtaining blue‐collar employment.
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Ross offered moral capitol and public recognition to those who financially
supported this exciting new organization. Recognition came in the form of giving
individuals and groups who donated in excess of five dollars a citation in the event’s
program, which publicly aligned donors with the new vanguard of racial protest in
St. Louis.3 There is insufficient documentation to offer a detailed analysis of social
class and annual income of members in St. Louis’ various African American
institutions. Still, it is not unreasonable to presume that Ross and many St. Louis
MOWM members followed historical precedent and thought of themselves within
the context of “uplift” strategy dating back at least to the late nineteenth century
club movement and was popularized by Du Bois’ notion that the Talented Tenth was
chiefly responsible for improving the lot of Black America.4
Social institutions and media outlets generated excitement for the rally by
publicizing it for several weeks beforehand. The St. Louis American encouraged
readers to attend, for “it is in the time of stress” that “insistent protests against the
undemocratic acts and practices here at home” would prove to be the most effective.
The paper urged readers to look inward, and instead of marching on Washington,
consider protesting against “jim crow and segregation right here in St. Louis and
Missouri.” Placing a premium on “courage right here at home,” the American chided
readers who denounced the lynching in Sikeston, attended a race rally when big‐
name leaders passed through on the lecture circuit, and who accepted Missouri’s
segregated law school but turned a blind eye towards pressing local issues like
segregated retail space and unequal employment opportunity.5 If we can trust
elements in the city’s African American media, St. Louis MOWM’s greatest
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impediment in its quest to mobilize Black St. Louis would be encouraging
individuals to direct their energies towards changing their localities rather than
changing the country as a whole.
St. Louis MOWM claimed public space by marching on sidewalks, occupying
grounds surrounding city hall, and taking advantage of arenas like Kiel Municipal
Auditorium.6 The August 14, 1942 rally came in the wake of Carter Carburetor’s
release of 146 African American workers. More than a response to the shrinking
number of Black workers at a specific plant, the rally tried to drum up support for a
grassroots push trying to force area defense contractors to open jobs for African
Americans.7 A handbill for the event linking employment opportunity with civil
rights spoke with a sense of urgency to “Mobilize Now! It is Now or Never! We Are
Americans Too!”8 MOWM’s call for “25,000 Negroes” to “storm the air‐cooled
auditorium” identified a multitude of issues to attract attendees that would,
hopefully, join the organization.9 Among the issues identified were limited
employment in defense plants, racial violence and lynching, continued segregation
of the armed forces, and the American Red Cross’ segregation of blood plasma.10
The air‐conditioned auditorium kept things comfortable on that summer
night, but St. Louis had the potential to heat up with racial violence. The city’s
history of stormy race relations caused federal officials to designate enough soldiers
from Jefferson Barracks to surround the building and ensure that “there was
absolutely no trouble at all.”11 Broad support for the rally, the largest ever in St.
Louis history up to that time, is evidenced in a motorcade of over 100 vehicles that
paraded the city boosting the rally.12 The motorcade was just one of the creative
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ways that St. Louis MOWM generated publicity. In an apparently unprecedented
publicity ploy, McNeal announced the demonstration through the city’s mainstream
White daily newspapers. This risky gesture saw unfamiliar White reporters
augment the ranks of African American journalists covering the event. Even though
it cost more money than similar advertising space in African American weeklies,
placing advertisements in the White media announced the depth of discontent
brewing among St. Louis’ African Americans to an audience that, by all accounts,
preferred to remain oblivious to the facts of segregation.13 The Kiel Auditorium
rally was supported by more conventional measures as well. As was typical for
events of this type, the rally was partially financed by a wide assortment of Black‐
owned businesses that purchased advertising space in the program. Political and
racial consciousness guided their support for the event, as nearly all of the
undertakers, restaurants, night clubs, bars, auto mechanics, hotels, hair stylists, drug
stores, physicians, and taxi services that advertised incorporated a message of
support for Black protest and solidarity with MOWM as part of their
advertisement.14 These independent Black‐owned businesses presented protest as
something sanctioned by a broad spectrum of blue and white‐collar professionals
and workers throughout St. Louis’ African American community. The support of
workers and professionals did more than add a measure of respectability to African
American protest, it also contributed to MOWM’s coffers and allowed the
organization to spend freely at the Kiel rally.15 White supremacy and racial
segregation necessitated “parallel institutions” that Darlene Clark Hine argues were
“safe havens” from racism that gave African Americans “private space to buttress
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battered dignity, nurture positive self‐images, sharpen skills, and demonstrate
expertise.”16 As seen in St. Louis, a healthy Black business community was a
significant element to financing and sustaining grassroots activism.
Attendance estimates vary from 8,000–12,000, but both of these figures
indicate a sizeable crowd registering concern about the local lack of compliance for
Executive Order 8802 and support for MOWM’s message that “Winning democracy
for the Negro is winning the war for democracy.”17 A lineup of speakers
contributing to the event’s success featured “an aggregation of top‐flight” national
leaders and well‐known local activists. These “men of national repute” included A.
Philip Randolph, Walter White, and Milton Webster.18 Nationally recognized
figureheads were joined by local activists such as David Grant, T.D. McNeal, Rev.
James Cook, and Chicago MOWM chairman Wesley Burton at the podium “to protest
in one great massive voice.”19 “Playlets, skits and songs depicting the troubles and
aspirations of the Negro people were presented” with acting and musical talent
donated by the Aldridge Players and the Celestial Choristers performing Dick
Campbell’s “The Watchword is Forward.”20 In the opinion of MOWM chairman, A.
Philip Randolph, the combination of outstanding oratory and the audience’s
enthusiastic response made the ”epoch‐making” Kiel Auditorium rally “up to the
standard of mass meetings held anywhere by the March on Washington Movement,
including New York and Chicago” as a “demonstration of Negro solidarity and
power” in the United States.21 The collection of nationally recognized orators, an
action‐packed program that included entertainment, the presentation of an
organizational program, and follow up demonstrations in weeks ahead, reveal that

143

McNeal attempted to build a sustainable vehicle for protest that could harness
African American discontent in St. Louis during the war years, something that the
Negro Defense Committee failed to do when they had a similar well‐attended rally at
the same location a year earlier.22
Press releases and speeches emanating from St. Louis MOWM and the
national office regularly affirmed that the organization maintained exclusively
African American membership because of a perceived need to develop organic Black
leadership.23 The message at Kiel auditorium was no exception, and press accounts
of the event indicate, “It was quite plain” that MOWM “was not against whites or
against the United States Government.”24 McNeal’s speech was halted by fervent
applause several times, especially when he announced, “We pledge ourselves to
fight against the Axis powers and at the same time dedicate our efforts to burying
Jim Crowism in the same grave as the Axis dictators.”25 Likewise, Walter White
argued that the real opponents to America’s interests were “Gene Talmadge of
Georgia, Governor Dixon of Alabama, Congressman Rankin of Mississippi, the Ku
Klux Klan, the National Workers League, and all of those who share their views.” By
inverting an argument that equated wartime protest with sedition, White made
racism in the “Fascist south” synonymous with un‐Americanism – a novel, but not
unprecedented, concept in the way some liberal Americans were thinking about
race at the time.26
The Kiel Auditorium rally was structured in culturally recognizable patterns
that combined secular mass protest with the rhetoric and rhythms of popular
African American religious practices. Speakers “scathingly attacked jim crowism,
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segregation and race prejudice in war industries and in the Army” and looked
towards MOWM to resolve problems in their city and country. Familiar songs like
“John Brown’s Body” morphed into “Robert Brooks’ Body.” The chorus lent itself to
MOWM’s ends, as lyrics printed in the program used capital letters to emphasize the
phrase “MARCHING ON.”27 Ministers, choirs, and spirituals were prominent at the
event, giving it an even closer resemblance to a sacred gathering. In the
performance of protest, speakers articulated a litany of social evils that could be
remedied by the faithful support of an inspired audience. Aside from rhetoric, song,
and structure, the rally most closely resembled a church service when long‐time
MOWM supporter Rev. James M. Bracey opened the event with an invocation that
was followed by Pine Street YMCA official James Cook passing a collection plate in
support of the upstart organization. Speech after speech expressed loyalty to God
and country, as orators emphasized “that the Negro was loyal but that he preferred
evidences of democracy now rather than many promises of full democracy after the
war.”28
David Grant spoke directly for St. Louis MOWM when he opened the event
with a speech entitled “St. Louis Negro and the War Effort,” an oration that one
newspaper listed among the evening’s best.29 Audience response became so
effervescent during his list of “what St. Louis Negroes resent and want remedied”
that Grant had to request applause be tempered. Grant used recent history to
illuminate the present. He referred to the “Close Ranks” campaign heralded by Du
Bois during the First World War as a precedent for when African Americans were
“promised equal rights but didn’t get them.” Grant thought it a betrayal to
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democracy that African American soldiers returned from the war to a country with
unbroken racism manifesting in “riots, unpunished lynchings, unemployment, labor
union bars, and discrimination.”30 For Grant, the present situation demanded “Not
1917 promises, but 1942 action.” According to St. Louis MOWM, this action had to
be uncompromising in its demands and aggressive in its tactics to receive full
recognition of African Americans as citizens of the United States.31
There was, in Grant’s words, “a new Negro” in St. Louis. “In 1917 we didn’t
demand freedom,” Grant continued, “but by the great Jehovah we demand it now!”32
Taking the economic road to civil rights was St. Louis MOWM’s hallmark in its early
years, and Grant did this when listing grievances with race relations and racial
inequality in his hometown. With theatres, ballparks, and eating facilities
segregated, Grant identified limited opportunities in the city’s booming defense
industries as “a final last ditch” effort in “the fight for life” that made “the St. Louis
Negro become aroused, resentful, and ultimately bitter.” Grant feared that if
proportionally representative employment was not achieved during a wartime
labor shortage, it would probably not occur in anyone’s lifetime.33 Grant’s work to
alleviate dissatisfactory racial conditions was strongly influenced by his critical
patriotism, a trademark that he shared with A. Philip Randolph.34 Grant pointed out
the contradiction of African American draft inductees en route to routine military
physical examinations being forced to use a service elevator instead of the
exclusively White elevator in the main lobby. Grant was strongly opposed to federal
complicity with racial segregation but, like any sensible patriotic orator, his love for
the United States was professed and he promised to “die if needs be for my country.”
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Grant’s dedication, however, had limits, and his sacrifice would not be “1917
style…with sealed lips as to my complaints, my desires, my demands” for civil rights
and racial equality.35
The lack of female speakers on the program that evening is a poignant
metaphor for the city’s African American leadership during the Second World War.
The audience was mixed, as one African American female columnist “noticed just
about as many women were present as men.” Still, only one woman, Sallie Parham,
spoke at the rally. Likewise, the fact‐filled Chicago Defender’s women’s page makes
only passing reference in of Frances Moseley’s arrival in St. Louis to assist the
MOWM chapter with logistics and operations.36 Photographs of events and accounts
from the contemporary media indicate that women were well‐represented at all of
the organization’s sponsored marches, sit‐ins, and planning meetings. Despite their
strong representation, women were rarely sought out as spokespeople by local or
national African American media outlets.
Gendered limitations on the parameters and scope of women’s involvement
in Roosevelt‐era protest politics make it hardly surprising that Sallie Parham was
the only woman to speak officially at the St. Louis MOWM event. As an
administrator of the St. Louis YWCA and leader of the local National Council of
Business and Professional Women, Parham was clearly one of the city’s most
recognized African American women. She used her time at the podium that evening
as an opportunity to remind listeners that while men shouldered firearms oversees
in the name of freedom, women on the home front had a responsibility to fight “for
the American negro” by using their words as weapons. Her interpretation of the
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Second World War was somewhat less overtly patriotic than that of the male
speakers. Not directly connected to conscription, and somewhat unaffected by the
logic of soldiering in order to justify full citizenship, Parham saw the war as one in
which “White men are fighting to preserve their democracy and we are fighting to
get our democracy.”37 Parham’s view of women’s activism was that females in
MOWM “fight for victory here now so that they [African American males] may have
a real victory at home when they return from war.” Thus, according to Parham, the
duty of African American women was to “shoulder the problems of the American
negro in the same way many men are shouldering the guns” to liberate Europe. This
duty translated to Black women on the home front maintaining constant agitation
for equal opportunity in defense manufacturing, pressing for a federal anti‐lynching
law, advocating the repeal of literacy tests and poll taxes, and changing insulting
policies such as segregated Red Cross blood banks. Above all, according to Parham,
the most important fight was to make sure that “those who are gone for victory
now” could come home “to a Victory here” at the war’s conclusion.38
Also speaking that evening was national leader, A. Philip Randolph. As
during the Harlem rally, Randolph “had to omit many portions” of his keynote
address at Kiel “due to the lateness of the hour.”39 In this case, he had little time to
demonstrate his well‐known prowess as an orator because this Friday night event
went on for over five hours and concluded at 1 am.40 Randolph used his few
minutes on the stage to ensure the enthusiastic but weary audience that “contrary to
some reports that the March on Washington Movement has been abandoned, it is
very much alive and it [the march] was only postponed,” perhaps only until
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September when MOWM would have a rally at Griffith Stadium. Randolph also
urged the crowd to attack racial segregation in the Army on grounds that it reduced
our “race to the status of second‐class citizens.”41 Like previous MOWM rallies in
Chicago and Harlem, the event was accompanied by a fifteen‐minute electrical
blackout “in Negro residential and business districts.”42 The resemblance was
intentional, as McNeal solicited Harlem MOWM for copies of publicity material and
tactics that it used in a recently successful blackout accompanying a rally at Madison
Square Garden.43 The context of America at war made the blackout an even more
powerful symbol because England was using urban blackouts to confuse German
bombers. MOWM seized the idea of turning off the lights in the name of freedom, an
action that indicated a community taking action to defend itself under threat of a
siege. The fifteen‐minute duration, as Randolph pointed out to Charles Wesley
Burton when planning the Chicago blackout, allowed for “better cooperation from
businesses” and was publically espoused as a way to “make the most dramatic
presentation of the feeling of dissatisfaction and resentment” with segregation in
the military and discrimination in defense industries.44 In the case of St. Louis,
however, getting compliance from the local African American community was easy ‐
many of them were already at the rally, making their participation in the blackout all
but guaranteed. Ostensibly, all St. Louis MOWM had to do was remind people to
turn off the lights on their way out the door before leaving to attend the rally.
The federal government was well aware of St. Louis’ racial discontent and it
is clear that the Roosevelt administration saw maintaining domestic tranquility as
integral to national security during the war. There is no evidence of COINTELPRO
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style sabotage experienced by later generations of Black activists, but it is certain
that the FBI closely monitored racial protest organizations, including the avowedly
patriotic MOWM.45 African Americans were generally aware of federal monitoring,
and even the Pittsburgh Courier remarked that the Kiel Auditorium rally was
attended by thousands of African Americans from the St. Louis metro area as well as
“many FBI men” who stood out in a sea of “sepia Americans.”46 Like the Courier,
McNeal was aware of the presence of federal investigators, commenting in a letter to
Randolph that the FBI was building a sedition case “on the basis of skits staged at
our protest meeting.”47 The militant rhetoric of wartime Black protest and the
crowd’s visibly impressive size was obvious, but the FBI did not recognize the
widespread support for St. Louis MOWM that came from other African American
institutions. Although this support was just below the surface and would have been
evident had investigators took the time to glance at the city’s Black institutions, the
FBI was occupied with investigations of genuinely subversive African American
groups around the city ‐ like the Pacific Movement of the Eastern World, a pro‐
Japanese organization denounced by MOWM as “hopelessly ignorant, anti‐social,
anti‐Negro, and anti‐Democratic.”48
The list of organizations that St. Louis MOWM thanked for planning and
coordinating its first major public rally reads like a directory of Black St. Louis’ civic
and social life: The Ushers Alliance of St. Louis, the Interdenominational Alliance of
St. Louis, the Celestial Choristers, The We Group, The Business and Professional
Girls Club, and the Industrial Club of the YWCA. St. Louis MOWM also thanked the
bands playing at the rally and Black media outlets, Argus and American, for their
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positive coverage of the event.49 The importance of existing Black institutions to St.
Louis MOWM’s operations is further illustrated by the list of co‐sponsoring
organizations for the Kiel Auditorium rally: St. Louis NAACP, YMCA, BSCP, American
Legion, and Elks Lodge 1012. The ability of “practically every Negro organization in
the St. Louis area” to coalesce and make this impressive one‐day protest rally
happen made organizer T.D. McNeal comment that, “For the first time we seem to
have absolute unity and solidarity among Negroes in the community and everyone
is doing everything possible to make this the greatest demonstration of Negro
power ever seen in the country.”50

March on Carter, August 29, 1942
Federal investigators had legitimate concerns about proceedings at Kiel
Auditorium because it led to a surge in public demonstrations – all of which had
potential to explode into racial conflagrations. McNeal and other members of St.
Louis MOWM hoped that the wildly successful rally “was merely incidental to the
general program” of organizing local people “to intelligently and militantly fight for
their rights.”51 The rally was somewhat of a coming out party for the upstart
organization, but it also served to drum up support for a public demonstration
taking place at Carter Carburetor’s small arms plant later that month. A relatively
large defense contractor with a $1 million contract to make artillery and bomb
fuses, Carter had upwards of 3,200 employees and no African Americans on its
payroll.52 The company’s recalcitrance made it an obvious target for MOWM to plan
a demonstration appealing to “all Negroes who are interested in fighting for
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economic justice in the form of jobs for our people.” St. Louis MOWM’s primary
grievance against Carter was that it “flatly refuses to employ a single Negro in any
capacity.” More galling was that, as a defense contractor, war bonds that Americans
of all races invested in subsidized the company’s racially exclusive hiring
practices.53
Two weeks after the “orderly demonstration” at Kiel auditorium, a crowd of
200‐500 African Americans assembled on a hot late summer day.54 They marched
in single file for a mile from Tandy Park to the company’s plant “with grimness of
facial expression and a spirit of militancy” noticeable to at least one observer.55
These were the kind of individuals cultural historian Robin D.G. Kelley had in mind
when he drew on Paul Laurence Dunbar’s poetry to conclude, “the mask was no
longer visible” on the faces of African Americans during World War II, it was
replaced “with a militant face.”56 The March on Carter established the precedent of
walking behind “a large American flag” that became one of St. Louis MOWM’s
signatures at all of its demonstrations. Denouncing “the Fascist practices of the
Carter company” brought little immediate gain, but it did keep St. Louis MOWM in
the headlines.57 There seems to be a ripple effect, as Sportsman’s Park, home of the
St. Louis Cardinals baseball club, was across the street from Carter Carburetor.
Accounts of the march on Carter mention that the demonstration attracted the
attention of fans in the stadium, and two years later this venue voluntarily
desegregated its seating.58
MOWM used local African American media outlets like the Argus to announce
that “all Negroes who are interested in fighting for economic justice in the form of
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jobs for our people” could and should assemble at a local park and “saunter”
together for nearly a mile to Carter Carburetor’s plant.59 McNeal advised “all
intelligent Negroes” to “drop everything and join this demonstration,” but he didn’t
rush St. Louis MOWM into action. McNeal’s experience as a labor organizer taught
him the productivity of negotiation with management. According to McNeal,
Carter’s management “ignored our request for a conference,” and implicitly “ASKED
FOR A MARCH!”60 Carter explained its actions to MOWM, rationalizing them as
necessary because a company‐wide retooling of machines meant that no new
employees were needed for the immediate future. Carter’s general manager, H.H.
Weed, reacted to the march with what one left‐leaning newspaper called a “manifest
untruth” when he claimed that the company had “no established policy barring
Negroes from employment.”61 A less partisan newspaper recorded additional
comments by Weed that suggest Carter Carburetor intended to stand firm on its
racially exclusive hiring practices. According to Weed, the company’s first
responsibility was rehiring the 600 workers who were laid off during the retooling
that slowed production while the plant was outfitted for defense work. After that,
the company had “3500 applications” to sort through before any new employment
applications were solicited.62 In short, Weed tactfully and transparently informed
St. Louis MOWM that Carter’s racial status quo would be maintained for the
foreseeable future. Carter management held fast to racial exclusion, and unlike
other employment centers targeted by MOWM, it never capitulated to pressure
politics or integrated its workforce.63
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Members of the “large crowd” were unquestionably bitter about Carter
management’s resistance towards integrating its workforce. A police squad car and
two motorcycle patrolmen followed the “quiet and orderly march.”64 This well‐
disciplined “group of more than 500 Negroes” followed a path on the sidewalk
through a White neighborhood, whose response ranged from disaffected to vocally
sympathetic.65 One eyewitness account reports that a White supporter yelled, “I
don’t blame you!” and another shouted that the city’s racial problems were the
result of White Southerners.66 Reports from White newspapers mentioned that
Carter employees silently stared at the procession but remained aloof, giving “no
sign of recognizing the demonstration.”67 David Grant led the march, which by all
accounts was within the boundaries of propriety, and he made sure that everyone
quietly disbanded after completing the mile‐long trek to a picket outside of the
factory.68
The march on Carter was the first demonstration sponsored by St. Louis
MOWM. Although risky, its decision to march over a mile and through a
predominantly White neighborhood gave the organization prominence and helped
rocket it to the top of the city’s ranks of African American leadership. McNeal and
Grant believed that mobilizing local people to take action at plants like Carter placed
their city at the locus of national problems. Working class African Americans came
out in droves, and their presence that day was noticeable. This was made possible
by keeping the action close to home, which made it easier for working people to
assemble without missing wages or possibly losing their jobs for taking time off.69
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It was clear that attendance was far short of T.D. McNeal’s call for “10,000
Strong” to fight for “jobs, freedom, equal opportunities, and full citizenship,” but the
Chicago Defender called this demonstration “a complete success” that raised
consciousness of the “vicious” racist hiring practices at Carter and other defense
plants in the area.70 McNeal himself was pleased with the turnout, and he thought
that the march satisfied its objectives. “The purpose of this demonstration,” McNeal
said, “was to dramatize the plight of the discriminated Negro” and put
contradictions of the issue squarely in the “conscience” of the city’s White residents.
McNeal’s scheme of protest politics caused him to believe that effective protest
would put “our problem before the people of St. Louis.” Once awareness of the
situation was raised, McNeal believed, “The conscience of the people will do the
rest.”71
In quantifiable terms of jobs gained as a result of St. Louis MOWM protests,
the march on Carter was one of the organization’s least effective demonstrations.
This event is noteworthy because it was the first of its kind in the Gateway City and
it heralded the ascendency of McNeal, Grant, and St. Louis MOWM to the pinnacle of
local Black leadership. The march on Carter also introduced rhetorical and
representative precedents that St. Louis MOWM adhered to in subsequent
campaigns.72 Also important was the prominent display of the American flag and
the use of Christian prayer as a vehicle for protest stayed with the organization for
its entire life. The recurrent appearance of patriotic Christianity in St. Louis
MOWM’s pronouncements and practices indicates that McNeal, Grant, and other
MOWM members were convinced that claiming loyalty to the United States and
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expressing this ideal in sacred rhetoric was both salient to them and familiar to the
city’s White power structure. In the end, it was evident that loyalty to God and
country was expected to translate into greater employment opportunities for
African Americans.73

Prayer Demonstration at St. Louis Memorial Plaza, October 18, 1942
As a young Black protest organization, St. Louis MOWM relied on the twin
pillars of militant civic engagement and public exposure that hyped its protests.
Keeping the community motivated necessitated that the organization always follow
through with more demonstrations, pickets, and public meetings. In the march on
Carter’s aftermath, McNeal announced that people “from all walks of life” were
called to gather for a prayer meeting at City Hall the following week. 74 There is no
documentary explanation why the public prayer demonstration was rescheduled,
but the event was eventually held on October 18, 1942. Organizers chose St. Louis
Memorial Plaza as a place to “pray for victory of the United Nations and for justice to
the Negro people” because the venue was nearby to city government buildings.75
The prayer demonstration was part of an orchestrated effort by MOWM’s national
office to have local units sponsor solemn public prayer services as a form of protest
against racial discrimination.76 St. Louis MOWM was in the vanguard in advancing
the idea of integrating sacred and secular protest in an outdoor public arena.
Though planning was difficult and the weather uncooperative, the ultimate success
of St. Louis MOWM’s public prayer demonstration prompted A. Philip Randolph to
direct Charles Wesley Burton of Chicago MOWM to “plan [for November 9th] public
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prayer meeting in the Loop, in the interest of teen age boys lynched in
Mississippi.”77
Plans for this joint effort between St. Louis MOWM and the Inter‐
Denominational Ministerial Alliance were “perfected” at MOWM’s weekly YMCA
meeting the week after the march on Carter. According to one account, this
planning meeting attracted 350 attendees, far more than any other weekly MOWM
meeting at the Pine Street YMCA.78 McNeal wanted to capitalize on increasing
support from “whites of the city,” and he hoped that “all local churches” would
support the public prayer “for the victory of the United Nations and for justice to the
Negro people now.”79 The outdoor service was advertised as a way for people to
demonstrate their faith in God and express support for St. Louis MOWM while
“presenting a mass Prayer Petition to the All Mighty for a full share of the
Democratic way of life for the Negro people.”80
St. Louis MOWM tapped into a well of overtly patriotic religious reform that
McNeal hoped would be “the greatest thing of its sort ever seen in America.”81
Publicity consisted of broadsides posted throughout the city, radio spots,
announcements in pulpits, and supportive editorials in African American
newspapers.82 The Pittsburgh Courier also used patriotism and religious devotion in
order to publicize the event, ensuring potential attendees that, “Every effort is being
made to see that the citizens of St. Louis attend and share in this event with the view
in mind of obtaining divine help in the fight on the part of the Negro for justice and
fair play and for an eventual victory for the allied forces…this war will be a righteous
war that will bring true Christianity to all and a real peace to the world.”83
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McNeal never overlooked the power of religion as a tool for mobilizing
masses, but his call in the St. Louis American used a slightly more secular tone.
Promising, “we, the Negro people of St. Louis, will consecrate our souls to the
unfinished task of completing the structure of our economic, social and political
citizenship,” McNeal weaved religious devotion with messianic civic involvement
that promised to fulfill egalitarian ideals. McNeal understood that, in the world of
protest politics, results deepened support, and he used his forum as event organizer
to point out St. Louis MOWM’s accomplishments. Chief among these victories was
that “Plants where five months ago Negroes were formerly confined to sweeping the
floors and other extremely menial work have opened the doors of economic
opportunity…to well paid jobs, in‐plant training and better jobs with better pay.”84
Estimates of attendance placed the crowd at the prayer demonstration at
1,500‐3,000, which was greater than the march on Carter but significantly less than
the Kiel Auditorium rally.85 In a letter to A. Philip Randolph, one St. Louis MOWM
member commented, “the entire program was undoubtedly soul‐stirring” but the
attendance was smaller than hoped, and “there were not many souls for it to stir.”86
Though disappointing to some St. Louis MOWM members, the outcome was
impressive considering that this was a grassroots demonstration without the benefit
of national star power like A. Philip Randolph or Walter White. Perhaps a larger
factor was the weather, which was overcast throughout the event and eventually
turned into a steady downpour towards the conclusion. Thus, even though “all the
ministers appeared as scheduled” and the event “was very beautiful,” attendance
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was less than predicted and the cloudburst during the collection meant that only
forty dollars ‐ less than half of the event’s cost ‐ was recuperated.87
Publicity for the prayer demonstration promised “a most unusual event”
showcasing an ethos of militant Christianity that portrayed African Americans as
“not only a fighting people, but also a praying people.”88 In planning for the event,
McNeal was careful to ensure that it could be easily attended because “the program
as a whole will consume less than an hour and will be packed with interest.”89 He
secured co‐sponsorship from the Interdenominational Minister’s Alliance, which
enlivened proceedings with a 300‐voice choir that drew from African American
churches across the city. The most prominent ministers participating in the service,
and at many other St. Louis MOWM events, included Noah Clark, James Cook, and
Inter‐Denominational Ministers Alliance leader James M. Bracy.90 For the zealous
race women and men in attendance that day, religion and politics were inseparable
– the path to true Christianity was also the way to truly fulfill the American promise
of democratic equality. A recurring message in publicity leading up to the event was
that sincere Christians supported America’s military efforts abroad and carried on
“a righteous war” against racial inequality “that will bring true Christianity to all.”91
Leaders of the service saw religion as a vehicle for smashing racial hostility and
perfecting human relations. This is best exemplified by Rev. Bracy, who believed
that spiritual power was the only way for mankind to break down “ancient as the
Chinese walls…racial walls, some walls of hate, others national, others social.” Bracy
continued his prayer, “and since most walls are built by the prisoners themselves,
they can be destroyed only by Jesus, who is the kind of truth that sets men free.”92
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As a secular leader, McNeal’s message that day was that African American
soldiers faced the threat of replaying the experiences of their counterparts in the
First World War, when Black veterans returned from Europe to a racial landscape
marred by violence and plagued with inequality. To McNeal, the physical war
against Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito was also an ideological battle. Victory meant
that soldiers would come home to see the democratic promise fulfilled with voting
rights unimpeded by the poll tax and abundant employment opportunities
unimpeded by racial restrictions. In his prayer, McNeal told the outdoor
congregation that “we can win the war and lose the peace” if steady efforts to
promote racial equality were neglected.93 As nearly every MOWM spokesperson did
at some point during oratory, McNeal took a moment from his ten‐minute prayer to
reiterate his unwavering support for the United Nations and seized the opportunity
to “restate the composition, aims and purposes of the March Movement,” defining it
as “an all Negro movement that is not anti‐white.” McNeal took this message of self‐
reliance a step further, reminding listeners that “Negroes should supply the money
and pay the price” for their freedom. A consummate organization builder, McNeal
urged listeners to join MOWM at the fee of one dollar per person. He made sure to
“stress and emphasize” that support and encouragement “of all liberal forces” was
appreciated, but that “the main and basic responsibility” for social change rested
“upon Negroes themselves.”94
McNeal’s message of self‐reliance was part of a longstanding tradition in
African American protest politics, but it was also indicative of another reality in
Roosevelt‐era America. The idea that African Americans should bear ultimate
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responsibility for eradicating racial inequality was an admission by McNeal that he
saw White supremacy as being so deeply entrenched in America’s fabric that it
could not be effectively challenged by the country’s sincere but marginalized White
liberals. Thus, McNeal prayed that “we, the Negro masses in the March on
Washington Movement dedicate our sprit and pledge our lives never to waver in our
patriotism and all‐out efforts to help win the war for the United nations and never to
falter, grow faint, or fail in our fight for a truly democratic America, SO HELP US
GOD.” He believed that African Americans could obtain equal protection as citizens
and ultimately bring the United States to a place where it could justly “assume the
moral and spiritual leadership of world democracy.”95
The formation of St. Louis MOWM over a year after Executive Order 8802
became law was recognition that African Americans stood at a critical disjunction in
the praxis of American democracy. Once hailed by the African American press as
the first significant progressive federal legislation since the nineteenth century, E.O.
8802 made little impact in the lives of countless African Americans. Publicly,
Randolph professed that President Roosevelt’s support was enough to cancel the
proposed march, and he repeatedly stated that E.O. 8802 was more than a gesture of
the Roosevelt administration’s commitment to equal opportunity. As seen through
the experiences of local leadership in St. Louis MOWM, African Americans were
cognizant of the disparity between theory and practice when it came to the
implementation of progressive public policy in a racial democracy. Members of St.
Louis MOWM believed that E.O. 8802 was their generation’s version of the
Emancipation Proclamation and the Reconstruction Amendments. As such, they
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understood that constant public pressure was necessary to ensure that legal
victories did not become dead letters through the willful ignorance or hostile
intransigence of local officials.

The Long Campaign to Integrate U.S. Cartridge, 19421944
In the course of three years, St. Louis MOWM expended much of its energy
engaging in a series of protests, pickets, and negotiations with U.S. Cartridge, a bullet
manufacturer known to locals as the Small Arms Plant.96 Armed with “a new set of
alphabets,” St. Louis MOWM took its campaign at U.S. Cartridge with law and the
FEPC on its side.97 Chances for some degree of success seemed likely because U.S.
Cartridge, like other ordinance plants that were expanding, did not have a long
tradition of excluding African American workers.98 In short, racial discrimination
was not deeply woven into the company’s history. Compounding this was the fact
that U.S. Cartridge needed all of the qualified manpower it could find. As the most
prolific producer of .30 and .50 caliber ammunition in the world, U.S. Cartridge
boasted, “its production is measured in fantastic figures, literally billions of
cartridges.” The campus of this critical component in the arsenal of democracy was
“a vast fenced in area, covered with hundreds of ultra‐modern brick and concrete
buildings.”99 Six months after Pearl Harbor, this impressive production center had
21,000‐23,500 employees, only 300 of which were African American. Of this 300,
there were zero African American women. Severely under‐represented, Black
workers at this company also had their opportunities for promotion greatly
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curtailed. All of them were classified as porters, and their duties encompassed
janitorial service and moving material.100
If comments from a company spokesperson can be interpreted as indicative
of management’s attitude, U.S. Cartridge’s view of Black workers was a neo‐
paternalism that allowed the company to imagine itself as a beneficent and well‐
intentioned employer. This view was tinged with a Gone With the Wind paranoia of
misguided and ill‐prepared African Americans infiltrating and ultimately destroying
cultural and economic institutions. The comments of a spokesperson rationalizing
the company’s reluctance to utilize Black workers to manufacture bullets illustrate
this well. “You just can’t,” U.S. Cartridge explained, “ turn unskilled workers loose in
an ammunition plant.”101 The implication was clear: African American workers
could not be trusted with direct involvement of armament manufacturing.
The few African Americans employed at U.S. Cartridge faced racial conditions
that were, at best, insulting. In addition to always being passed over for promotions,
they were often served leftover food in the employee cafeteria and were
inconvenienced by “Colored Only” restrooms.102 By 1943, disdain for their
treatment was at the core of a walkout that was designed to express their
opposition to “enforced segregation” and register protest against perceived racial
insults hurled by an exclusively White cadre of foremen. “Prior to the war,” U.S.
Cartridge told the FEPC, “Negro Workers found employment chiefly in heavy
industrial trades” that were limited to the most “menial and lowest‐paying jobs.”103
This occurred in spite of an eighteen‐month old promise to the Urban League that
the company would train more African American workers for skilled positions with
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greater prestige.104 The company could clearly not be counted on to hold its word.
The daily experiences of African American workers gave lie to U.S. Cartridge’s claim
that “there was no concerted or set policy of intra‐plant segregation of Jim Crow.”105
This was personalized by the experiences of Blyden Steale and Elvin Matthews. Just
days before St. Louis MOWM’s first demonstration at U.S. Cartridge, the company
denied Steale and Matthews employment “despite the fact that they are the only two
Negroes in the city who are members of the St. Louis local of the A.F.L. union of
Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers Union” and they had extensive experience on
union job sites alongside White workers.106
Attempts by African American organizations to carve a niche for Black
workers on U.S. Cartridge’s payroll began in 1941, when the local Urban League
negotiated with the company to offer more training opportunities for those already
employed with the company. This program’s ultimate goal was to prepare Black
workers to fill supervisory positions in racially exclusive divisions, thus eliminating
the possibility that orders from a White foremen could be interpreted as racial
antagonism. This compromise offered the appeal of upward mobility for blue‐collar
African American workers but, over the course of a year, it amounted to little real
progress.107 St. Louis MOWM stepped with protest politics to force the company to
follow its word and the law.108
Maliciously or not, U.S. Cartridge dismissed nearly 200 African American
workers without providing paperwork explaining their separation – an action that
all but ensured their permanent exclusion from St. Louis’ industrial labor force. This
event was the impetus for St. Louis MOWM to get involved with demonstrations at
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U.S. Cartridge.109 St. Louis’ Black residents were outraged. With little FEPC
presence in the city “so that we could feel that something or somebody was there,”
David Grant later explained to Congress, “the only place we could go was to the
streets.”110 This is precisely what happened on June 20, 1942, when an “army of
marchers,” numbering between 200‐600, “representing all social and occupational
strata” picketed for two hours. Demonstrators “from the dicty to the despised”
braved temperatures in the low nineties on a balmy solstice day to surround the
perimeter of U.S. Cartridge’s sprawling campus.111 In order to get there, they
walked over four miles, much of which was through a predominantly White
neighborhood.112 The determination of this diverse group of African Americans
surely pleased A. Philip Randolph, who urged McNeal to “try to get as much
people…as possible, old and young, educated and uneducated, good and bad, crap
shooter and preacher; for everybody is needed in this fight for Negro rights.”113
Ranging from “adolescence to almost senility,” this loose assortment of “Ministers,
doctors, lawyers, teachers, housewives, laborers and labor union representatives”
demonstrated the heightening resolve and increased solidarity of Black St. Louis.114
Typifying the patriotic atmosphere St. Louis MOWM cultivated at all of its
pickets, protestors at U.S. Cartridge marched behind a “huge American flag” that
unquestionably testified their allegiance to the United States and symbolized their
claim to full citizenship. “A large detachment of squad cars and police officers”
received this “peaceful” protest “courteously” while curious but aloof U.S. Cartridge
employees looked on.115 The police came out at McNeal’s request, and there is no
indication that law enforcement behaved antagonistically that day.116 David Grant
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remembered that White observers “kept their thoughts to themselves,” perhaps in
respect to a demonstration that exemplified the pageantry of mid‐twentieth century
Black American protest.117 Grant’s responsibility at the demonstration was to
ensure that the crowd’s words and gestures could not be interpreted as an
expression of animosity towards potentially hostile onlookers. In this capacity,
Grant had “to advise people in the line of march not to carry on conversations with
bystanders, with people who might be there to heckle.” He also instructed the
crowd make sure that police or appointed event monitors be notified of any
disturbances.118
Demonstrators communicated with plant management, the city’s power
structure, and other citizens through messages carried on eighteen different
MOWM‐authorized placards. Without bullhorns or a marching band, St. Louis
MOWM relied on the public dignity and orderly procession of demonstrators to
present a multi‐faceted argument for incorporating African American workers into
military production. Strongly influenced by Double V rhetoric, their messages often
made racial discrimination and fascism synonymous. A sampling of St. Louis
MOWM’s slogans includes “How can we DIE FREELY for democracy abroad if we
can’t WORK EQUALLY for democracy at home,” “Selective service for Negroes – U.S.
Army – Front Line! – U.S. Cartridge – Rear Line!,” “Winning Democracy for the Negro
is Winning the War for Democracy,” and “Why Make Propaganda for Nazi
Goebels?”119 Their rhetoric was an attempt to bring the war against fascism home
to America, where its parallel was the struggle against racism.120
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The St. Louis American called MOWM’s protest at U.S Cartridge “one of the
most significant demonstrations ever staged in St. Louis.”121 The Pittsburgh Courier
followed suit, praising it as “one of the most spectacular ever held in the Mound
City.”122 The reaction of St. Louis’ White media was, at best, tepid. The St. Louis
American attacked Sunday PostDispatch for sending a “crudely biased…Dixie‐
trained reporter.” The American’s biggest gripe was the use of the modifier “alleged”
whenever it mentioned the plant’s racial discrimination because signs designating
racial segregation were clearly posted throughout the plant. U.S. Cartridge’s “jim
crow policy is an open book,” the American wrote, comparable to the “alleged…Jap
attack on Pearl harbor on December 7th.”123
McNeal knew that the equation for progress was more complicated than the
simple arithmetic of street demonstrations and a need for manpower translating
into more jobs for Black workers. From the beginning of his organization’s
involvement at U.S. Cartridge, McNeal thought that the aim was “to bring this matter
to the attention of the public here, to the Roosevelt administration and particularly
to the Fair Employment Practices Committee in Washington.”124 This stance speaks
to St. Louis MOWM’s remarkable commitment to the democratic process and faith in
a well‐informed electorate to behave sensibly. In this framework, displaying
banners and placards “pointing out what we considered the justice of our cause”
should be enough to foster meaningful social change. In reality, getting African
Americans included in the defense industry took more than snappy slogans and
sound logic. Numbers were what mattered most, and St. Louis MOWM constantly
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tried to get people to come out and publicly express faith in the federal government
to enforce its own laws in spite of local customs and practices.125
In a letter to U.S. Cartridge’s public relations director, McNeal warned that
this demonstration “was a mere token of what the Negro people think…and how
they resent discriminatory policies and anti‐democratic attitudes of the U.S.
Cartridge company, all of which flagrantly violate the declared policy of the
American people as expressed in President Roosevelt’s executive order number
8802.” McNeal threatened to occupy public space around U.S Cartridge indefinitely
to publicize the extent of racial discrimination at the plant. He promised to keep the
issue “in the streets” with “constantly increasing numbers…until it is settled and
settled right.” These comments encapsulate St. Louis MOWM’s program, which
intended to attract the attention of a reluctant but dutiful federal government
through non‐violent disruptions of everyday life. As pointed out by one scholar, this
tactic relied upon “the physical impressiveness of large numbers” and support from
the Roosevelt administration.126 St. Louis MOWM believed that it could topple racial
employment barriers with a politically mobilized community and a supportive
federal government.
Before committing St. Louis MOWM to picketing, McNeal and Grant
negotiated with U.S. Cartridge through Industrial Relations Manager, R.V. Rickard.
Discussions quickly hit an impasse and collapsed, but small gains were made in the
aftermath of the June 20 demonstration. In its aftermath, African American workers
at U.S. Cartridge, all of whom were porters, received a ten‐cent per hour raise. This
is noteworthy because it marked the first time in company history that African
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Americans received a pay increase of any sort, even though White employees
enjoyed periodic raises throughout their career.127
Post‐protest negotiations also secured a promise from the company that 100
African American women would be hired.128 Within four days, seventy‐two African
American women added to the over 8,000 women already employed by U.S.
Cartridge.129 The gain was small but welcome for a group that, as of 1941, averaged
only one‐fourth the weekly earnings of their male counterparts and, even towards
the war’s end, only comprised 4% of the 7 million women workers employed
nationally in war production.130 Progress at U.S. Cartridge was bittersweet, as all of
the newly hired Black women were taken on as matrons. The concentration of Black
women workers into this one position added stigma to a job whose primary duty
was to clean women’s restrooms on the company’s sprawling campus.131 Statistics
reveal that African American women integrated the defense workforce, with their
proportion in this industry rising from 6.5 percent to 18 percent between 1940‐
1944.132 Numbers such as these suggest that the proportion of African American
women working in defense industries tripled during the Second World War, but
incidents like U.S. Cartridge caution historians to consider the quality of work as
well as its quantity. Emphasizing quantifiable gains like pay grades and the amount
of jobs secured allowed MOWM’s literature to cheer, with some amount of truth,
that its demonstrations represented “action followed by immediate results!”133
Still, a small pay increase for porters and the acquisition of 72 jobs for
African American women were only partial victories in St. Louis MOWM’s first
round of negotiations and pickets at U.S. Cartridge. The young organization was still
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well short of its stated goals, which was universal compliance with E.O. 8802, the
complete desegregation of all work facilities, and convincing the company to stop
recruiting workers from outside the St. Louis metro region until the city’s existing
labor supply was exhausted.134 David Grant thought that the campaign at U.S
Cartridge symbolized a paradigm shift in the city’s race relations, which he believed
were analogous to that of the United States as a whole. As such, Grant did not want
to cause trouble or instigate counter‐productive friction because “we are hopelessly
outnumbered.” Compounding the problem of being a minority group in a
representative democracy was a longstanding tradition of conflict at the confluence
of racial protest and law enforcement. “The constabulary and police department,”
Grant pointed out at a Congressional FEPC hearing, “are never sympathetic” to
African Americans who agitate against the status quo. Facing a hostile police and an
unresponsive FEPC, Grant argued that “there was no agency to which we could
reliably look,” thus leaving the city’s Black community with no other choice but to
agitate for change.135
Like Grant, McNeal also located the strongest force of change outside of city
or state government. He saw Black St. Louis’ strongest ally as the federal
government – not local defense plants that seemed to be in desperate need of
qualified workers. As he did at Carter Carburetor and in subsequent campaigns,
McNeal’s plan to integrate U.S. Cartridge’s workforce hinged upon attracting the
FEPC’s attention and getting the agency to conduct hearings with a view of
correcting the bad employment conditions for Negroes.”136 This was a departure
from the St. Louis Urban League’s previous efforts, which relied on good‐faith
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agreements between individual employers for increased representation of African
American workers. In the words of one newspaper, the addition of protest politics
added a sense of urgency to a situation that was already in flux, and St. Louis
MOWM’s program “spread like a fire” through St. Louis’ Black community.137
Acting as a mouthpiece for St. Louis MOWM, the St. Louis American predicted
that this success “served notice to other defense plants that their time is coming.”138
This was welcome news to MOWM, which wanted to use its success at U.S. Cartridge
as a springboard to accomplish the same “in every plant in St. Louis working on war
production.”139 Not content with a few menial jobs and a small raise for the
company’s existing Black workers, McNeal promised, “there is no intention on the
part of the Negro community to let up in its fight on small arms because of
these…token job considerations.” Emboldened by the implicit support of federal
authority of E.O. 8802 and a handful of politically engaged African Americans,
McNeal asserted that “the Negro citizens of St. Louis have a right to thousands of
jobs” filling defense orders throughout the city.140
Members of St. Louis MOWM hoped that pickets and protests would not be
seen as opposition to U.S. Cartridge, and the organization cancelled the next round
of pickets to demonstrate this.141 David Grant even boasted that St. Louis MOWM
“worked hand in glove with management,” as a sort of Urban League that drew its
power from protest politics.142 This blend of protest and uplift was a factor in the
six‐fold increase of African American employees at U.S. Cartridge over the year to
almost 1,700. MOWM’s organizational literature boasted, “Brother, that is money
you can count!”143
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Things were quiet between St. Louis MOWM and U.S. Cartridge for almost a
year, but then the organization sponsored another rally at Kiel Municipal
Auditorium to give “shot in the arm of St. Louis” and generate interest in resuming
demonstrations at the bullet factory. The purpose was to rally support for FEPC
hearings in the city and cheer the 8,000 African Americans who entered St. Louis’
defense workforce in the past year. Unlike the previous year’s rally, when
attendance estimates reached over 10,000, only about 1,500 came out on May 9,
1943. Event planners told reporters that this one “will be shorter but promises to
be even more impressive than the one last August.” The small attendance figure is
puzzling considering that MOWM’s “masterful, intelligent, and fearless” national
leader A. Philip Randolph and the “eloquent” David Grant were on the bill.144
McNeal was not on the program that evening, but his leadership style was better
suited to organizational work than oratory. Randolph acknowledged this by
opening his address with a gesture to McNeal and “fellow marchers.”145
The St. Louis American cheered Randolph for “LEADING like a real leader at a
time when a REAL LEADER is sorely needed.” The national leader urged listeners to
join AFL and CIO unions, demand equal citizenship rights, and pledge unity with
“democratic forces against fascism.” He also cautioned African Americans to avoid
radical third party politics, advocating instead for building a “strong political bloc
among 15,000,000” African Americans that was comparable in strength to other
special interests such as farmers and manufacturers.146 Speaking with “his low‐
pitched voice and clearly enunciated words,” Randolph denounced Republicans and
Democrats as “tweedle‐dee and tweedle‐dum as far as the Negro is concerned,”
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criticized Socialists as “too weak,” and cautioned about the “handicap” of “being red”
when “it’s hard enough being black.” Randolph’s salvo closed with a salute to
winning the war, reminding his audience that an Axis victory was a “negation of all
freedoms.” This, in Randolph’s mind, was something that African Americans could
ill afford because they “are not free, never have been free and we have to fight for
our freedom at home.”147
Within a day of St. Louis MOWM’s second rally, upwards of 200 White
women, “many of whom have come to work from small towns where Negroes are
kept in segregation,” staged a “sit‐down strike” at U.S. Cartridge.148 This wildcat
hate strike demonstrates what one historian identified as “the Rosetta stone of
American working class history,” in which “white American workers are race‐
conscious first and class‐conscious second.”149 The impetus for their action was
learning that “about 50 Negro floor men” from the nearly all‐Black Unit 202 were
now servicing machines in their production unit.150 Reactionary fervor spread
quickly as about thirty female machine operators on the first shift that Monday
stopped working. Within hours, their number grew sevenfold. Surprisingly, there
was only one physical confrontation during this tense moment and, fortunately,
plant guards quickly defused it.151 Company spokespeople explained the hate strike
was caused by a “misunderstanding…that the white men had been discharged,”
when in reality, “they were promoted.” The presence of “the Negroes” was
apologized for, with the rationale being that it was “impossible to get white
men…because of the manpower shortage.” It was further explained that floormen
“merely moved material,” and had no supervision over the female machine
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operators.152 U.S. Cartridge handled the striking group gently. Within a day, it
conceded their demand for an exclusively White shop floor, announcing it
“abandoned” a plan using African American material handlers in previously all‐
White units. U.S. Cartridge capitulated to White supremacy and reverted to its
former policy of keeping what by that time was all 3,500 of its African American
employees in the completely segregated Unit 202. The company decided to make
Unit 202 a self‐contained segregated workforce. It started advertising in St. Louis’
Black newspapers for “men with some experience in machine and metal trades” as
well as “housemen, clerks, dishwashers, janitors, porters, elevator operators,”
looking for “clean inside work” to apply for a position that helped the country and
furthered the war effort.153 This was the beginning of U.S. Cartridge’s equivalent to
the Tuskegee Airmen, and it allowed African American workers to “carve a niche for
themselves” in an industry that was previously racially exclusive.154
Race relations at U.S. Cartridge in the aftermath of the women’s strike were
tumultuous. A month later, an estimated 3,600 African American workers from
three different shifts at U.S. Cartridge walked out in reaction to “the appointment of
a white foreman to supervise them.”155 The foreman in question had a year of
experience working with the company’s all‐Black squads and came to U.S. Cartridge
from another war plant, but strike leaders complained that “the company had fallen
down” on its “promise” to racially integrate the exclusively‐White floor management
crew that had been in place since Unit 202’s inception in July 1942.156 As a result,
the wildcat “man bites dog” strike began with 1,500 African American workers
simultaneously sitting down. Like the White women’s strike, they did not picket or
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create any other disturbance. The strike easily spread through the next two shifts
and included all of the company’s African American employees, effectively shutting
down production in unit 202.157
The St. Louis Argus explained that African American workers at U.S. Cartridge
were bitter that members of their race were always passed over for promotions to
foreman.158 The racialization of the relationship between low‐level management
and laborers was even more bitter because the company had recently promised to
give greater consideration to African American workers for promotions.159 St.
Louis’ African American newspapers were favorable to MOWM but these same
media outlets were ambivalently guarded in their appraisal of the striking Black
workers.160 An example of this is seen in the St. Louis American, which criticized the
day‐long strike as “provincial” and “non‐democratic.” The American restrained its
criticism because the controversial strike was a reaction to racial segregation that
had little to do with “any innate prejudice against their foreman’s hair, eyes, religion,
or color” and more to do with carving out upwardly mobile job opportunities for
Black workers.161 The Daily Worker was more vociferous in its condemnation of the
strike as the product of “Fifth Column traitors, or misled dupes who either
deliberately or thoughtlessly join in provoking internal strife that disrupts and
endangers our war effort.”162 CIO Local 825 shared this opinion, albeit in more
tactful language. This union represented many of the striking workers, and it took a
blanket stance against all work stoppages.163
As could be expected, St. Louis MOWM downplayed the strike’s magnitude.
After all, the organization fought valiantly to secure jobs for the three thousand plus
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African American workers at U.S. Cartridge. St. Louis MOWM denounced strikers as
“unwise, ill‐timed, hasty and without outside support of Negro people, your union or
the March on Washington Committee.”164 With little outside support from Black
protest organizations or media outlets, this strike still managed to be the largest one
led by African Americans during the war. Though their dissatisfaction was clearly
deep, the strike was settled in one day – hardly enough time for the notoriously
inefficient FEPC bureaucracy to set in motion and rectify a deeper systematic
problem at U.S. Cartridge. The strike had a program, but workers agreed to return
to their positions and continue arbitrating while resuming production.165 St. Louis
MOWM tactfully stayed away from wielding the kind of mass pressure politics that
made it an effective wartime organization. Instead, McNeal had the organization
confer and cooperate with company management to address the problem. In short,
St. Louis MOWM functioned as union in its position as a liaison between African
American workers and U.S. Cartridge.166 The result of the strike was a promise to
“replace the white foreman” and train Black leadership in Unit 202, which it quickly
followed through with by placing almost three dozen African Americans in foreman
positions by the month’s end. In only eighteen hours, production resumed to pre‐
strike levels and an agreement was made “to arbitrate the dispute.”167 Resistance by
White employees to work as peers with African Americans and the refusal of Black
workers to labor under exclusively White foremen came to a head in the day‐long
strike.
The fight for equal employment opportunity at U.S. Cartridge did not end
with a labor disruption that was “one of the most spectacular ever held in the
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Mound City.”168 As was the experience in Reconstruction and later in the Civil
Rights Movement, members of St. Louis MOWM knew that constant vigilance was
necessary to protect gains that were won by pressure politics. In this case, a
reactionary response came quickly. In July 1943, over one hundred African
American employees, many of whom were women, were fired from U.S Cartridge.
The St. Louis American, a local Black newspaper that had a history of being very
sympathetic to MOWM campaigns, acknowledged that miscreants and rascals were
indeed among some of the released. The paper blasted “Every shiftless, drunken,
poorly disciplined colored war worker” as a “double saboteur” of racial progress
and the war effort.169 Roughly half a year earlier, another of St. Louis’ African
American media outlets anticipated mass firings and the racially coded language
explaining their dismissals. The Argus championed African American war workers
for “making history.” As the beneficiaries of Roosevelt’s momentous executive
order, they were responsible for being on their best behavior at the job site.
“Common sense,” the Argus argued, dictated that “exacting” government work
should be done with an eye for perfection, even in personal appearance while in
uniform.170 For commentators and common people who understood race relations
in the moral terms so common to that generation, the irreverent and outspoken
George Schuyler’s words encapsulated the problem of African American workers.
Poorly disciplined and uncouthly mannered workers that did not meet company
standards of personal behavior and appearance “are in the minority, but they shape
white majority opinion, which in turn shapes our lives.”171 Thus no one, not even St.
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Louis MOWM, rose to defend U.S. Cartridge’s first mass layoff of African American
workers.
This was not a time to take antagonistic action against any defense company
in St. Louis that would hire African Americans in any capacity. Further layoffs at U.S.
Cartridge and slower than expected hiring at Curtis‐Wright made “available jobs for
colored women” bottom out at a “critically low point.” In 1943, these were the only
two out of 325 total companies holding defense contracts in St. Louis that had an
appreciable number of African American women employees. The prospect of more
layoffs and continued recalcitrance from other employers presented working
African American women with a choice: “going into domestic service at extremely
low pay or be subjected to actual want.” With 20,000 African American women
available for work in St. Louis area defense plants in 1944, it seemed likely that they
would only be incorporated into defense work after the supply of Black men was
nearly exhausted.172 Two years of MOWM activity on their behalf and intervention
by Mayor’s Race Relations Commission made little impact, causing a local observer
to conclude, “there is no city in the nation where employment conditions are as bad
for colored girls and women.”173
In 1944, after three years of racial animosity that saw wildcat strikes from
workers of both races, U.S. Cartridge and St. Louis MOWM leadership agreed upon
the “St. Louis Plan.” This management program officially designated Unit 202 as an
all‐Black production unit. In comparison to other programs, the most important
change that this designation brought was the introduction of African American
management to this historically Black unit. Unit 202 employed 5,000 workers, all of
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whom labored and lunched in segregated but respectable facilities. Though St. Louis
MOWM saw this as a compromise “at which we were not over happy,” it represented
a pragmatic solution to the problem of offering a minority group economic
opportunity in spite of pervasive White supremacy shared by many employees and
managers.174 The city’s Black institutions did not unanimously accept this double‐
edged sword of increasing employment for Black workers coupled with the
compromise of accepting a completely segregated workspace. The Urban League,
for example, was concerned that its agenda of securing jobs for Black workers was
incorrectly aligned with MOWM’s support for Unit 202 and the St. Louis Plan.
Executive Secretary John T. Clark explained that his organization would never
support the “segregation of Negro workers” even if it meant more immediate
opportunity for the race as a whole. Clark and the Urban League dissented because
it saw segregation “under any circumstances” as a “doubtful expedient.” He argued
that segregating the workplace “fails to get the best production output from those
who are segregated and creates in their minds suspicion and distrust” of the
American government for supporting employers engaged in such practices.175
McNeal’s reserved approval and Clark’s opposition to racial arrangements in
Unit 202 reveal an ideological fault line separating MOWM and the Urban League.
This division seemed to matter little to the workers in Unit 202 who, after eight
months on the job, outpaced the rest of U.S. Cartridge’s employees in all relevant
measures of production. U.S. Cartridge’s statistics indicate that Unit 202’s
absenteeism rate was 20% lower than the rest of the company. Workers in Unit 202
not only showed up more often than their White counterparts, they were also more
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efficient. Unit 202’s output was 12% higher than the next most productive unit and
they made 6% more “Grade A” bullets than the next most accurate group. David
Grant saw this as an example of “just how far the Negro worker will over‐
compensate, will attempt to make good if given the opportunity.”176
Unit 202’s overachievers saw their fortunes rise and fall with the company in
which they were employed. As early as November 1943, U.S. Cartridge started
laying off workers at its Small Arms Plant, including nearly 1,000 African Americans.
The problem with their work, as with all war industries before the military‐
industrial complex became entrenched in America’s economy, was that employment
was unsustainable. A surplus of ammunition made the possibility of keeping
superfluous workers on active payroll a luxury that no capitalist economist schooled
in the Great Depression could advocate. 177 St. Louis MOWM fought for the
integration of Black workers into an industry undergoing a temporary surge. The
increase of African American workers, males and females alike, at U.S. Cartridge was
only part of a three‐year period in which they enjoyed the economic benefits of
being integrated into the industrial workforce.
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CHAPTER 6
MARCHING BEYOND DEFENSE PLANTS: ST. LOUIS MOWM FIGHTS TO
INTEGRATE PUBLIC UTILITIES AND PUBLIC SPACES
Freedom’s not just
To be won Over There.
It means Freedom at home, too –
Now – right here!
Langston Hughes, “Jim Crow’s Last Stand” 1
Southwestern Bell Telephone, 1943: “It is not the will of the St. Louis
community…to practice such undemocratic, unAmerican and proHitler
employment policy.”
By its second full year of campaigns, St. Louis MOWM leadership recognized
the need to create employment opportunities that would remain after the war. This
shift in focus led the fledgling organization to reposition itself as working towards
“integrating colored citizens in employment of public utilities,” a mission that fit
MOWM’s tactics well because utility companies in St. Louis benefited from
substantial federal contracts during the war but obstinately stood “in flat refusal…to
even discuss hiring Negroes,” and that federal policy considered telephone service
part of national defense and thus subject the anti‐discrimination measures outlined
in E.O. 8802.2 This program preceded the more widely recognized “Don’t Buy
Where You Can’t Work” campaigns waged by MOWM’s Harlem unit against
Metropolitan Life Insurance Corporation by two years. A distinguishing
characteristic of MOWM’s “Don’t Buy” campaign from similar struggles by
progressive and left‐leaning groups during the Roosevelt years was that gender was
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at the center of this struggle. MOWM’s literature argued for increased employment
of African American women because “the demands of war” left a void in the industry
because “men [are] being taken out of the public utilities.”3 Historically, White
women operated the company’s switchboards and staffed its local collecting offices.
Some argued that “even racially prejudiced minds” could not discern race through a
telephone and therefore it was more practical to direct African American women
towards the operator’s room. With more women in general entering the workforce
during the war, Southwestern Bell was a coveted white‐collar job that must have
attracted females who needed to work but wanted to avoid the assembly line.
In St. Louis, the target for what one observer called “the greatest and longest
campaigns” in the history of that city’s MOWM unit was Southwestern Bell
Telephone.4 MOWM’s concern with the situation at Southwestern Bell makes sense,
especially because of a pervasive belief in an “inherent right to employment”
through the public sector that was nourished by New Deal rhetoric.5 In short,
MOWM’s ideology of democratic capitalism envisioned a world in which one’s
citizenship was predicated by one’s job.6 Like Metropolitan Life in Harlem,
Southwestern Bell profited from the business of its many African American
customers while employing relatively few Black workers even though, as the
Chicago Defender reports, “a number of highly intelligent and adequately prepared
colored girls made application.”7 However sincere the city’s African Americans
were in their struggle to open more employment opportunities for Black workers,
pragmatism kept them from completely boycotting telecommunications. Instead, St.
Louis MOWM “marche[d] on in the struggle for jobs for Negroes” through pickets at
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company headquarters and staging dramatic demonstrations to deleteriously
impact the productivity of Southwestern Bell’s billing department.8 There was
reason for optimism, as telephone companies in Washington, Cleveland, and New
York had recently integrated their workforces.9
As an experienced grassroots strategist, McNeal knew that “The
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company is going to be a tough job,” but he was
convinced that the campaign would attract widespread support because the
promise of secure and respectable employment appealed to “men and women of
color in all walks of life in St. Louis.”10 McNeal, like many African American activists
of his generation, thought that White liberals could be forced to act as agents of
change by prodding their conscience with dramatic protest.11 Thus, St. Louis
MOWM’s protests hinged on the presumption that White allies would advocate on
their behalf because, in McNeal’s approximation, “it is not the will of the St. Louis
community…to practice such undemocratic, un‐American and pro‐Hitler
employment policy.”12 To make support for St. Louis MOWM appear larger than it
perhaps was, McNeal devised easy ways for ordinary people act as armchair
activists protesting Southwestern Bell’s racially exclusive hiring practices. This is
best seen in a set of penny stickers that St. Louis MOWM printed emblazoned with
the slogan, “Discrimination in employment is undemocratic. I protest. Hire Negroes
now.” The intent of these stickers was to have them attached on the envelope of
phone bills to demonstrate that customers favored integrating the company’s
workforce.13 Another way that MOWM tried to make protest accessible was by
urging people to “call the companies business office and register their opposition to
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the employment policy.”14 While pickets outside of the phone company might draw
300 supporters, these other forms of protest could allow those who were occupied
with other affairs to add their voice to a chorus of protest that, to borrow the grand
rhetoric of a writer from the St. Louis American, that “knew their reason for
marching was just and each person had supreme faith that the walls of
discrimination would tumble.”15
As reported by Eleanor Green, an African American woman who applied to
work at Southwestern Bell, one of the biggest hurdles facing prospective Black
female employees was that their applications were handled “with a diplomacy we
would find hard to resent.” If Green’s experience can be taken as typical, and it was
by the St. Louis’ Black media, African American women were routinely received
graciously and courteously throughout the application process they were uniformly
denied employment on grounds that the advertised positions were filled. As is the
ritual faced by working class people for generations when they apply for jobs that
they have little chance of obtaining, Southwestern Bell promised that resumes
would be kept on file and carefully considered if an unexpected opening arose.16
This ritual was familiar to Eleanor Green, a former schoolteacher, who was
unsurprised that the hiring screener favorably appraised her skills and experience
but dismissed her without a job offer.17 Green’s example demonstrates that it was
indeed difficult for, “pretty intelligent Colored girls” to “put the Bell telephone
Company on the spot.”18 In an effort to save face, Green thanked her interviewer
and reminded her to carefully consider applications like her own because “I was
qualified for the job and also because Negroes as a race were subscribers to the
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telephone company and deserved some share in the jobs.” It all amounted to, in
Green’s words, “the run‐around” that African Americans of her generation were
accustomed to. Even though “care was exercised to not even mention race,” the St.
Louis American reported, “the March Movement takes the position that the only
reason none of these young women have been hired is the fact that they are
Colored.”19 At a MOWM picket outside Southwestern Bell, McNeal explained that
African American women like Eleanor Green were frustrated because “The pigeon‐
holing of applications due to race, creed or color, is an undemocratic, un‐American
and pro‐Hitler employment policy” that ultimately retarded the war effort.20
Green’s experience is best understood when contextualized as part of a city‐wide
push by the Black media to integrate African American workers into St. Louis’
expanding economy. This is most obviously seen in a St. Louis American that
followed up an excerpt of a Randolph speech about taking initiative and self‐
responsibility to “Tell the Bell Telephone Company, we mean business” because “we
are on the march” and “neither iron‐bands nor prison cells or death or all the
demons can stop us.”21
Using last year’s gains at U.S. Cartridge as a precedent for when “hard headed
discriminatory policies” were overcome with mass protests, St. Louis MOWM
opened its campaign to integrate Southwestern Bell’s workforce with a picket that
leadership believed would be successful because the company had a very real need
for workers and observers in the city thought that the campaign excited much of the
city’s African American community.22 Eyewitness accounts of the June 12 picket
describe an all‐Black crowd numbering 100‐300 gathering outside “the jim crow
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citadel…with appropriate banners and signs” united thematically through the slogan
“work where we spend our money.”23 The most succinct description of the picket
was from the St. Louis American, which described people “Carrying placards and
walking single file, the Negroes circled the entire block let the printing on the signs
they carried take silent messages to the group that can be employed by the
telephone company.”24 St. Louis MOWM leaders thought that by emphasizing
respectability through orderly public demonstration that they could embody an
argument for equal opportunity that would “bring this situation to the attention of
our fellow St. Louisians dramatically” and effectively. Although attendance was
small in comparison to other MOWM‐sponsored protests, there were enough
marchers to form “a complete circle of Negroes from all walks of life and of a wide
age range” around the city block of Bell Telephone’s building. The “wide awake”
T.D. McNeal led the picket line while it marched on “the walls of Jerico” demanding
“decent” jobs in exchange for the estimated $4,000 dollars spent by African
American customers every day on Southwestern Bell services. The core of McNeal’s
argument was that since “we pay our money to make Bell Telephone a solid
institution and we are entitled to some of the returns.”25
With no immediate gains to show for this rhetoric, however, reports from
sympathetic newspapers resorted to cheering the demonstration’s ability to
increase general awareness of racial exclusion within company ranks and “attracted
the casual curiosity of passerby.”26 As usual, St. Louis’ African American media
outlets were clearly partisan regarding the Southwestern Bell campaign. Though
the print media’s crusading attitude was often an asset in struggle, it sometimes
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distorted reports. For instance, the St. Louis American reported that “Fully 90
percent of the white observers were sympathetic” to the picket, some of whom even
sent well wishes to St. Louis MOWM’s office.27 This contrasted other accounts,
which depicted local Whites as demonstrating little interest in the spectacle of
“peaceably” marching African Americans behind a United States flag.28 Other
accounts emanating from the city’s White daily newspapers even suggested that the
picket fell short of raising public outrage at the company’s lily‐White hiring
practices because it elicited only “the casual curiosity of passerby.”29 Partisan
reporting aside, the image of a couple hundred African Americans “following the flag
of the United States of America, mute in their appeal to be accorded full rights of
citizenship” was undeniably poignant in the context of Black protest in a segregated
city during a war against fascism.30
The Southwestern Bell picket was followed by a summer‐long lull in visible
protest that abated with a revival of public demonstrations in autumn. That
September, St. Louis MOWM launched a program which ultimately galvanized over
200 African Americans to pay their phone bills en masse with unsorted pennies on a
busy Saturday morning.31 According to St. Louis MOWM’s plans, “this un‐American
situation” of racial exclusion from the company’s ranks would be “dramatized”
during peak visitation hours. In addition to hampering the collection process by
overwhelming cashiers and frustrating other customers, the volume of pennies
deposited would have made a visual impact about the power of African American
consumer dollars – effectively making a non‐verbal argument for the hiring of
African American women in public sector jobs in backrooms as operators and on the
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front line as collectors. Somehow, MOWM’s plans were leaked to the company, who
prepared for the protest by having additional collectors on duty that day with empty
change bags and instructions to count the remuneration later. Even though the
company prudently prepared for the onslaught, “considerable excitement was
caused at the Bell Telephone Building” as 205 “irate” MOWM activists and
supporters arrived together.32 Like the pickets earlier that year, the penny‐paying
protest was undeniably dramatic but did not yield immediate results and thus, failed
to generate sustainable enthusiasm for the kind of continual agitation that could
have hastened the pace of corporate change.
Three months later, and after yet another series of negotiations involving
Bell Telephone and War Manpower Commission, St. Louis MOWM issued a press
release finally announcing a small victory. Southwestern Bell planned to open a
branch office in a predominantly Black neighborhood at 1047 N. Vandeventer
Avenue effective immediately after the present tenants’ lease expired and
appropriate interior renovations were complete. Though limited in scope, this new
office promised better service to the neighborhood and a small number of jobs
staffing the to “receive payment of bills, handle moves and orders for telephone
service and perform certain accounting functions.” MOWM cautiously praised the
action, calling it “a step forward” and proof that, with enough prodding,
Southwestern Bell’s management took “a sympathetic appraisal of the problem.”
Though only a small gesture, St. Louis MOWM recognized the Vandeventer Avenue
branch as a necessary first step towards the “ultimate objective” of “complete
integration of Negro workers into all phases” of employment at Southwestern Bell.33
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At worst, this was a compromise that allowed White supremacy to persist at the
price of increased African American opportunity. It was, nonetheless, progress
towards developing a sustainable African American “white collar” workforce in St.
Louis during the Second World War and it hinted at the possibility of securing other
public works and utilities jobs for African Americans in the Gateway City.
For his leading role in this battle over access to jobs, co‐worker in struggle
and St. Louis NAACP leader David Grant commended McNeal for his “meritorious
and unselfish services” while “fighting to get big public utilities like Bell Telephone”
to hire African American workers.34 More important than accolades exchanged
between leading figures on Black protest was the fact that Southwestern Bell’s
capitulation established a precedent for St. Louis MOWM to wage similar campaigns
at several other municipally supported corporations such as Union Electric
Company, Laclede Gas and Light Company, and St. Louis Public Service Company.
These were strategically important businesses because the wartime labor shortage
offered a porthole through which a foothold could be made to equitably integrate
African American workers into industries that would remain vital during
peacetime.35
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Citizen’s Civil Rights Committee SitIns, 1944
In times like these, when there is so much being said about Democracy, we naturally
feel racial discrimination more keenly than we would under ordinary times.”36

In the summer of 1944, African American women planned and implemented
roughly a dozen sit‐ins at department store lunch counters in St. Louis. Their efforts
are an example of unity among grassroots members from a variety of protest
organizations, the establishment of nonviolent direct action as a tool for political
change, and the effectiveness of women’s activism during American racial
apartheid.37 Additionally, the sit‐ins should be seen as an incident where the
struggle for worker’s rights and protest for equal access to spending opportunity
was unified into a holistic fight under the general heading of racial equality. This
occurred through the Citizen’s Civil Rights Committee (CCRC), an arm of the city’s
NAACP chapter that splintered off and became almost synonymous with MOWM
during the 1944 sit‐in campaigns. The timing of the sit‐ins in 1944 is significant, for
as the war waned, so did the possibility of using a genuinely anti‐fascist moment to
further civil rights efforts – and so long as there was a war, African Americans could
reasonably use the anti‐fascist rhetoric of war to explain why merchants should
“give all of our countrymen justice.”38 There are innumerable instances of similar
rhetoric in wartime St. Louis, all of which was part of a national pattern in which, as
historian Barbara Savage demonstrates, “African‐Americans used democracy’s
rhetoric against itself.”39 More important than their contributions to protest
rhetoric, however, is the fact that four months worth of sit‐ins directly led to
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improvements in the food service at several department stores and influenced other
spheres of public space to desist practicing racial discrimination.
CCRC and St. Louis MOWM’s collaboration was successful largely because of
the ability to draw the city’s rank‐and‐file of African Americans. Energized by
increasing participation throughout the summer, “the fight against
discrimination…intensified” during June and July of 1944.40 Fifteen “white,
courageous, determined and dignified women” as well as an unreported but
probably small number of men joined forty African American women to “hasten the
winning of the war and lay the foundation for a lasting peace.”41 Unsurprisingly,
Pearl S. Maddox, Thelma Grant, and Ruth Mattie Wheeler were present, but
journalists also noted some of the fleeting women who took the same risks as
protest leaders but of whom little is known. Indeed, there is an absence of
documentary sources on women like Hattie Bobo, Lillian Sawyer, and Evelyn
Roberts, but their participation was undoubtedly important to the St. Louis sit‐ins.42
Though historians know little about these women, MOWM officials claimed that they
“came from all walks of life…professional people, office workers, house wives,
college students.”43 A clear pattern of distancing women’s activism from traditional
blue‐collar or lumpen activity is evident, the function of which was to give CCRC and
MOWM the appearance of speaking for a “middle class” that supposedly constituted
a large segment of African Americans in St. Louis. In this instance, race, gender, and
class identities are layered in such a way so as to represent the “politics of
respectability” which saw participants behave in a uniformly “dignified manner.”44
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Democratic rhetoric proliferated throughout the United States during the
war years but it did not necessarily create social or political change. Indeed, other
forces were at work as well. For instance, at David Grant’s speech to the St. Louis
Race Relations Institute in 1943, he argued that race relations in the city “are
probably at their lowest ebb right now.” Grant reached this conclusion because
migrants from the countryside brought “rural attitudes on race” into supposedly
cosmopolitan war plants. Grant attributed increased racial tension among St. Louis’
working class as a departure from a pattern developed in the Depression, when
shared hardship created temporary but effective bonds of solidarity.45 In terms of
racial demographics, wartime St. Louis resembled Chicago because it was a place
where African American migrants had long relocated from the lower Mississippi
Valley. Literature from the Race Relations Institute likened Black urbanization as
comparable to “earlier streams poured from rural Italy and the counties of Ireland.”
Like most rural peasants, they “came poor, illiterate, unskilled; yet filled with
boundless hope and ambition” that relocation could lead to increased opportunity.46
This was, of course, an impediment to desegregation efforts that was mirrored in
Missouri’s legislature. Twice in the years immediately preceding the sit‐ins,
representatives from areas other than St. Louis were outspoken opponents of
legislation equalizing access to public space.

House Bill 47
Legislative efforts pushing public desegregation provide a context for looking
at direct action and sit‐ins as the result of the political system’s failure to address
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social change at a critical moment. As such, wartime sit‐ins can be seen as part of a
larger struggle in which equal access to public space was contested in a Mississippi
Valley manufacturing center. In 1943, Representative Edwin F. Kenswil, husband of
St. Louis NAACP Vice President Liza Kenswil, proposed House Bill No. 47 for “equal
privileges in public spaces” throughout Missouri. This bill threatened to punish
violators with a misdemeanor sentence of 30‐90 days and/or a $300 fine.47 Kenswil
modeled the bill after other recently approved civil rights acts in midwestern states
including Kansas, Illinois, and Iowa.48 St. Louis chapters and branches of MOWM,
NAACP, and Negro Business League all lobbied for the bill, coalescing in a “mass
demonstration” outside of the state congress in Jefferson City the day that the
proposed legislation cleared the Committee on Civil and Criminal Procedure and
came to the house floor for discussion and voting.49 Kenswil’s legislative efforts, as
well as lobbying by NAACP leader Sidney Redmond and MOWM chairman T.D.
McNeal were undoubtedly on the minds of Pearl S. Maddox, Vora Thompson, and
other sit‐in participants when they chose to use direct action to claim civil rights
when the legal process denied them.50
As one could expect, House Bill 47 was challenged in committee and
eventually put to rest. Rep. Phillips W. Moss, the “Tom Connally” of St. Louis, led an
attack on Kenswil’s proposed legislation, likening it to “the old prohibition act – a
law that possibly the people were not ready for and would not enforce.” Kenswil
defended his position, arguing that he was “no radical” while presenting the case
that “real democracy” was only possible when “all citizens enjoy the same
privileges.”51 Missouri’s African American press cheered Kenswil, the only person of

193

color in that state’s legislative body. As was consistent throughout the loosely
organized Double V campaign, the symbol of African American soldiers was
appropriated to convince the White power structure that, “he is good enough to
enjoy the fruits of his sacrifices just like any other citizen,” with one of those benefits
being full civil rights. St. Louis’ Black media portrayed House Bill No. 47 as
something that would bring Missouri “out of the horse and buggy days” and into a
modernity where human rights mattered and citizens participated in daily life on an
egalitarian field. Advocates of House Bill 47 generally recognized that there was a
disparity between law and implementation – after all, E.O. 8802 had only recently
illustrated that point all too well – but they recognized that “the law against stealing
or robbery does not stop such crimes, but the law is there and has its effect.”52 For
Black Missourians like St. Louis MOWM who were working for political change,
getting the law on one’s side was an important part, but not the only part, of the
battle to disassemble the structures of White supremacy.
State Representative Kenswil’s failed anti‐discrimination legislation
demonstrates that there was a top‐down push from at least one politician concerned
with racially segregated public space. The failure to get Kenswil’s bill passed
heightened awareness of the possibility that what came to be known as the
“Greatest Generation” could crack Jim Crow. At least for sit‐in participants, this
awareness quickly became disillusion with the legislative process, which ultimately
translated into their use of direct action. The sit ins were “promulgated by the
National March on Washington Movement and the Fellowship of Reconciliation” but
organized under the auspices of St. Louis’ NAACP’s Citizen’s Civil Rights Committee.
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Members of this cadre of grassroots activists had strong NAACP ties, but their work
in the CCRC was strongly identified with MOWM because of that organization’s
commitment to direct action. For all practical purposes, one can portray the CCRC
as a predominantly female group of African Americans with organizational ties to
both the NAACP and MOWM. Within this matrix, the sit‐ins should be understood as
officially sanctioned by MOWM because that organization’s name appeared most
widely in contemporary media accounts of the event and that organization’s
national platform strongly endorsed such direct action.
St. Louis MOWM’s name was emblazoned across most media accounts of the
sit‐ins, but it is difficult to give the organization full credit for this phenomenon
because, according to St. Louis MOWM president T.D. McNeal, he contributed little
to the events. Though somewhat convoluted, this instance is an example of local
activists appropriating a grassroots organization to further their autonomously
determined ends. In short, women in the St. Louis chapters of both NAACP and
MOWM found an outlet for their leadership impulse through CCRC. MOWM
inherited visible leadership of the sit‐ins from longtime NAACP member Pearl
Maddox, a prominent resident of Black St. Louis who was the primary strategist and
frequent participator in St. Louis’ wartime sit‐ins. Maddox’s voluntary resignation
of her rightful position in Black public leadership probably had something to do
with unequal gender relationships in MOWM and NAACP, but this decision was also
influenced by a pragmatic need to protect herself. As a property‐owning widow
who actively confronted proto‐apartheid, Maddox understood that her leadership
could threaten her livelihood.
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“These women really did the work”: MOWM, NAACP, FOR and the Genesis of
the Citizen’s Civil Rights Committee’s SitIns
Maddox’s choice of McNeal to assume leadership of a movement that she
galvanized speaks as much to the limits of how far one could transgress boundaries
in mid‐twentieth century America as it does to McNeal’s stature within Black St.
Louis. Likewise, McNeal’s willingness to step in as a leader of a campaign that he
appeared to have little involvement in is indicative of his role as a full‐time paid
labor organizer, his stature within the local Black community, and his status as a
bachelor who boarded at a hotel and was thus insulated from institutional reprisals
punishing his activism. In short, Maddox chose McNeal because he had the least to
loose and the best reputation. Thus, the sit‐ins must be understood as “not really a
March on Washington project, not a project headed by McNeal.” While McNeal was
a public face, he acknowledged that “the women were still calling the shots…These
women really did the work.”53
If Pauline Murray and her Howard University classmates set the standard for
Second World War sit‐ins in January 1943, St. Louis’ summer 1944 sit‐ins certainly
measured up.54 Predominantly female, these “Crusaders for humane treatment”
were loosely affiliated with MOWM through the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the
CCRC. The women who planned and participated in sit‐ins were part of a broader
national trend in which, as one historian notes, “The war against racism, in short,
furnished African American women with models of pride and resistance” that
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served to inspire further action and to also give rhetorical structure to their
desegregation appeals.55
St. Louis MOWM held a fundraising appeal and membership drive just before
the sit‐ins began. This event was highlighted by a visit from Dr. W. Montague Cobb
of Howard University School of Medicine. There is no record of Cobb’s remarks at
the keynote event, but it is possible that he mentioned the efforts of Howard’s
students the previous year.56 By this time, the CCRC coalesced under Pearl Maddox
with support from a dedicated cadre of females from the MOWM and NAACP, Labor
Union Auxiliaries, Postal Alliance Auxiliary, Civil Liberties Committee, and
Coordinating Council.57 Housed loosely under MOWM’s auspices, the CCRC and all
of these other organizations were as responsible for the sit‐ins as MOWM was. The
professional women and co‐ed college students of CCRC recognized “certain
possible dangers” and chose to use “non‐violent direct action” that was previously
discussed through collaboration with FOR at MOWM’s 1943 Chicago conference.58
Though delegates at the conference almost unanimously endorsed this
unconventional tactic, few considered St. Louis as a laboratory to evaluate this
tactic’s usefulness.59 Likewise, there is little linkage between their activism and a
national MOWM campaign to have Bayard Rustin A.J. Muste train members in non‐
violent goodwill direct action at the Harlem Ashram.60 As evidenced by the fact that
St. Louis did not appear on a list of potential locales for this dramatic new protest
tactic to be implemented, the 1944 sit‐ins occurred at the impetus of local people
addressing their immediate concerns.61 At the local level, there was significant
cooperation from FOR, who back in 1943 joined St. Louis MOWM to survey White
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public opinion in the city about opening jobs at Public Service Company and Bell
Telephone to African Americans.62 Members at a MOWM weekly meeting in 1943
noted several stores that enjoyed considerable Black patronage but had no African
American employees. This observation is notable because most of these stores were
targeted for sit‐ins the following year.63 Members of these two upstart
organizations joined disaffected NAACP members like Pearl Maddox to form a
coalition that successfully increased the consumer options for St. Louis’ African
American community.
The most active women with strong ties to MOWM who also participated in
this campaign were Mrs. Thelma McNeal, Ms. Vora Thompson, Ms. Shermine Smith,
and Ms. Ruth Mattie Wheeler. These ladies embodied Adam Clayton Powell’s
definition of a “new Negro” that was committed to “the technique of non‐violent
direct social action” and carried him or herself with a stoic demeanor that
dramatized the plight of African Americans by displaying coolness in the face of
emotionally charged adversity.64 If statements from female sit‐in participants could
be taken at face value, they interpreted activism as an extension of their belief that
women in wartime were responsible for making the home front a better place for
male soldiers to return. This was combined with religious rhetoric, as they were
“praying that the Hitlers over here see the light before our boys return from over
there.”65 In short, the community was an extension of the home, and it was their
responsibility to ensure that men came back to a place that was improved in their
absence.
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In addition to Kenswil’s proposed legislation, 1943 also saw the foundation
of a collaboration between Fellowship of Reconciliation and MOWM that resulted in
“a new effort to break down discrimination…using the technique of non‐violent
direct action” at department store cafeterias in St. Louis.66 In April of that year, the
organizations jointly sponsored the St. Louis Race Relations Institute, a weekend‐
long program attended by an estimated 400 people.67 FOR‐affiliated James Farmer,
Ira De Reid and author Krishnalal Shridharal joined national MOWM secretary
Pauline Myers as keynote speakers on “Non‐Violent Good Will Direct Action in St.
Louis.”68 Myers’ presence in the city was part of a broader national strategy to
instruct and train MOWM locals to challenge racial segregation and discrimination
through a combination of Thoreauvian non‐cooperation and Gandhian spiritual
solidarity.69 After two days of speeches and panels, inter‐racial attendees split into
groups guided by a young Bayard Rustin “to study amicable solutions to racial
questions involving social, political and economic conditions.” The product of this
workshop was a yearlong poll of White public opinion about African American
employment, the data from which was used in attempts to discredit the rationale
that African Americans could not integrate workforces because White workers
would protest.70
MOWM’s national office did its best to inform local branches about Non‐
Violent Goodwill Direct Action and convince them to adopt this method of protest
when confronting segregation.71 In addition to facilitating cooperation between
local branches with officials from the Fellowship of Reconciliation to conduct non‐
violence training seminars, MOWM’s national office made its ideological
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commitment to non‐violent goodwill direct action public through its access to
African American media outlets. African American newspapers reported on this
fresh protest tactic by using its full name, but correspondence between MOWM
secretary Pauline Myers and officials in St. Louis MOWM suggests that non‐violent
goodwill direct action “seems like a really long hard name but it is really simple and
easy to understand.”72
Since the organization saw itself as “a mass action movement…fighting for
justice for the American Negro,” MOWM had to construct an operational and
ideological framework that was relevant wherever African Americans were found in
the United States. Thus, MOWM’s national office recognized that “different parts of
the country are ready for different kinds of action,” and urged local branches to
commit to non‐violent direct action as an effective method to desegregate busses in
Richmond, open lily‐White YMCA hotels in New York, or repeal restrictive covenants
in Chicago.73 Regardless of the target or the region, MOWM saw the purpose of
protests as bargaining chips that built negotiating power to be used in conferences
with members of the power structure. As such, MOWM’s program for protest
depended on individual employers’ pragmatism as much as it relied on the power of
public opinion. In MOMW’s scheme, “If talking it over with those who have power to
change the system does not move them, the pressure of public opinion” will create
conditions in which it was implausible to deny Black demands.74 Of course, this
scheme operated on the presumption that a silent majority of racially progressive
White liberals would rally to MOWM’s support and lend a voice to the chorus calling
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for desegregation – a plausible but not likely scenario in mid‐twentieth century
America.75
St. Louis MOWM officials knew that their optimism for non‐violent goodwill
direct action would be out of place in the Deep South.76 For example, the “two or
three white women” who David Grant reported participated in sit‐ins by ordering
food that was passed on to African American protestors” were the products of a
place that was segregated but not completely “Jim Crow.”77 Interestingly, utilizing
White sympathizers in civil disobedience does not appear to have attracted much
dissent from within the traditionally Black organization even MOWM relied on an
“in‐group” mentality that reinforced psychological solidarity and solidified
relationships bonds amongst its most active members.78
A series of small fundraisers and a sizeable rally at Kiel Auditorium with A.
Philip Randolph and David Grant coincided with the first rumblings of protest
through direct action.79 As MOWM did with its first major rally, this “follow up” took
advantage of public space by using Kiel Municipal Auditorium to boost membership,
raise funds for operational expenses, and increase awareness of problems that
token measures insufficiently alleviated.80 Randolph and Grant gave orations that
were preceded by “a Biblical narration” presented as a skit composed by David
Grant, who used the book of Moses in order to interpret contemporary problems
facing African Americans in St. Louis. The story of Israelites’ suffering and bondage
under Pharaoh was cast by the March on Washington Players, a performance group
led by Ernest Hutchinson.81 The skit was strongly influenced by Grant’s penchant
for using history to illuminate current affairs. This was also a common practice for
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events planned by MOWM’s national office, which frequently used plays to outline
the organization’s campaigns through an entertaining and accessible medium.82
Grant looked towards Biblical antiquity for precedent when unlikely leaders
overcame seemingly insurmountable odds. In his Biblically‐based skit, Grant
emphasized the how Moses used words as weapons to demand that Pharaoh “let my
people go.” Grant hoped that Black leadership in wartime St. Louis could succeed in
toppling “the walls of discrimination, intolerance, prejudice, deceit and abuse”
through an “onslaught of truth, courage, determination, and forthright thinking” to
defeat “the false prophets and traducers of the democratic way of life.”83
Grant was prone to rhetorical flourish in his literary production but his
orations were blunt. At the podium that evening, he addressed issues surrounding
employment in local defense plants. He cheered advances made in war industries
but tempered this enthusiasm with dismay that African Americans were still unable
make inroads into more sustainable civilian jobs such as bus drivers for the Public
Service Company and operators for Southwestern Bell Telephone.84 Attendance for
the second Kiel rally was respectable, but the numbers once again were far short of
stated goals and did not compare to the approximately ten thousand attending a
similar rally at the same location only one year earlier.85
Randolph’s speech that evening underscored his status as a wartime
reformer. He differentiated MOWM’s “non‐violent goodwill direct action” from
Gandhi’s anti‐colonial struggle because, in the United States, direct action was
employed as a method of protest that “seeks upholding rather than the breakdown
of civil government.” Indeed, Randolph emphasized that MOWM’s purpose was “to
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UPHOLD our government and seek to rectify its faults…Jim Crow and
discrimination.”86 This sentiment was evident again in 1944, when a St. Louis
MOWM member wrote that “practicing ‘White Supremacy” was the chief
impediment to America fulfilling its egalitarian principles.87 For many African
Americans in St. Louis, “getting democracy practiced” meant expanding their
consumer rights and increasing opportunities in civil service.88
Organizational literature and African American journalists denounced public
segregation as “Fascism, pure and simple,” and explained the sit‐ins through
Gandhian theory or as a way to fulfill the American promise.89 Yet, the impetus for
many participants was personal; they had simply “reached the limit of human
endurance in accepting the yoke of fascism in America.”90 Other women complained
that “the further denial of service” at department store lunch counters, “affects us
more than can be expressed in decent words.”91 These women connected human
rights to consumer rights, asserting that human dignity in a consumer economy was
contingent upon unrestricted participation in the cash economy. Whatever their
motives, women of the CCRC indisputably possessed “devotion to the cause and
moral stamina that will not quit them when the going gets tough” that MOWM’s
national office deemed necessary for successful deployment of this exciting new
protest tactic.92
In addition to consciously incorporating non‐violence as a protest tactic, the
sit‐ins also introduced an element of inter‐racial cooperation to St Louis MOWM’s
affairs. Indeed, this was the first time in the organization’s history that it
collaborated with even a small amount of sympathetic White activists. In St. Louis,
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this was strategically sound: their presence at sit‐ins allowed food to be procured
while also proving that White supremacy was not an ideological monolith in St.
Louis.93 The presence of White progressives at sit‐ins challenges the prevailing
conception of MOWM as a uniformly Black protest organization. At least in St. Louis,
localized autonomy from national policy allowed for some degree of White
participation in MOWM’s challenges to White supremacy.

Recovering Details of SitIns in 1944 St. Louis
“We get no thrills out of these fights, all we want is to be free from insult just like any
other citizen in our pursuit of happiness.”94
The first wartime sit‐in to occur in St. Louis was on Monday evening, May 15,
1944, at Grand‐Leader, a site “chosen because that store was more friendly toward
colored people” and, as such, “enjoyed” sizeable patronage from St. Louis’ African
American shoppers.95 NAACP members Pearl S. Maddox and Birdie Beal Anderson
were flanked by a “valiant” group of “Three young American pretty brown college
girls,” with ties to MOWM: Vora Thompson, Shermine Smith, and Ruth Mattie
Wheeler.96 Also present was Hugh Gilmartin, a “true conscientious” liberal White
Catholic.97 At around seven o’clock that evening, they occupied a small corner of
the food counter and placed an order without “fear” or “excitement.” Accounts from
the Black media are clearly partisan, depicting the students as stoic and poised
while the waitress “stammered…incoherently.” Soon, Vora Thompson was invited
into a private conference with Grand‐Leader’s management in a private office. Mr.
Hyatt, the manager, explained that “revolutionary change” would “create a
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disturbance” and reminded her that racially integrated dining services were
“against the traditions of this state.” Thompson “intelligently explained” to Grand‐
Leader management that “Our brothers, and our sweethearts are suffering and
dying all over the world, to destroy Fascism and you and I must get rid of it at
home.”98 Thompson made her discussion with Hyatt public, causing her colleagues
to prod Hyatt into admitting that Grand‐Leader served “other races including
Japanese and Germans,” and that African Americans were the only group excluded
from full participation as consumers.99 In her absence, Gilmartin procured a soda
and sandwich that he gave to Smith and Wheeler. They ate “leisurely” and were
“unmolested” while “hundreds of curious persons gazed” at what must have been a
spectacle in wartime St. Louis – and a pattern of public protest that became a weekly
ritual in the summer of 1944.100 The strategy of incorporating White supporters
visibly demonstrated that at least some White Americans supported desegregated
public space in St. Louis. Perhaps more importantly, it also allowed the
procurement of food for African American demonstrators – an important gesture of
inter‐racial solidarity and a theatrically dramatic way to confront the perceived
injustice of the racial status quo. This important tactic was expanded upon in July at
Famous‐Barr, when fifteen White women helped the forty “courageous, determined,
and dignified women” from the CCRC by purchasing and distributing ice cream.101
It is worth mentioning that eyewitness accounts make no mention of police
or private citizens verbally threatening or physically accosting any of the sit‐in
demonstrators at Grand‐Leader. This pattern held true throughout most of the
1944 sit‐ins, in fact, there were even several White customers who expressed
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support with the protestors.102 The most notable exception to the lack of overt
resistance occurred at a sit‐in earlier staged at Katz Drug Store sometime in May.
One report mentions that the manager, Mr. Francis, “lifted” Shermine Smith “from
her seat by the arm” and “took a half‐eaten sandwich from her hand.” Smith
responded to this affront of her person with “poise…she never resisted or uttered
one word.”103 Accounts of the sit‐ins from St. Louis’ African American newspapers
and from documents generated by groups like MOWM and CCRC suggest that the
only White opposition to the first round sit‐ins came from employees and managers
of target stores ‐ not the White patrons dining at these lunch counters.104 Thus, it
appears that the phenomena of racial segregation in St. Louis was understood or
presented as a practice driven by top‐down store policy and enforced through the
action of managers. In other words, it seems that White customers were indifferent,
supportive, or silently opposed to African Americans being served at department
store lunch counters. Typically silent resistance should not be misunderstood as
widespread complacency among those who favored racial apartheid. Indeed, there
were incidents when it appeared that the generally tranquil sit‐ins elicited strongly
oppositional emotional responses from White Missourians. In July 1944, at sit‐ins
staged in three stores ‐ Stix, Baer, and Fuller, Famous‐Barr, and Scruggs
Vandervoort’s – the demonstrators met the same response. Waitresses declined
service as per management’s orders, White customers grumbled and fled, and the
store’s lunch counters closed for the day.105 Each of these three department stores
took up an entire city block and was six to nine stories high. The fact that they
ceased food service would surely be newsworthy in Detroit or New York, but St.

206

Louis’ daily newspapers kept a code of silence in order to not give protest
publicity.106
Thelma McNeal quickly followed up with another sit‐in at Stix‐Baer & Fuller’s
lunch counter in early July.107 This time, management tried to defuse the activity at
the demonstration’s onset by getting all of the protestors into a closed‐door
meeting. Hyatt and another manager, identified as Mr. Lawson, affirmed their belief
that slowly educating the American populace was a necessary and unfulfilled step
that needed to occur before the store could integrate its food service. Hyatt and
Lawson believed that racially equitable consumer rights were unlikely to occur in
the immediate future, and they pledged to offer food service to African Americans if,
and only if, other St. Louis stores did so first.108 The first round of sit‐ins failed to
reach their goal of integrating lunch counters, but the participants gained important
experience in handling recalcitrant store management who passed responsibility for
discriminatory company policy off on supposedly widespread White Supremacy in
order to justify their store’s policy.
This “dauntless band of well‐trained young colored women” continued
applying pressure wherever they thought progress could be accomplished. The
piecemeal strategy of staffing sit‐ins with whatever possible demonstrators at the
stores most likely to be receptive towards their demands brought the CCRC back to
Famous Barr. This store’s segregationist minions included a “cute little illiterate
waitress” and “some kind of a nut” who physically shoved sit‐in participant
Modestine Crute Thornton. The unnamed assailant was chased away by angry
demonstrators who, according to one journalist, quoted the Constitution while
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pursuing him. It is likely that strongly partisan journalists simplified the encounter
at Famous Barr in order to emphasize the contrast between dignified African
American women and brutish White employees, but there is little doubt that
thirteen African American women and one White friend resolutely sat at Famous
Barr’s food counter to demand service symbolizing recognition of their status as
consumers in a democratic capitalist economy.109
July 1944 was a high water mark for CCRC civil disobedience because it
featured sit‐ins on lunch counters at three different department stores, all of which
“cater to a very large Negro patronage,” and had few if any African American
employees.110 Another pattern characterizing the sit‐ins was that participants all
maintained an almost stoic public persona. As a whole, the 1944 St. Louis sit‐ins
were part of a sporadic and unorganized wave of African American challenges to
racially segregated space that occurred throughout the Second World War. During
the demonstrations, David Grant tells us, the stores were “honeycombed with cops,
plainclothes cops” that he recognized because of his work in the Circuit Attorney’s
office.111 This increase in racial protest manifested itself in scores of accounts of
African Americans refusing to move from restricted areas on busses as well as sit‐
ins at diverse locations such as St. Louis, Washington, D.C., and North Carolina.112
Sit‐ins occurred throughout summer 1944, abated only by a two‐week
moratorium during which the Mayor’s Race Relations Committee sought to mediate
a racial crisis brought on through sustained Black protest and steady White
recalcitrance. Progress seemed plausible, especially in light of recent desegregation
of eating space at St. Louis’ central post office and all municipal buildings.113
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Schooled in the labor movement, MOWM’s principal strategists David Grant and T.D.
McNeal strongly believed that “a march should never be staged during attempts at
negotiation.” Women from CCRC had considerably less faith in the ability of
bureaucratic channels to create lasting change.114 “Not depending on… action” from
store owners prodded to do right by a comparatively moderate and politically weak
committee, CCRC “remained busy from day to day getting ready for future
demonstrations” and recruiting more “liberal minded citizens” during the
interim.115 Like other inter‐racial cadres fighting racism in the Second World War,
this group was comprised of “sensitive, intelligent, loyal” liberals who were
motivated to join a pre‐existing African American protest movement through their
own sense of morality and a strong political conscience that took the promise of an
egalitarian America seriously.116
CCRC and MOWM adjusted tactics as the sit‐in campaign grew increasingly
protracted. This was an organic outgrowth of a protest movement germinating
from escalating discontent beginning with letters and telephone calls “protesting
this humiliating pattern.”117 With correspondence ignored, direct action functioned
as a lever through which lines of communication were forced open. Political
maturity developed alongside the escalation of tactics. For instance, the date for
direct action was altered from Mondays to the busier lunch hours of Saturdays.118
Using a weekend increased pressure on store management because simply closing
the shop to thwart the campaign had more serious economic consequences.119 They
also learned to prolong protests and delay law enforcement response time by
waging simultaneous campaigns at several stores. Yet another way that sit‐in
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tactics became more sophisticated was the incorporation of signs. By July, the third
month of demonstrations, participants at these “silent protests” wore placards
inscribed with patriotic and anti‐racist slogans.120 Likewise, the CCRC identified
ways to enlarge attendance and participation at its demonstrations, primarily by
increasing the involvement and visibility of nearby students and faculty in
protests.121 For example, three sit‐ins in mid‐June 1944 were supported by students
and clerics from the nearby Eden Seminary, who printed and dispersed “several
thousand” handbills grounding the sit‐ins in patriotism, Christianity, and the
democratic extension of a war against Nazi Germany’s fascist extremes.122
One of the most important developments arising out of the St. Louis sit‐ins
was the shift in religious emphasis of non‐violent direct action. Though Bayard
Rustin and others in CORE commonly explained spiritually driven direct action
through an Eastern religious framework popularized by Gandhi, African American
activists in CCRC and MOWM interpreted their struggle through a framework of
militant messianic Afro‐Christianity. For example, an op‐ed in the St. Louis Argus
written by a CCRC member equated atheists with the even more “stupid” people
who “are still trying to hold on to the status quo.” To the editorialist, who
unfortunately chose to remain anonymous, patience and protest over the summer
amounted to little real progress, leaving “our cups…sweetened with the bitter dregs
of racial prejudice.” Further drawing from Biblical allusion, the writer continued,
“We have…asked for bread, but have been given stones,” just as the CCRC and
MOWM asked for economic integration and affirmation of human dignity towards
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African Americans but failed to accomplish significant structural changes to the
racial order.123
White patrons at stores where CCRC sit‐ins took place responded in a variety
of ways. Accounts from the first sit‐ins in May indicate that outright hostility was
muted. The St. Louis American reports, “heads turned and people mumbled.”124
Likewise, this same newspaper claims, “not one angry word was spoken” and that
“no unkind attitude shown by anyone present” other than stubborn managers who
refused to equally accommodate African American patrons.125 This pattern
continued as the sit‐ins grew in size and frequency during the next month.
According to T.D. McNeal, the norm was that “large crowds” of curious White
patrons gathered to observe the unusual sight but “few comments” expressing
opposition were ever uttered. In fact, McNeal claims that most White spectators
that did speak up “expressed the belief that the demonstrators were well within
their rights” and offered “sad commentary on our democracy” because “such
demonstrations are necessary.”126 The initial lack of outright resistance suggested
the possibility that opposition to desegregating food service might not be as
outrageous as expected. Silence was the norm on this issue, as the mainstream daily
newspapers gave sit‐ins little coverage. Likewise, while there was little outright
hostility, there was also little explicit support. White support was strongly gendered
and based in religion. All of the three documented White males that supported the
sit‐ins were Catholic, two of whom were clerics.127 Little is known of the religious
background characterizing the fifteen White women that abetted a sit‐in at Grand
Leader, but the disparity between public female and male support for sit‐ins
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indicates that gender was an important variable in determining who was likely to
participate in racially progressive activism.
Local Black media outlets enlivened discourse about the sit‐ins by explaining
them as part of the complimentary struggles for consumer rights and civil rights
that, when combined, represented a significant step in fulfilling the egalitarian
American promise. For example, Henry Winfield Wheeler, MOWM activist and
father of sit‐in participant Ruth Mattie Wheeler, used his weekly column in the St.
Louis American to argue “that you cannot be happy as long as any group of human
beings are being denied food or drink or civil rights and economic justice.”128
Typical of coverage by African American journalists is the depiction of sit‐in
participants as college trained “pretty young colored girls” connecting consumer
rights with human rights by demanding the privilege of getting “nourishment like
ice cream, soda, sandwich or malted milk” at department stores where non‐edible
items were purchased freely. Though the nutritional value of their dietary
selections is questionable, reporters noted that the CCRC’s sit‐ins “pricked the
consciences” of observers who witnessed store management “out‐Hitlerizing
Hitler.”129
African American women in the CCRC were “looking for a new world after
the war,” but columnist and MOWM member Henry Wheeler looked to the past for
inspiration. He saw progressive White Christians as heirs to a tradition established
by abolitionists like “Elijah Parrish Lovejoy, Chauncey I. Filley, James Broadhead,
Francis Blair, Judge Roswell Field and Carl Shurz” who “spoke out fearlessly…in
those dark days.”130 By locating the historical inspiration of desegregation efforts in
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the abolitionist movement, Wheeler portrayed the Double V moment as a time when
political and cultural changes as significant as those of the mid‐nineteenth century
were possible during the Second World War.131 Wheeler was unquestionably over‐
enthusiastic, as few White Christians in wartime St. Louis possessed the
combination of spiritual and ideological zeal that characterized the most fervent
abolitionists, but at least White opposition was muted and generally confined to
store management.
Women involved in direct action and sit‐ins used discourse that was well
within the boundaries of respectability for gendered activism during the war.132
Instead of declaring an all‐out fight against White supremacy, they were simply
doing “the least we can do on the home front” by helping to “make a safe place” for
soldiers in post‐war America. Thus, the domestic sphere of home was enlarged to
include the community and, ultimately, the entire nation. As the movement’s most
active propagandist, Wheeler used the St. Louis American to reinforce the image of
women in sit‐ins as properly bourgeoisie. The activists were depicted as “cultured”
and “refined” individuals who “gracefully” took seats at the lunch counter. Speaking
a language of class privilege, educational attainment, and unbridled consumer
rights, they were contrasted against “the cute little illiterate waitress at Famous‐
Barr” who “stammered…incoherently” when she refused to accept their orders. 133
It cannot be overemphasized that women participating in the sit‐ins were precisely
the kind of people Pauli Murray saw of as leading the race with “Good taste, poise,
co‐operativeness, firmness, personal neatness and cleanliness, and ordinary human
decency.” In Murray’s understanding of cultural politics, this was the type of
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demeanor that could “yield the largest returns.”134 However demure these women
were depicted as being, it must be recognized that individuals like CCRC leader and
MOWM member Thelma Grant had enough political acumen to see through
“bedtime stories” and “phony conferences.”135 While St. Louis MOWM curtailed
protest during negotiations with Bell Telephone and U.S. Cartridge, Grant, Maddox,
and CCRC members symbolically chose “to sit and enjoy the scenery” long after
stores “discontinued all service” for the day.136 Their unceasing commitment to
protest until a resolution was reached was a major factor in CCRC’s successful
campaign to improve food service at some of St. Louis’ busiest establishments.
Women participating in CCRC sit‐ins spoke the language of women in
wartime. They saw themselves as “lay[ing] the foundation for a lasting peace” by
making a “safe place” for “our sons, husbands, and sweethearts” returning from
war.137 Their patriotic protest and loyalty to the United States was behind a
complaint in Henry Wheeler’s St. Louis American that contributions by African
American employees at Famous‐Barr made to the war by purchasing war bonds was
undermined by the store’s “Sabotage!” by refusing to integrate its lunch counter,
thus undermining “President Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie.”138 At the June 10
Scruggs Vandervort’s sit‐in, some African Americans passed for White and
successfully ordered food. Since “only persons who seemed white” were treated
with dignity, the St. Louis Argus accused the store of “hanging a Millstone around the
neck of America that will drag her down to hell.” As was typical for Black protest
rhetoric in that era, “Nazism” was feared as the logical end of “segregation, Jim
Crowism, and discrimination.”139 More dramatically, and with fewer words, Hattie
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Duvall attended one sit‐in with a sign declaring “I invested five sons in the
Invasion.”140
In autumn, the Mayor’s Race Relations Commission proposed a compromise
that would have businesses serve African American patrons food of equal quality
but only in designated basement spaces. Though an improvement to the existing
order, the implied insult was glaring. On the surface, this compromise is surprising
considering that MOWM stalwarts T.D. McNeal and David Grant were longstanding
members of the Mayor’s Committee and eight of this committee’s members
participated in various degrees at MOWM events.141 The inability of activist‐
oriented African Americans like McNeal and Grant to direct the Mayor’s Race
Relations Committee towards a more progressive solution illustrates the tendency
of fundamentally conservative institutions to preserve the existing order. Indeed,
the Mayor’s Committee also included a member who accidentally used a racial slur
instead of “Negro” when reporting from the City Plan Commission. Likewise, the
temporary Chairman was “one of the worst offenders” against E.O. 8802.142
The Mayor’s Committee acted uncharacteristically by stepping in as an
arbiter between the CCRC and St. Louis businesses, especially considering that the
committee’s typical activities included sponsoring the National Negro Music Festival
at Sportsman’s Park and initiating informal discussions with the Real Estate
Exchange to open restricted blocks.143 While sit‐in participants wanted to fulfill a
democratic ideal that “our boys are fighting and dying for, and what we are paying
taxes and buying bonds and Saving Stamps for, and preaching to the world about,”
the Mayor’s Committee’s sought “to amicably settle the demand for equal treatment
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at all lunch counters.”144 These competing visions of desegregated public space
provide context for CCRC’s profound “disappointment that department store
owners should even suggest that American citizens be confined to eating in
basements” and disillusion with an official body that would broker this
compromise.145
Protest rhetoric emanating from St. Louis Argus depicted “the women leading
a quiet but earnest fight” with the benefit of “right and justice on their sides,” they
did not have access to bureaucratic channels that could force change from the top
down.146 For unexplained reasons, the Mayor’s Committee stepped in as an arbiter
during the sit‐ins but this body avoided issues where it probably had more
jurisdiction. One such place was the employee cafeteria at City Hall, which was
recently desegregated by local ordinance. Social stigma and underlying racial
animosity hardly made this a welcome place for inter‐racial dining. A St. Louis Argus
investigation revealed that some division heads were “angry with the Negro
employees for eating” in previously forbidden areas, which suggests that
predominantly or exclusively Black groups of employees tested the boundaries of
where they could actually dine. The investigation also found that at least one
African American employee claimed that he was asked to “take a cup of coffee in the
kitchen.” Sources do not give a context for this encounter, but it is obvious that a
racialized subtext informed interracial interactions. Already tense, the situation at
City Hall was exacerbated by a rumor that one African American employee was fired
for eating in the recently desegregated lunchroom. The Argus’ investigation
revealed that the employee was, in fact, on personal vacation, but the presence of
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rumors and prevalence of hostility made the situation at City Hall ripe for
intervention from an outside source like the Mayor’s Committee – and of course, the
interventions never occurred.147
Somehow, a rumor was spread that CCRC and MOWM accepted an offer from
Scruggs Vandervoort’s for a basement cafeteria that exclusively catered to African
American patrons. As is the nature of rumors, its origins are unknown and this false
information spread without the authority of anyone in either organization. CCRC
responded by hosting meetings discussing the nature of civil rights and by
publishing position statements in the city’s African American media outlets. In one
such editorial, the CCRC defended its “no compromise” stand on human rights and
civil rights, promising that it “will not make any compromise in…non‐violent
resistant action for the same treatment in cafeteria and fountain services as all other
Americans.”148 While CCRC tried to defend its militant reputation, Scruggs
Vandervoort’s quietly, and without fanfare, offered food service to African American
patrons who accepted eating in a segregated room.149 Though it is likely that
Scruggs altered its discriminatory practices without an impetus from disruptive
activism, it is likely that management offered this concession to ward of future
protests and to dictate for itself the nature and extent of its service to African
Americans would be.
Few African Americans appeared eager to capitalize on this new dining
opportunity, but at least one observer saw benefit in the changing store policy
because it was a component in the “process of getting white persons used to seeing
us…in places frequented by them, that is important.” Reports from African
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American customers at Scruggs Vandervoort’s indicate that they were treated
courteously, and, more importantly, that the facility, product, and service was
superior to that of other establishments targeted by CCRC for integration.150
Another side in the debate within St. Louis’ African American community was
that the “hydro‐headed monster” of “the spirit of Hitler” would be emboldened if the
compromise for segregated department store lunch counters were accepted.151 In
response to allegations by various department store managers blaming pervasive
White supremacy among its existing patrons as the raison d’être for racial
discrimination, an editorial in the St. Louis Argus cited recent successful instances of
integration at unlikely places such as Philadelphia Transportation Company, the
employee cafeteria in St. Louis’ central post office, and seating at St. Louis’
Sportsman’s Park.152
In the end, of course, St. Louis’ sit‐ins brought lasting change to more than
the city’s department store lunch counters. Scruggs Vandervoort’s opened a
downstairs cafeteria catering to an exclusively African American clientele. Shortly
thereafter, Famous Barr made a similar arrangement and Grand‐Leader
desegregated its food service. There was a ripple effect, as voluntary desegregation
occurred at several places that did not experience any form of direct action protest,
chief among these was Sportsman’s Park and the employee dining room at City Hall.
The sit‐ins also caused an upsurge of sensitivity to the hypocrisy of practicing racial
discrimination during a war against fascism. For example, just as the sit‐ins were
happening, Mayor Kauffman announced that Wendell Pruitt, a native son and
member of the Tuskegee Airmen was to be feted with a parade. David Grant
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challenged Kauffman’s credibility with African American voters, threatening to get
protestors at “all three of the department stores” to stand outside with placards
reading “Pruitt may be a hero, but he can’t get a sandwich in this joint.” Kauffman
called off the parade.153
Finally, the sit‐ins established a model for inter‐organizational, inter‐racial
protest that, in the words of one historian, “signified an emergent new model of
political agency built around the creative methods of nonviolent direct action.”154
The presence of long‐standing members from MOWM and NAACP, as well as White
collegian supporters, demonstrates that grassroots protest is sometimes
characterized by an intense localism in which activists define programs, tactics, and
ideology to suit immediate needs within their community. Thus, while national
officials for NAACP and MOWM had a relationship marked by cautious cooperation
and an undercurrent of conflict, in St. Louis members from both organizations
collaborated through CCRC to challenge manifestations of racial discrimination.
Likewise, while A. Philip Randolph formulated an anti‐Communist explanation for
keeping MOWM racially exclusive, the St. Louis chapter successfully practiced the
policy of incorporating White sympathizers so long as African Americans defined
the battles for themselves. Still, for all of the individual businesses that de‐
segregated as a result of CCRC activism, this tactic had limited application in
codifying change. The most important limitation was the inability to pass a bill
desegregating public accommodations, and Board of Aldermen shut down proposed
legislation to this end twice during the war years.155
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CHAPTER 7
‘“AN ECONOMIC DDAY FOR NEGRO AMERICANS”:
TRANSITION AND DISSOLUTION, 19441946
“The struggle is not over, it assumes new forms.”
‐ Greg Bennick1
T.D. McNeal spent nearly all of his life in struggle. McNeal’s career as a labor
organizer for BSCP gave him a foundation for understanding public service and
grassroots activism as facets in the complimentary struggles of race and class. Two
decades after MOWM’s heyday, McNeal became the first African American elected to
Missouri’s state senate. Campaign literature in McNeal’s 1966 re‐election bid
campaign credited his contributions towards MOWM’s success “in opening up a
whole area of new industrial employment opportunities” deriving its power by
getting “the 110,000 St. Louis Negro community…in motion as it had never been
before.”2 McNeal’s capacity to galvanize grassroots protest made him a power
broker in wartime St. Louis. McNeal’s status within Black St. Louis earned him a
place on Mayor Kauffman’s Citizen’s Committee for Post War Improvements and
Employment, a temporary committee that, on paper, sought many of the same ends
as MOWM: minimizing the threat of racial violence by facilitating better race
relations, increasing representation of African Americans in municipal employment,
and improving the urban environment.
Discrimination by the Public Service Company was particularly galling to St.
Louis MOWM. The typical response of protests and complaints addressed the fact
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that African Americans were shut out of bus driving positions. As it had in other
instances, MOWM solicited White public opinion to gauge whether the community
was ready for African American drivers, used the Black media to register
dissatisfaction with exclusion for what would become an important career in the
post‐war world, and even met with company management to ensure that African
American applicants would have a fair chance to fill vacancies.
St. Louis MOWM’s increased attenuation to post‐war employment was
consistent with A. Philip Randolph’s shifting focus on the same issue in both BSCP
and MOWM. At BSCP’s 1944 annual convention, the indefatigable labor leader
predicted that Black workers would be subject to the “old rule” of being the “last
hired and first fired” once “the shooting ends.” Now nineteen years old, the union
dedicated its convention to mapping plans for a post‐war world and a contracting
economy characteristic of military demobilization.3 Lester Granger of the National
Urban League Speaking spoke with a similar tenor. His speech on a radio broadcast
in St. Louis emphasized the necessity of confronting a constricting economy and the
imperative of adjusting American culture to make congruent with progressive
wartime shifts in global race relations. Granger agreed with St. Louis MOWM
activists that it was necessary to “make secure the temporary gains made during
this emergency,” so that race relations in the United States “can see some
brightening” though Black Americans participating equitably in the post‐war
economy.4 Over a dozen MOWM members had similar hopes as Granger, and they
institutionalized their aspirations through service on the Citizen’s Committee for
Postwar Planning and Improvements in St. Louis. This advisory committee was
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comprised of over 200 of the city’s most visible leaders in politics, industry, and
social life. Charged with helping the city adjust to economic life without the heavy
infusion of defense dollars into its manufacturing base, the committee acted in an
advisory capacity for the mayor. In addition to McNeal, other committee members
who worked with or alongside MOWM over the previous three years included
churchmen like Dr. John M. Bracy, Urban League Director John T. Clark, and MOWM
members Richard Jefferson, David Grant, and Bige Wyatt.5
The other significant trend in post‐war economic planning was the push for a
Permanent FEPC, a drive nationally spearheaded by A. Philip Randolph and
supported by a conglomerate of labor unions and special interest groups.6
Individuals like T.D. McNeal worked to “make FEPC a permanent governmental
agency” responsive to local conditions and nationally strong enough to confront
discriminatory employment by large manufacturers.7 St. Louis MOWM joined the
progressive chorus in lobbying for the Dawson‐Scanlon‐Lafollette Bill, also known
as the Fair Employment Practices Act, and sent David Grant to Congress to argue
that an adequately staffed, sufficiently funded, bureaucratically permanent FEPC
would have a positive impact on St. Louis.8 Appearing before the Committee on
Labor on June 6, 1944, Grant testified, “Thousands of Negroes in and around St.
Louis have been refused employment by war factories, despite the need of
workers.”9 Grant’s experience with the MOWM and CCRC made him especially
aware of “a great reservoir of Negro women” with mechanical aptitude. More
saliently, given his generation’s beliefs about gender and military service, Grant
argued, “Negroes in the Armed Services won’t accept the closed door labor
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policy…that met them in 1918.” This new kind of soldier was better educated than
the previous generation and promised to return prepared to fight remnants of
segregation remaining after the war because they “would not take the closed‐door
policy with the same trust in the paternalistic policy that happened in 1918.”10 The
very real possibility that well‐trained African American veterans would come home
to a rigidly segregated United States made Grant “shudder to think of their
resentment, their justifiable resentment, which must well up in their hearts” if
African American soldiers have no “governmental authority to which they can state
their case.”11
The House Committee of Labor chair Mary Norton introduced Grant as
representing the Mayor’s Interracial Conference, the Committee for a Permanent
FEPC, and St. Louis MOWM. Grant knew that he was an ambassador for each
organization and that his leadership in all of them gave him credibility as a
spokesperson before Congress. Cognizant that his audience had the power to
federally back the FEPC with finances and greater enforcement power, including the
ability to revoke contracts for noncompliance, Grant offered details of St. Louis
MOWM campaigns such as the demonstrations at U.S. Cartridge. He did this “for the
purpose of showing how far we had to go to become employed…because there was
no responsible agency to which we could look with any degree of confidence” to
confront employers in violation of E.O. 8802.12 Grant believed that racial protest got
results, and implicit in his testimony was the bargain that demonstrations would be
immediately curtailed once disaffection could be channeled through an effective
bureaucratic outlet.13
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Grant and St. Louis MOWM based their support for a permanent FEPC on
grounds of fair play, and he rejected the notion that such legislation constituted
preferential treatment. In questioning before the committee, Grant affirmed the
right of employers to hire and fire at will with the limitation that private industry
could not completely choose its workforce. Grant cited the existing child labor laws
as an example analogous to proposed fair employment legislation because both of
these cases impacted exactly whom an employer could choose to hire. Grant
supported his case for federal intervention in private industry with “The mere fact
that employers have at times used up the best years of employees’ lives, has brought
about social security legislation and unemployment compensation assistance…in
order to have safeguards against unscrupulous employers.”14 In short, even the
freedom of employers to buy the type of labor that they wanted needed restrictions,
and free labor could not exist in an unregulated market. In response to Michigan
Congressman Hoffman’s questioning as to whether a famer would be forced to hire a
Mexican, Grant reminded Hoffman that the proposed legislation did not apply to
small businesses like the one in his hypothetical situation. In reality, the law only
applied to employers with federal contract, engaged in interstate or foreign trade,
and had a payroll of five or more people.15 In this incident, the sanctity of small
business was used as a foil to argue against fair employment legislation even though
the law did not apply to it. Grant did his best to bring the questioning back to his
district, where the issue was not that Missouri’s farmers refused to hire and live
with African American stable hands, but that big businesses such as Carter
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Carburetor, McDonald Aircraft, and American Torpedo still offered limited, if any,
employment opportunities to African Americans.

Increasing Labor Militancy and the Arrival of FEPC in St. Louis, 1944
Notoriously underfunded and inadequately staffed, FEPC’s failure to
immediately foster significant change in St. Louis was an important reason why
MOWM remained relevant long after the march itself was cancelled. Without a
strong FEPC presence, MOWM became a leading advocate for alleviating the double
burden of racial and gender discrimination that factored into the city having 17,000
African American women out of work.16 The combination of sheer necessity for
laborers and pressure from groups like St. Louis MOWM created new opportunities
“for the integration of Negro women” into positions that White women formerly
held in their exclusive domain.17 The most publicized example of increased
employment opportunities for African American women was at the aircraft plant
with a $16 million contract, Curtiss‐Wright.18 In 1944, this company was among the
first in St. Louis to offer, free of charge, five‐week training sessions for twenty‐four
Black female workers. While not statistically staggering, the two dozen African
American women earned “the same rate of pay as other workers in like jobs,” and
enjoyed on‐the‐job training for riveting, drilling, and “skilled jobs” in defense
production. Two dozen trainees does not herald a new era of workplace equity, but
their employment at Curtiss‐Wright was a small landmark in the protracted fight for
access to well‐paying jobs.

225

A survey of the professional profiles of applicants for Curtiss‐Wright’s
training program indicates the difficulty that otherwise qualified workers had
securing white‐collar jobs. The first class of trainees included four college
graduates, a social worker, a postal worker, a swimming instructor, and two recent
high school graduates ‐ hardly the background one would expect for a group of
applicants to work on warplane assembly lines.19 The belated and disproportional
presence of professional African American women in blue‐collar manufacturing
during the war speaks to Jeanetta Welch Brown’s observation that “The
employment of Negro women is not a social experiment but an economic necessity,”
which she predicted would exacerbate after the war because “many of the men will
not return.”20
Grassroots protest and top‐down federal action in the form of sit‐ins and a
FEPC hearing both occurred in St. Louis during the summer of 1944. Public hearings
were an important part of FEPC operations that occurred at many major
manufacturing cities during the war.21 Like most of these hearings, the 1944 session
in St. Louis was the result of White supremacy’s persistent recalcitrance and
prolonged protest from vocal minority groups and labor unions. As labor historian
Andrew Kersten demonstrates in Race, Jobs, and War, the industrial midwest
typified the pattern of FEPC success through strong local support.22 Though not
articulated in such a way, getting St. Louis congruent with this pattern of expanded
opportunities through FEPC intervention was St. Louis MOWM’s primary concern.
As early as August 1942, T.D. McNeal urged FEPC officials to investigate allegedly
unfair hiring practices at four defense factories: U.S. Cartridge, McQuary‐Norris,
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Carter Carburetor, and Curtiss Wright.23 St. Louis MOWM provided local activists
with a constructive outlet by directing activism towards soliciting, investigating, and
quantifying complaints of industrial discrimination. Perennially short‐staffed, FEPC
relied on local cooperation with organizations like MOWM throughout the midwest
in order to accomplish its mission.24
MOWM assumed responsibility to investigate racial discrimination in defense
plants, as well as the general employment situation of Black Americans in St. Louis,
because “the FEPC is such a small group” that it could not effectively “investigate
conditions in every town and city.” St. Louis MOWM’s logic was that individuals
“must help to enforce” E.O. 8802, thus “it is necessary for the people in each
community to report any violation” in which the FEPC had jurisdiction. In short, the
prevailing conception was one of a responsive government that would rectify
injustice whenever citizens reported illegal activity. To use the rhetoric from
African American journalists of the day, FEPC represented David fighting the Goliath
of deeply entrenched discrimination in industries that had “billions of dollars.”25
MOWM’s role as arbiter of protest and investigator of racial discrimination
was recognized long before the FEPC hearings and subsequent opening of a sub‐
regional office in the city.26 The trend in St. Louis was true throughout the country,
as African American activists took it upon themselves to fight against “the complete
emasculation of the President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice.”27 Indeed,
Black activists in St. Louis were convinced that grassroots participation and mass
pressure were necessary to ensure that FEPC’s presence was not reduced to
conducting “fruitless investigations” confirming grim facts that people already
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knew.28 This facet of St. Louis MOWM’s program made it a natural ally with
progressive factions of the city’s labor movement, namely the CIO‐affiliated St. Louis
Industrial Union Council, in the “call for the immediate establishment of a fair
employment practices committee for this area.”29
The push for an FEPC office in St. Louis succeeded, but federal authority’s
belated arrival hampered its ability to enforce E.O. 8802. In strictly bureaucratic
terms, the October 1944 opening of a new sub‐regional office increased bureau
visibility in Region IX. Of course, African Americans who pushed for FEPC’s
presence expected more from this short‐lived office, especially since it received over
100 complaints in its first day of operations.30 As a labor organizer, McNeal’s
leadership style of calculated decisions based on an abundance of accurate data
translated well into St. Louis MOWM’s fact‐checking of racial inequality. In fact, this
was part and parcel of the organization’s operations since at least 1942, when
McNeal and others tried “ascertaining facts and correcting the existing deplorable
conditions” in preparation for an FEPC public hearing. Early the following year, the
greatly anticipated hearings were cancelled, prompting McNeal to denounce a
“flagrant violation of the intent and spirit of Executive Order 8802.”31
In an effort to register protest about this new federal agency being
“handicapped by a small staff and a lack of funds,” St. Louis MOWM sent President
Roosevelt a “Giant Protest Card” measuring 60 by 40 inches.32 Emblazoned with the
signatures of 32 African American leaders in St. Louis representing a variety of
constituencies including labor, fraternal, religious, and civic welfare groups, the card
carried a message of “indignation,” reminding President Roosevelt that “The St.
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Louis Negro Community remains aroused and gravely concerned” by the railroad
hearings’ cancelation.33 Some factions from St. Louis’ African American leadership
personally wrote President Roosevelt, protesting Paul McNutt’s decision to
“indefinitely postpone” the aforementioned hearings. MOWM members Joseph
McLemore and David Grant led two of these organizations, the St. Louis Lodge of
Colored Elks and the Mound City Bar Association.34
Almost two years passed since the first hearings in St. Louis were postponed,
but when they finally occurred, the hearings brought out an impressive crowd.
Under Monsignor Francis Haas’ direction, forty different witnesses testified that 22
railroads and 14 railway unions excluded African Americans in both practice and
policy.35 To the St. Louis American, it seemed as though “Presidential intervention”
was the only remaining option to get railway unions to recognize Black workers as
fully‐fledged members.36 Unfortunately, St. Louis FEPC hearings were hardly
covered in America’s major news outlets – a damaging problem fact for an already
weak federal agency born through the threat of mass protest. MOWM’s strategy for
positioning FEPC in a way that it could create meaningful change relied on agitation
that elicited sympathy from a well‐informed electorate. Unfortunately for MOWM,
the New York Times and left‐leaning PM were the only major media outlets covering
the hearings.37 As a result, knowledge of the hearings was limited, and public
outrage of the railroad industry’s lingering racism was largely confined to African
Americans.38
Budgetary and human resource limitations plagued FEPC throughout its
existence, and its time in St. Louis was no exception. Twice rescheduled in order to
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save travel expenses, the 1944 hearings finally occurred as summer waned.39 It was
no secret that FEPC was “living a hand‐to‐mouth existence” with little funding or
and few full‐time field staff. 40 As such, the agency relied on private citizens to
report grievances about racial discrimination in hiring practice. “MOW and other
agencies” capitalized on FEPC’s “administrative difficulties” that twice postponed
the hearings by using the interim as an opportunity “in which to prepare and
process cases [that] expose local discriminatory employment policies.”41 In
anticipation of FEPC hearings, St. Louis MOWM “asked that all local Negroes who
have been discriminated against” file a complaint through its volunteer staff.42 This
was a continuation of an established pattern in which MOWM functioned as an
arbiter racial discrimination in defense employment. During St. Louis MOWM’s
earliest campaigns at U.S. Cartridge and Carter Carburetor, it urged “every Negro
who has been refused employment…because of his or her color” to visit the
Jefferson Avenue headquarters in order to discuss the matter with David Grant and
volunteers in the complaints division. Once “in proper form,” this team “submitted
[documentation] directly to the Fair Employment Practices Committee.”
This same procedure was used in 1944, when St. Louis MOWM cited an
“extreme need” for individuals who could “prove” that they were refused
employment or were dismissed “on account of their color.” To support the hearings
with empirical data, St. Louis MOWM urged local residents to visit its office during
business hours for an interview. Several months of accumulated facts armed St.
Louis MOWM with sufficient information to present a case to the FEPC and “open
the way for new jobs for the race.”43 African American women were especially
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sought out, as MOWM officials urged them “to actually make application to the war
plants now barring them” in order to build a stronger case to present the FEPC.44
The times were, according to the Chicago Defender, “over ripe,” because “local war
plants are daily turning down hundreds of colored women applicants.”45 Those who
did not experience employment discrimination but still “believes that orderly
procedure is the only permanent solution” were encouraged to attend the public
hearing and help assure that “the intent of the Executive Order” was fulfilled so that
“the security of America and the United Nations may be guaranteed by full
production.”46 In St. Louis MOWM’s version of pressure politics, all interested
members of the community played a role in making E.O. 8802 more than a dead
legal letter.
If testimony gathered by St. Louis MOWM can be trusted, many African
Americans reported racially discriminatory hiring and job placement practices,
unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, and racially based wage scales for
employees performing the same work.47 For instance, Christine Berry Morgan, a
worker at International Shoe Company, wrote St. Louis MOWM “in the interest of
others and myself” asking for “several members of your organization to visit the
factory” and give credibility to her complaints about working conditions. She was
concerned about “the sanitary conditions where colored girls work, especially the
fifth floor,” and unequal “work and salary compared to others in the same building.”
Morgan also asked St. Louis MOWM’s advice on forming a union and questioned the
sagacity of striking to address problems outlined above.48 One African American
woman wrote instead of visiting MOWM’s office “because my job doesn’t allow me
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to come in person.” After completing training as a welder through NYA, she “was
not fortunate enough to get a job.” Recent weeks saw Kaiser Shipyard advertising
openings for welders, so she visited company headquarters at 410 Broadway. Even
though she claimed, “I could weld anything including cast iron. I can weld vertical,
horizontal…and overhead welding…I could weld like a machine,” her on‐site visit
was to no avail and she asked MOWM to intervene on her behalf.49
Another anonymous author writing under the name “A General Cable
Employee,” petitioned MOWM to not “forget to mention General Cable Corporation”
at the FEPC hearings. The disgruntled employee complained, “That place is the most
outstanding in discrimination against Negroes in employment,” and accused the
company of only hiring Black workers “to keep on the safe side of the F.E.P.C.” The
writer took White supremacy personally, claiming that supervisors “treat all their
negro employees as if they don’t give a dam if you work there or not.” Subsequent
investigations supported the writer’s claim that General Cable shifted African
American workers around in divisions but only limited job opportunities to
“janitors, maids, and kitchen supply clerks.” Discrimination and protests at Carter
Carburetor and the Small Arms Plant at U.S. Cartridge drew headlines in the city’s
Black press, but countless companies like General Cable continued daily operations
as if there were no FEPC. It was, in the plaintiff’s words, “the worst place of
discrimination against negroes in employment I have ever seen.”50 In fact, the
situation at General Cable went largely unnoticed by most observers until hundreds
of White workers reacted to the hiring of a few African Americans with a wildcat
strike.51
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MOWM’s efforts supplied FEPC with so much information that the agency
needed to extend the hearings an additional day. Both ten‐hour sessions occurred
before a ”crowded courtroom with white and Negro spectators.” Seven of the eight
firms present at the hearings had charges involving, in FEPC chairman Malcolm
Ross’ words, “the alleged refusal…to hire needed and available Negro women war
workers and the refusal to upgrade Negro workers to jobs utilizing their highest
skills.”52 U.S. Cartridge set the tone, claiming innocence of discrimination and
showing evidence that it “made a sincere effort to integrate Negroes into industry
and provide them with the same opportunities offered whites.” U.S. Cartridge’s case
was unique because the company had a relatively long history of employing African
American war workers in the all‐Black Unit 202. The charge levied against U.S.
Cartridge was that it discharged more senior African American workers before it let
go of White counterparts with less experience. It was alleged that White men took
priority when the company re‐absorbed workers even though, again, many of them
had less seniority.53
In a departure from past pressure tactics, MOWM urged members to not
confront racial discrimination through direct action. Instead, St. Louis MOWM
proposed following a protocol for filing discrimination charges – effectively taking
protest from the streets to the proper bureaucratic channels. The result was over
100 complaints, “mostly from the failure of qualified Negro women to be employed,”
against St. Louis area employers operating on federal defense contracts.54 An
anonymous letter from a writer claiming to work at General Cable is a good example
of the rhetoric used to grumble about racist hiring practices and the prevalence
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racial confrontations at the few workplaces that employed any considerable number
of African Americans. If we can rely on the author’s testimony, General Cable hired
Black workers as menial laborers and refused to promote them. The reason for
hiring them at all was to subvert FEPC regulations by having at least some
representation of African Americans on their payroll. Not content with menial work
and practically excluded from promotions, Black workers must have felt that the
ceiling on their careers was not one of glass but of reinforced concrete. Perhaps
because he or she was afraid of being identified and face retribution at work, the
writer would not attend the FEPC hearings, but reminded MOWM representatives
that his or her employer routinely pigeonholed African American workers into
dead‐end positions. The anonymous complaint indicates that some local people saw
MOWM, not FEPC, as an organization that was responsive to their needs. Further
proof of this is that the writer wanted MOWM representatives to not “forget” about
Black workers in places where African Americans had secured employment,
however menial, in plants at which MOWM did not regularly hold demonstrations
at.55
The most obvious gains coming out of the hearings was the creation of a sub‐
regional FEPC office in St. Louis ‐ a bureaucratic event that was hoped for by
MOWM’s most diehard activists and stodgy members of the St. Louis Race Relations
Commission alike.56 Coming of the heels of demobilization that one newspaper
called “an economic D‐Day for Negro Americans,” creating a FEPC office in the midst
of imminent economic contraction was too insignificant of an accomplishment at a
point too late in the struggle. Still, the flood of discrimination complaints filed
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during its first day of operations gave the St. Louis FEPC office one of the nation’s
largest case loads, thus legitimating the past three years of MOWM demands for an
increased federal presence. Somewhat shortsightedly, the new FEPC office
supervisor Theodore Brown attributed the astonishing volume of complaints to St.
Louis’ geographic location on the borderlands of north and south. Brown’s analysis
is surprising considering the sustained efforts of St. Louis MOWM to solicit,
investigate, and analyze complaints prior to the office’s opening. His blindness,
intentional or otherwise, to St. Louis MOWM’s contribution to the impressive
volume of complaints processed by that city’s FEPC is even more astonishing
considering that an overwhelming majority of the cases did not come from White
ethnic or religious minorities, both of whom comprised a small proportion of FEPC
complaints in other cities. In St. Louis, African American men complaining that they
were systematically passed up for promotions and African American women who
believed that employers blacklisted them for reasons of race and gender comprised
an overwhelming bulk of FEPC’s cases.57
Shortly before FEPC’s St. Louis office opened, statistics were released
indicating that an “all‐time high” of 6,000,000 Black workers were gainfully
employed throughout the nation. The Chicago Defender attributed this to the
combined confluence of manpower shortages, efforts of pressure groups, and FEPC’s
increasing visibility.58 National progress did not necessarily translate to a tranquil
working class. In St. Louis, perceptions of increased opportunities with imminent
FEPC hearings were probably a factor in an upsurge of labor unrest amongst African
Americans who held positions at companies with defense contracts.
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In July 1944, 160 African Americans at National Lead Company’s titanium
plant went on a wildcat strike without support from their union, Local 12 of CIO
United Gas, Coke and Chemical Workers. Contemporary newspaper accounts do not
indicate specific demands from the striking workers, but reporters noted that ten
White employees joined their picket line and the complaint of “unfair discrimination
against Negroes” was often voiced.59 The wildcat nature of this CIO local’s action,
the predominantly Black nature of the strike, and the regional African American
press’ silence to the event are all significant, but the timing of this wildcat strike less
than one week before the FEPC arrived make this incident even more historically
salient. Unauthorized autonomous militancy among African American workers
occurred in other Missouri locations as well. Earlier that July, Granite City
witnessed 290 African American chippers strike at General Steel Casting
Corporation, a company making locomotive beds, tank parts, and gun mounts.
These members of CIO Local 1022 were inspired to action by “because a white
foreman to whom the chippers objected had not been discharged or transferred by
the management.” Since this factory was subject to federal intervention, African
American workers thought that FEPC’s presence in Missouri was leverage that could
get this unpopular White foreman transferred to a different division or dismissed
altogether. The mid‐day strike was cut short after only five hours because CIO
officials coaxed about a third of the striking workers away from the picket with a
promise that negotiations between the union and management were underway and
that their unauthorized shut down would not aid these discussions.60 Even with a
good‐faith commitment from company management and the union, resolving the

236

conflict required representatives from the War Labor Board to step in with the
threat of suspension and discharge of the roughly 200 African American workers
who remained on the picket line.61 As articulated by shop steward J.C. Cole, the chief
complaint was that Black workers were systematically barred from four of the
company’s seven units and that existing Black employees were routinely overlooked
when other employees were upgraded and promoted.62 The chronological
proximity of both of these strikes to the FEPC hearings indicates that the promise of
increased federal presence in St. Louis coincided with a feeling among African
American war workers that progressive changes in their industry were on the
horizon.

Desegregating Higher Education in St. Louis
Progress sometimes occurred in places that were never flashpoints of
struggle. In April 1944, St. Louis University, a traditionally Catholic institution in a
city where more than half of the residents shared the faith, announced a plan for
racial integration in the ensuing summer session. The school’s gradualist approach
brought in three female African American public school teachers as graduate
students and two African American males enrolling as undergraduates. Shortly
after, eight more African American women entered the School of social work.63 St.
Louis University’s voluntarily removal of racial barriers and the subsequent conflict
between MOWM with Lincoln University occurred in the context of an era in
Missouri’s history when, according to one commentator, African Americans found
that “Education on a college level, except for the teaching profession, is virtually
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impossible.” This problem was more acute at the graduate and professional level,
where opportunity for Black students to pursue advanced or terminal degrees was
severely curtailed, causing one commentator to remark that the school was “neither
equipped, organized, nor financed on a basis which permits real college work…a
University in name only.”64
St. Louis University’s Senior President Father Patrick Hollohan pro‐actively
denounced racial segregation as “undemocratic” and “un‐Christian.” He explained
desegregation as the extension of “the evident duty of all Catholics to receive a
Catholic education…not restricted to grade school or even high school.” As the only
Catholic institution of higher education in the city, Hollohan argued that St. Louis
University was morally obligated to admit qualified African American applicants
who otherwise had no alternative for Catholic higher education.65 Hollohan’s anti‐
racism is remarkable considering that one year earlier, White students protesting
against the school’s racially exclusive practices were expelled.
Just as MOWM and FOR cooperated to quantify public opinion, St. Louis’
League of Women Voters provided the university with data from a poll that, though
far from representative of the city, revealed that 90% of St. Louis‐area Whites
favored integrating the institution.66 Father Claude Heithaus concluded from this
data “that the number of fair‐minded people in this country is larger than many of
us realize.”67 Heithaus, a professor of classical art and archeology, grounded his
appeal for institutional integration in legal theory, arguing that “The law demands
that they fulfill their civic duties…They are required to pay taxes, to serve in the
armed forces, and to observe the law. Therefore the state is bond in return to see
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that they get their rights.”68 To Catholic liberals like Heithaus, the issue was a
conflict between Christian doctrine and Herrenvolk Democracy in the United States,
a contradiction “that could not be reconciled,” and, in Heithaus’ appraisal, already
forced a hundred thousand African Americans to “turn in despair to the followers of
Lenin.”69
As a theologian, Heithaus explained his position as one of “Paternal
affection,” ensuring “Christian justice and charity for the Negroes.”70 Heithaus used
his role as a leader in a hierarchical religious institution to give a “surprise
sermon…against race prejudice,” which was received favorably by a student body
that had already staged a five hundred‐person demonstration calling for their school
to integrate.71 Just as “Jesus denounced injustice in the highest places,” Heithaus
used his pulpit to identify racists as not worthy of calling themselves Christians and
criticize White supremacy as “snobbery against Negroes” that amounted to
“diabolical prejudice.”72 While Heithaus gave clerical support for desegregating
religious higher education, St. Louis University’s student body led the institution to
desegregate itself. Of all of the pontificating in the school’s pulpits, none was more
impressive than the student’s response to Father Heithaus’ sermon against racism.
They joined him in a prayer of penitence and “reparation for the suffering which
prejudice has inflicted” and for “the wrongs that white men have done to Negroes.”73
There are no reports of anyone in the student body opposing the brief prayer
that he asked them to repeat: “Lord Jesus, we are sorry and ashamed for all the
wrongs that white men have done to your Colored children. We are firmly resolved
never again to have any part” in propagating or abetting racism.74 MOWM member
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Henry Wheeler praised Heithaus’ sermon in the pages of the St. Louis American as
“the most courageous, the most direct and the only test of real Christianity of a
white group that has ever been made in the history of our city.”75 Even though
African American enrollment did not proportionately reflect the city’s racial
demographics, it was, to people like David Grant, symbolically important because it
showed that “doors are opening up.”76 In another appraisal of St. Louis University’s
self‐directed desegregation, and editorial in the St. Louis American praised the
school for giving “all true Americans” a reason to believe in “the greatness of our
Country.” The American noted “a fine feeling within the Negro citizenry…not a
feeling of celebration or overt jubilation, but one in welling respect for a deed done
in the cause of [Christian] brotherhood.”77
In contrast to St. Louis University’s voluntary desegregation, Lincoln
University, Missouri’s only publicly supported institution for higher education open
to African Americans, resisted enrolling Black students in some of its graduate
programs.78 The evasiveness of Lincoln’s “Missouri Compromise” mirrored much of
the South in its tendency to inadequately fund separate and ostensibly equal
services for African Americans. The extension course at a satellite campus allowed
Missouri to not finance a separate and equal School of Journalism while also
avoiding the integration of its flagship university.79 In 1941, three years after the
Gaines decision, an investigation by the Chicago Defender revealed that most of the
fifteen states with segregated higher education simply ignored the Supreme Court’s
decision.80
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Journalism was not the only field that Lincoln University did not offer an
adequate program in. The law school was so poorly equipped that an editorial
referred to Dean William Taylor as “Judas” and a two‐faced “Janus” more concerned
with his career as an administrator than with the inequity of a “Jim Crow Law
School” that constituted “a ridiculous insult to all fair‐minded Missourians.” The
American recommended that, since this mock law school was already “dead,” it be
“buried without benefit of the clergy.”81 Inflammatory editorial commentary aside,
in 1944, both the School of Law and School of Journalism were on the verge closing
on account of insufficient enrollment. MOWM and the NAACP attributed low
enrollment to Lincoln’s practice of discouraging prospective students as part of a
broader plan that the State of Missouri had to ultimately close the Law School.82
Like the School of Law, Lincoln University’s School of Journalism was on the verge of
dissolution. If this occurred, aspiring African American journalists had to get
instruction from White faculty who were based out of Missouri University. Formed
in Gaines’ aftermath, the School of Journalism was essentially created to fail, as it
was never adequately funded or staffed.83 By design, Lincoln’s School of Journalism
was an extension school, with a small campus to call home but no faculty to call its
own.84 In a public letter, President of the Alumni Association William Green
reiterated the crux of NAACP and MOWM’s argument, “If the state desires to
preserve its dual educational system, let it pay for it.”85 The legalese was clear:
follow the letter of Plessey or desegregate inequitably funded publicly supported
institutions.
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After an agreement was made for Missouri University professors to lecture at
Lincoln University, St. Louis MOWM took the helm and led a charge that the
arrangement violated the Gaines decision.86 In February 1944, Washington
Tabernacle Baptist Church McNeal hosted a St. Louis MOWM rally protesting what
T.D. McNeal called the “sneak‐plan of shifting teachers from Missouri U. over to
Lincoln in order to keep democracy out of education in Missouri.” With support
from NAACP and twenty‐three other African American institutions including the
Inter‐Denominational Ministers Alliance, the rally drew over 500 attendees whose
attitude revealed, in the words of one newspaper, “the Missouri Negro of 1944 is not
for sale.”87 About two months later, longtime MOWM member Thelma McNeal
stepped forward as a test case to gauge the extent to which under‐funded
segregated institutions could be forced to either disintegrate or get enough public
money to be legitimized. Just four months before she played a leading role in the sit‐
ins, McNeal applied to study at Lincoln University School of Law.88 Dean William E.
Taylor truthfully testified to the Lincoln University Board of Curators that he
refused McNeal’s application because the Law School became inactive as of
February 1944, and it only existed on the campus of this publically funded Black
university to comply with Gaines. Thelma McNeal claimed that Taylor “would not
allow her to register,” but that Lincoln School of Law would accept her application
when funding to reestablish the program was secured. MOWM member David Grant
represented McNeal in court, and he alleged that Lincoln’s administration was
“shoving around” African American students and “ignored” the Supreme Court’s
1938 decision. Thelma McNeal’s sincerity as a law student cannot be verified, but
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her case successfully illustrated that Lincoln University maintained the rudiments of
a law school so that the University of Missouri could “avoid the necessity of opening
the doors” to Black law students.89
MOWM’s battle with Lincoln’s Dean escalated, with David Grant and Thelma
McNeal questioning his leadership as an academic administrator. Grant and McNeal
accusing Taylor of discouraging applicants to the law school, abusing official power
in order to gain control of the Poro Hotel for his private lodging, and converting a
University telephone into a line for personal calls.90 The Board of Curators
exonerated Taylor of any wrongdoing, prompting Henry Wheeler to denounce
University administration as “contrary to the spirit of the Gaines Decision.”91 The
battle waged by MOWM and NAACP against Lincoln University led to a stalemate in
the maintenance of a “scholarless school,” and it exposed fissures in Black St. Louis
by controversially casting University leadership as figures unworthy of emulation
from students because they sheepishly compromised with “Jim Crow politicians to
perpetuate their bad acts of faith.”92 For all of the rhetoric, Lincoln University
remained as it was. The school’s integrity among area African Americans was
publicly called into question, but little actually changed. The final full year of
American involvement in World War II witnessed St. Louis University voluntary
desegregate on a very limited basis and without incident. Meanwhile, name‐calling
and resistance to handling racial equity in public higher education tarnished Lincoln
University’s image.
Vigilant protest politics reaped other unintended dividends in 1944, this time
in the improvement of living conditions within St. Louis’ predominantly Black
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communities. Urban rehabilitation, an issue long advocated by the city’s Urban
League, became a reality that summer under the guidance of the St. Louis Race
Relations Commission’s Housing and Living Conditions Committee.93 Headed by
Reverend John Markos, the Housing Committee acted through the mayor’s office to
eliminate de jure segregation and restore blighted urban spaces through an
ambitious program of improving home fronts, streets, sidewalks, and sanitary
services.94 This ambitious season of urban improvements was delayed by
negotiations with the Real Estate Exchange and undercut by funding difficulties.
These obstacles aside, the Housing and Living Conditions Committee managed to
make a “marked improvement of housing conditions in the so‐called blighted
areas.”95 The committee also pushed the city’s Commissioner of Parks and
Recreation to schedule playing time at city fields for all‐Black ball clubs that were
formerly shut out of access to public fields. Though certainly not revolutionary, this
was an instance where a municipal body recognized and acted upon the need for all
city residents to have access to public recreation lands.96
A final noteworthy alteration in the city’s racial order was the desegregation
of grandstand seating at Sportsman’s Park, home of the Major League Baseball club
St. Louis Cardinals – a team whose star player, Stan Musial, served in World War II
and was somewhat of a racial progressive.97 Desegregating seating at the stadium,
“the last outpost of Jim Crow seating in the majors,” was an important harbinger of
change, but the historical process through which this occurred is less than
fascinating.98 There was little fanfare surrounding the change in stadium seating
policy, local Black protest organizations like MOWM never staged a picket, and there
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appeared to be scant, if any, resistance from White spectators. Although St. Louis
MOWM never targeted the team for demonstrations, Cardinals management was
undoubtedly aware of the scope and nature of MOWM’s protests because the
stadium was located only a few blocks away from Carter Carburetor. Instances of
voluntary top‐down directed desegregation like this and St. Louis University’s
recent desegregation represented small steps which some interpreted as signs that
“pointed toward a truly integrated democracy.”99
With little fanfare, the summer of 1944 saw significant changes in the city’s
race relations. Just as administrators at St. Louis University never publicly
mentioned increased Black protest throughout the city as a factor in its decision to
abruptly change a longstanding policy of racial exclusion, St. Louis Cardinals owners
Sam Breadon and Don Barnes never acknowledged that groups like MOWM
coordinated highly visible protests over the past two years that influenced their
decisions. 100 It is likely that these sudden changes in racial policy were the result of
a ripple effect originating from activity by groups like the “March on Washington
Committee…the agency which has done more than any other, to force industry and
government in St. Louis to give Negro citizens a greater degree of justice.”101
With the war waning and a march on Washington surely not about to occur
any time soon, MOWM faded from the national scene. 102 Locally, when FEPC
established an office in St. Louis, David Grant said that MOWM “sort of slacked off”
before formulating a new campaign to keep the organization relevant in the post‐
war world.103 There was still no shortage of issues to tackle, many of which looked
like the changing same as St. Louis MOWM urged activists to continue pressuring
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plants like McQuay‐Norris, U.S. Cartridge, and Amertorp to ensure that they
followed recommendations from the FEPC.104 With E.O. 8802 on the books and a
FEPC office open in St. Louis, MOWM’s persistent utilization of public protests to
draw federal attention to illegal practices seemed passé, if not stale. The inability to
adapt its program after FEPC opened an office in St. Louis was certainly a factor in
why the organization began to lose its appeal in a city where it once thrived.105
St. Louis MOWM tried to keep interest going in protest politics, non‐violent
direct action, and mass mobilization, but it could never distance itself from sharing a
name with a national organization that never did what its name boldly declared was
its mission. Interplay between national leaders and local activists demonstrate that
national/local interaction was usually mutually beneficial. In October 1944, David
Grant and A. Philip Randolph spoke at Washington Tabernacle Baptist Church to
discuss “Where Will The Negro Be When The War Ends?” 106 This time, however,
Randolph’s appearance did not ignite a passion for protest among St. Louis’ Black
residents and, in less than a year, the answer was obvious. By July, 1945, the
Chicago Defender reported that 6,000 recently unemployed African Americans in St.
Louis crowded the U.S. Employment Service office looking for work.107 A full‐page
photo essay in this same newspaper just a month prior to Grant and Randolph
publicly speculating on post war prospects indicates that this issue was on the mind
of many African Americans during the war’s conclusion.108
Grant and Randolph addressed the question from a local and national
perspective, but they shared the belief that “The fight that we put up between now
and the post‐war period will determine whether we will be found in the bread lines,
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pushing apple carts or on good paying jobs when the war ends.”109 Grant and
Randolph concretely addressed salient and sustainable issues for the organization
to tackle as America re‐adjusted to a peacetime economy. These issues included St.
Louis’ persistent use of an exclusively White workforce on its bus line, recalcitrant
employers who still rejected en masse applications from African American women
even after FEPC had an office in town, and demanding full integration of the city’s
lunch counters instead of accepting seating and service in a segregated section.110

National Council for a Permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission
Ever since Randolph unequivocally called off the march in summer 1941, his
critics pointed out that FEPC had little power to coerce defense contractors into
obeying the President’s anti‐discrimination policy as outlined in E.O. 8802. With
little legal authority, FEPC’s principal pressure tactic was moral suasion from within
the federal government.111 African American newspapers throughout the nation
lifted their pens in defense of the beleaguered agency whenever the Southern‐
dominated Congress attacked its authority or threatened its appropriations. In St.
Louis, the Argus cheered FEPC for “giving the Negro a man’s chance to work and
earn a living” and warned that without the embattled agency, African Americans
would be set back “for years – or maybe generations” in public sector employment.
The crisis of war created a moment of opportunity, and the paper warned, “If we do
not get integrated into industry now…our future in the industrial life of the nation is
too dismal to think about.” Without FEPC as representative of federal support for
equal opportunity, “there is little hope for the future.”112
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African Americans throughout the nation recognized that statistical gains
made during the war were threatened by “extreme job displacement” when the
economy reverted to traditional civilian patterns of production.113 Expanded job
opportunities in places like Los Angeles, where over five thousand African
Americans entered war industries in a single year, and in Milwaukee, where one
plant with a forty‐year history of racial exclusion suddenly had almost five hundred
African Americans on its payroll, were obviously threatened by the imminent
conversion to a peacetime economy.114 It is statistically impossible to gauge the
extent FEPC influenced rising employment of African Americans, but gains such as
those mentioned above contributed heavily to one perceptive commentator’s
remarks that FEPC was “one of the most significant and one of the frailest” agencies
created during Roosevelt’s lengthy tenure.115
A. Philip Randolph’s assumed leadership of the National Council for a
Permanent FEPC because he recognized the urgency of preserving this federal
agency. Randolph’s position as head of MOWM made it awkward for him to criticize
FEPC because his reputation as a national figure in the pantheon of protest heroes
depended on the agency’s existence. Still, even Randolph admitted that “success of
this committee” was surprising considering that it was “hampered by insufficient
funds and lack of authority to enforce its orders.”116 Despite its alleged impotence,
FEPC was certainly an ingredient in the recipe that made the number of gainfully
employed African Americans reach a reported all‐time high of six million workers,
veritably wiping out unemployment among African Americans in urban centers.117
The Pittsburgh Courier best summarized the problem of FEPC’s precarious place in
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the federal bureaucracy, “When the war ends…the Fair Employment Practices
Committee…will also end, because war contracts will end and the national
emergency requiring tremendous war production will also terminate.”118 The
Courier’s gloomy forecast was correct, and the Russell Amendment made sure that
even an activist Oval Office could not revive the dying agency. By mandating that
the president could not allocate money to executive agencies whose budgets have
not been previously approved by Congress during that fiscal year, the Russell
Amendment was a virtual death knell to the FEPC, and the agency continued
operations for only a year under the Truman Administration, which effectively
renamed it the President’s Committee on Government Contract Compliance.119
The push for a national FEPC ultimately failed, but the immediate post‐war
years saw two dozen states take the initiative to ensure that all citizens within their
jurisdiction were guaranteed equal access to employment opportunity. In lieu of
federal backing for equal opportunity, individual states created their own fair
employment commissions. Although they operated on a smaller scale, state
commissions were generally more effective because they had more legal authority
and they were usually better funded than the old federal agency, which was
symbolically important but actually had little ability to create change.120 Politically,
Democrats were the most vocal and visible supporters of permanent national and
state fair employment commissions, with New Yorker Vito Marcantonio and New
Mexico Senator Dennis Chaves leading the way.121 These states tended to have
strong labor lobbyists as well as multiracial and multiethnic populations comprised
of African Americans, Asians, and European ethnics.122
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In part because MOWM was unable to generate a strong showing in support
of a permanent FEPC, Randolph joined with Allan Knight Chalmers to direct the
National Council for a Fair Employment Practices Commission.123 Formed in 1943,
this single‐issue special interest group sought to form an alliance between America’s
racial and ethnic minorities with the predominantly white labor movement.
Without a grassroots base inspired by Randolph’s leadership, his leadership in this
short‐lived organization existed primarily on letterhead. Rather than street theatre
and public protest, Randolph’s new organization depended almost exclusively on
lobbying.124 Though the tactics and its avowedly inter‐racial composition were
certainly different than MOWM, these two organizations shared many of the same
goals.125 Another similarity is that both MOWM and the National Council for a Fair
Employment Practices Commission relied heavily on the work of its executive
secretary, in this case Anna Arnold Hedgeman, to coordinate its national affairs.
Hedgeman served in this capacity from 1944‐1946 before personality conflicts and
“a big fight” with Randolph caused her to abandon the organization.126 Gender
problems were likely a factor in Hedgeman’s departure because, like MOWM,
women did much of the organizing but men were almost exclusively the
organization’s mouthpieces.127
AFL economist Boris Shiskin and other influential members of the National
Council for a Permanent FEPC hurled charges of mismanagement at both Randolph
and Chalmers, but the fact that Hedgeman virtually ran the organization by herself
and that the Council had difficulty fulfilling its financial obligations to her should not
be overlooked. Never one to burn bridges, Hedgeman simply resigned and let other

250

members of the organization accuse Randolph and Chalmers of poorly leading the
fledgling but much‐needed lobbying group.128 Reasons behind Hedgeman’s
departure include dissatisfaction with her position, personal frustration with
Randolph’s notoriously poor management skills, and the organization’s incurable
financial distress. The latter of these factors figures strongly in a handwritten letter
from Arnold Aronson, her successor at the position, to A. Philip Randolph. This
undated personal letter from sometime in the 1960s includes reminisces on his time
working with Charles Wesley Burton for Chicago MOWM in 1941. Aronson reflects
proudly on “that great day 22 years later, when we marched side by side holding
hands down Constitution Avenue.” Arnson’s memory some two decades later
indicate that the National Council for a Permanent FEPC was hamstrung by trying to
“surmount the financial problems inherited from Ann Hedgeman.”129 In sum,
Randolph’s efforts in this new organization appear doomed from the start. His
influence in the mixed and predominantly White organizations that comprised a
bulk of the NCFPFEPC was limited, and his proposal to march on Washington in
1946 for a permanent national FEPC was opposed by nearly all of the leaders whose
organizations backed the NCFPFEPC.130 In part, this was due to FEPC’s historical
record as an agency that disproportionately addressed African American exclusion,
a tendency that made it difficult to develop inter‐racial alliances.131

Fighting the Jim Crow Army
MOWM lost much of its steam but Randolph remained entrenched in civil
rights battles and in the fight against racial apartheid. He found success in the
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campaign to abolish segregation in the armed forces, an issue that MOWM identified
as urgent but ultimately could not rectify during the war. Randolph was at home in
this campaign because it featured one of his specialties, Presidential pressure
politics. The military was an ideal camp for pressing top‐down desegregation
because it was under the President’s direct authority and not subject to
Congressional pressure. Randolph’s experience lobbying Roosevelt for change
proved, to him, that the Executive Branch could be swayed more easily than
America’s traditionally conservative legislative body. Since MOWM’s conception in
1941, Randolph wanted to employ civil disobedience and a march on the Capitol to
“shock” the government into ensuring the safety of Black soldiers stationed at
southern military bases surrounded by hostile locals and to desegregate the
military.132 The march was called off without any measures addressing segregation
in the military, but Randolph persisted in pressing the issue.133 By mid‐war, the
issue reinvigorated with a letter writing campaign urging Roosevelt, as Commander
in Chief, to force the desegregation of what former Civilian‐Aid to the Secretary of
War William Hastie identified as the largest employer of African Americans in the
country.134
MOWM’s interest in getting the military to alter a long‐standing policy of
segregation re‐kindled when African American draftee Winfred Lynn refused to
serve in a segregated army. MOWM joined the ACLU in arguing that the draft’s
racial quota system and the existence of segregation in uniform was
unconstitutional. MOWM raised funds to support Lynn’s legal defense and printed a
pamphlet authored by Dwight MacDonald entitled “War’s Greatest Scandal: Jim
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Crow in Uniform,” that sold “by thousands” to grassroots distributers for three
cents, who in turn peddled the literature for a nickel.135 Just as MOWM’s local
chapters operated somewhat autonomously from the national office, Randolph
threw the organization behind campaigns like the Lynn case even though there is
little evidence of MOWM’s local chapters latching on for the battle.136 In hindsight, it
appears that the Second World War was an unlikely time for a successful military
integration effort. Activists like Randolph saw opportunity during the crisis, but the
military was reluctant to alter a longstanding pattern of racial segregation at a time
when the armed forces were actively engaged in combat. It is also to important to
recognize the depth of resistance to change permeating the military’s upper
echelons. This is best seen in 1940 comments from the War Department arguing
that racial segregation “has been proven satisfactory over a long period of years and
to make changes would produce situations over a long period of years and to make
changes would produce situations destructive to morale and detrimental to the
preparations for national defense.”137
Randolph’s discussions of applying non‐violent civil disobedience to confront
segregation and racial inequality within America’s fighting force petered out as
MOWM faded from the limelight, but he remained interested in the issue through
the Truman Administration. Randolph’s inner circle for this successful campaign
included many activists with whom he was acquainted with through his work with
MOWM and the battle for a permanent FEPC: Maida Springer, Pauli Murray, Hazel
Alves, and Bayard Rustin. Randolph also brought the same spirit of confrontational
militant rhetoric that was typical with MOWM. At his most brash, Randolph told
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members of a Congressional hearing that he would go so far as to commit treason
and oppose a “Jim Crow army till I rot in jail.”138 True to form, Randolph never
followed through with this defiant promise, but the possibility of protest was
undoubtedly a factor in President Truman’s integration of the military with E.O.
9981.139
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CHAPTER 8
EPILOGUE
“Most of this nation’s conflicts of arms have been – at least for Afro‐Americans –
wars‐within‐wars.”
Ralph Ellison, Invisible Man1
With the war over, the idea of a march on Washington became “outmoded”
and the national organization floundered. In St. Louis, as throughout the country,
“the war affected but did not revolutionize race relations” while African Americans
“remained on the occupational and economic fringes.”2 MOWM’s executive
committee unanimously agreed that the “March on Washington” name was
misleading, and they recommended that it be changed to “Progressive Negro March
Movement,” “All‐American Negro Progressive Movement,” or “National Institute for
Negro Affairs.”3 There was considerably less discussion when St. Louis MOWM
disbanded. Once the organization lost its steam, members flooded the city’s NAACP
branch. The transition was natural people like T.D. McNeal, David Grant, and Henry
Wheeler, all of whom had previously existing ties to the longest running
organization specializing in registering Black protest. Thus, while MOWM dissolved
as an institution, its members remained active in protest politics and the struggle for
Black equality. In fact, David Grant used political capitol accrued by his activity
during the war and parlayed it into being elected president of the city’s NAACP.4 He
was the first Democrat, and first native son of St. Louis, to hold the position.5 This
was possible, in part, because “officers and key people” in St. Louis MOWM “went
into the NAACP, practically took it over.”6 Garfinkle recognized that, on a national
level, MOWM’s decline was attributable to “a complex of political, organizational and
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leadership rivalry,” but in St. Louis the individuals who drove MOWM to the city’s
forefront of protest slipped into other organizations and continued their struggle.7
Randolph’s campaign for a permanent FEPC gathered national headlines,
stirring debate and prompting a filibuster in Congress, but it was not an issue that
ignited grassroots fervor the way that a proposed march on Washington did.8
Randolph’s prophecy that “Unless America enacts FEPC legislation, it is going to
witness a series of devastating and destructive racial tensions and riots…which will
make the race conflicts following World War I seem petty” incorrect, but his sense of
urgency was not enough to convince a divided Democratic Party to adopt fair
employment legislation.9 With the fight for FEPC lost, the agency’s St. Louis office
permanently closed in April 1946, after only a year and a half of operations. Less
than three months later, the FEPC completely disbanded. Eulogized as having “done
more to advance the Negro in employment than any other legislation in the history
of the country,” the FEPC could not survive repeated cuts to its appropriations and
the lack of urgency for defense production that accompanied peacetime industrial
conversion.10 FEPC’s closure was “anti‐climactic” because the agency effectively
shut down weeks before official word was passed to the media.11 With its
dissolution went the most important national gain wrought by MOWM. Now
MOWM’s only remaining accomplishments consisted of intangibles such as the
acquisition of leadership training for dozens of Black activists, temporarily
increased incomes for African American war workers, and local alterations to racist
practices such as the desegregation of lunch counters at a few select department
stores in St. Louis.12

256

Even in the mid‐twentieth century, the fulfillment of the planks in MOWM’s
8‐Point Program were seen by some as utopian “high sounding but empty
platitudes” that amounted to little – a fact that was not lost on the NAACP, which
charged that MOWM negligently tried to appropriate its program.13 Elizabeth Grant
certainly embellished her portrayal of MOWM’s brief tenure in African American
protest politics as “one of the most dramatic efforts of the American Negro to escape
the limitations which, since his advent on this continent, have been imposed upon
him,” it is accurate to conclude that the organization filled a critical gap in the
available cache of protest tactics available to African American activists during the
mid‐twentieth century and to argue that it served as a conduit for introducing and
refining techniques that would ultimately overthrow de jure racial segregation in
the United States within the next two decades.14 MOWM is also representative of a
brand of highly critical but deeply patriotic Black protest that dates to at least the
eighteenth century abolitionist movement.15 Similar to the mid‐twentieth century
NAACP, MOWM used militant rhetoric to espouse moderate reform measures,
affirming that “an organization can be critical of its government’s directive actions
and yet remain patriotic and loyal.”16 Though somewhat intangible, MOWM’s
protests were part of a broad sweep of international events and rhetorical shifts
that saw an increasing number of Americans come to believe that “racism was
morally wrong,” and realize that it was “an impediment to the war effort.”17
In contrast to the national office, gains made by St. Louis MOWM are well
documented in the organization’s press releases and by the city’s African American
media. Though difficult to gauge, it is important to at least consider that less

257

tangible but still important changes were made in the minds of activists and African
Americans living in places like St. Louis during the Second World War. The breadth
of protest activity aiming to integrate African Americans into an economic upswing
speaks to Robert C. Weaver’s conclusion that even in crisis, “the color line gave way
slowly and only after great resistance” could African American workers “gain a
foothold in single‐skilled jobs.”18 In addition to acquiring experience as activists and
leaders, individuals who attended MOWM’s weekly meetings and participated in
direct action undoubtedly experienced a personal transformation when they stood
up to the structures of White supremacy in their city and, as seen in some cases,
created localized economic and political change. In the St. Louis Negro Grade
Teachers Association’s endorsement of MOWM’s protests, the all‐Black union
identified a greater cognizance among White citizens that “the Negro population is
deadly in earnest in their efforts to win for themselves industrial and political
privileges due them as citizens of America,” a realization that was finally reached
because of “the employment of mass power as an effective weapon.”19 In an
obviously more biased opinion, St. Louis MOWM’s fundraising letter claimed
responsibility for 8,000 new jobs for African Americans in war plants and lifting the
general morale of Black people, while causing the nation to develop a “respect for
the determination of the Negro people to fight for their rights.”20
Randolph fell out of favor with the national Black press just as quickly as he
shot to the headlines of those same media outlets in MOWM’s early years. Reasons
why he fell out of favor are uncertain, but even in St. Louis, a bastion of pro‐
Randolph MOWM supporters, news of his appearance at a rally supporting a
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permanent FEPC was often buried deep in the pages of newspapers that gave
MOWM prime coverage space just two years earlier.21 If Randolph’s ability to gauge
the zeitgeist of Black America and lead MOWM was his greatest asset, his inability to
develop sustainable protest that engaged and motivated the masses of African
Americans was a major factor in his organization’s downfall. Likewise, MOWM’s
activity was so specific that it imposed an artificial limitation on the organization’s
appeal. For instance, while St. Louis MOWM could claim credit for securing 8,000‐
14,000 jobs and acting as a clearinghouse for discrimination complaints filed with
the FEPC, the Gateway City’s NAACP publicized an impressive list of
accomplishments and activities every year that crossed political ideologies and
addressed issues such as education, industrial development, and public
segregation.22
MOWM’s rapid rise and disintegration in the national protest scene coincided
with the total collapse of African American radicals’ support for the Communist
party and a period of unprecedented growth in the NAACP’s membership.23 This
organization’s eightfold increase was due, in part, to tireless recruiting efforts by
fieldworkers like Ella Baker and Daisy Lampkin, to the increase of expendable
income that African American war workers had during the temporary economic
boom, and to a general “organizational upsurge in black America that was
unprecedented in scale.”24 Another factor was that “the NAACP had overcome the
sins of its past,” and it redirected its focus on grassroots programs directed by
African Americans.25 MOWM appropriated a brand of militant direct action
characterized by the Depression‐era American Left and amalgamated it with a
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pseudo‐Garveyite style of Black nationalism to energize an undetermined but
significant amount of African Americans. Its efforts led to an unprecedented gesture
of Presidential support for equal opportunity. MOWM’s tactics of using mass
pressure to inspire federal action fits well within a scheme of mid‐twentieth century
African American protest politics, a style of democratic participation that dominated
racial activism for the next two generations.26 MOWM also revealed the limitations
of grassroots pressure politics, for its effectiveness necessitates constant civic
engagement. This is best illustrated in MOWM’s failure to respond when Paul
McNutt postponed FEPC’s railroad hearings, despite Randolph’s strong warnings
otherwise. Randolph’s reply as to why his organization did not react more strongly
indicates that increasing momentum in some of its local chapters did not bolster
MOWM’s national credibility, making it, in Randolph’s words, “utterly impossible to
mobilize a March on Washington upon the issue of the postponement of the railroad
hearings.”27
The fact that considerable struggles over Civil Rights were needed nationally
and in St. Louis speaks to the reality that MOWM did not completely shatter the
structures of racism in St. Louis.28 In summarizing the power of White supremacy,
Walter White recognized near the end of the war that “the world has not yet learned
the danger and folly of its racial greed and intransigence.”29 Many of the things that
they fought for would take decades to completely mature and precious gains had to
be zealously safeguarded lest the revolution go backwards.30 As late as 1966,
McNeal’s bid for re‐election as an incumbent to the Missouri Senate called for some
of the same things that McNeal and MOWM members fought for decades ago: a state
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Fair Employment Practices law enforced by the authority of the Board of Aldermen,
a state law ensuring equality of public accommodations, and increased
appointments of African Americans to various St. Louis municipal posts including
the Board of Elections, Board of Police Commissioners, and Board of Education.31
Understanding that all mass movements have shortcomings and that the
struggle against White supremacy and racial inequality is still ongoing, St. Louis
MOWM stands out as that city’s leading voice in the chorus of African American
protest during the Second World War.32 Their efforts gave credence to Horace
Cayton’s analysis on a St. Louis radio broadcast that “The war has broken down
conventional race relations patterns,” making it “impossible to maintain the old and
established race etiquette.”33 Likewise, the success enjoyed by McNeal, Grant, and
St. Louis MOWM demonstrates historian Barbara Ransby’s point that “An organizer
did not have to have the perfect political strategy but did have to have the respect
and trust of those he or she struggled alongside.”34 In St. Louis, MOWM took
advantage of pre‐existing social networks that were typically deeply entrenched in
many urban African American communities because of the need to insulate
themselves from segregation. Herbert Garfinkle was correct when, in an epilogue to
an expansion on his original study of MOWM, he recognized that “the multiplicity of
leaders and organizations…provides a number of bases on which various strata of
the population can be brought together” that outweighs the strain resulting from a
“hidden competition for funds and programmatic priorities.”35 MOWM achieved
public uniformity masking internal divisions in Black St. Louis because, according to
David Grant, they used a “quarantine” to increase support for their agenda. “If we
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found in our midst a traitor,” he or she would be socially ostracized from the
organizations and institutions in which one enjoyed membership. In other words,
segregation created strong community ties and social pressure that could be
wielded through various networks to encourage others to participate.36
A major issue facing MOWM is that the increase of African American workers
in war industries was inevitably temporarily, as defense production could not
possibly sustain such high output. St. Louis MOWM was cognizant of this flaw, and
adjusted the focus of protests to emphasize lobbying for jobs in municipal utilities.
Layoffs should have surprised no one. As early as January 1944, announcements for
gradual reductions in the workforce of an explosives plant rippled through St.
Louis.37 Layle Lane identified another factor in MOWM’s demise. In her analysis, a
“slump in public support for the March is to be expected” because public enthusiasm
for protracted civil rights struggles was fickle. Nevertheless, Lane was confident
that organizational personnel and policy could mitigate this problem “with careful
planning” around solvent issues that connected local problems to national affairs.38
MOWM’s greatest failure was its inability to accomplish what may have been
impossible: complete support from all of the country’s newly integrated war‐
workers. Even though one account of St. Louis MOWM’s brief history makes an
unsubstantiated claim that the organization had 4,000 members by 1945, it is
unlikely that this number indicates the amount of dues‐paying supporters. This is
because the organization constantly operated under desperate fiscal constraints,
and the dues collected from four thousand members would have greatly enriched
MOWM’s coffers.39 Jordan W. Chambers’ tenure as treasurer of St. Louis MOWM is
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wracked with “impassioned” pleas for the estimated 14,000 Black workers in St.
Louis defense plants earning an estimated $450,000 per week to give his
organization “100 per cent support.”40 As it was nationally, St. Louis MOWM’s
fundraising tactics were “a precarious way of raising money” because dependable
revenue from dues was minimized.41 Although this theoretically made it easier for
the organization to increase its membership numbers, this policy left MOWM
vulnerable to relying on charitable giving for its institutional sustenance. It is
unlikely that MOWM’s widely publicized efforts to integrate area defense plants
were unknown to these newly employed defense workers. This leaves open the
explanation that African Americans who gained lucrative but typically temporary
jobs in defense plants either had little consciousness of their position in context of
current events, or they simply had little desire to keep a protest organization fiscally
solvent. A final explanation could be that these workers saw their upward
employment mobility as the result of forces outside the St. Louis Black community.
To them, new job opportunities were the result of shortages in available White labor
and prodding from FEPC officials, not from Randolph’s advocacy or McNeal’s public
demonstrations.42 Although St. Louis MOWM could dominate headlines in the local
Black media and “continue hammering relentlessly” on the structures of racial
inequality, MOWM’s own leadership admitted that it could not draw significant
revenue from the people whom it helped the most.43 This was, of course, a veritable
deathblow for an organization operating on the premise that “The effectiveness of a
movement such as this depends to a large extent upon the size of the base
membership.” Organizers like Charles Kennedy and Eugene Wood were
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undoubtedly sincere in stating that “we are in this fight to stay, no matter what the
future may bring in hardships, suffering, opposition or expense” they could not keep
a local branch of a national organization relevant when the national office could not
establish machinery to meet its operating expenses.44
In terms of membership, by the end of the war, St. Louis’ NAACP greatly
outpaced the city’s MOWM branch. In part, this was because economic equality was
the centerpiece of MOWM, and St. Louis’ NAACP had a history of agitating for job
opportunities that predated MOWM’s arrival on the scene.45 Another factor behind
the inverse correlation between St. Louis’ NAACP’s rise and MOWM’s demise during
the mid 1940s is that NAACP’s national office invested tremendous resources to
increase membership in the city. In this case, resources translated directly to more
effective organization and heightened membership. Thus, as Pauli Murray
mentioned to Randolph in a brief note, there were more important things to be done
besides condemning Communism, namely, addressing “our weakness” including the
“lack of strong organization.”46
The war’s conclusion symbolized the end of MOWM’s place in the
constellation of Black protest groups shining in the dark sky of mid‐twentieth
century racial apartheid in the United States. MOWM’s brief but fiery history
provides a historical model for patriotic protest from a historically oppressed racial
minority during a period of international crisis. As a study of organizational
behavior, MOWM demonstrates that local branches of national groups involved in
inspiring and steering grassroots struggle can expect an operational disjuncture that
is not necessarily detrimental. To wit, St. Louis MOWM thrived through grassroots
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civic engagement and pressure politics that often impacted the economic
opportunities and civil rights of African Americans in that city. While the national
office was calling policy conferences and formulating plans for protests, St. Louis
MOWM responded to immediate local issues that resonated with the city’s Black
population. Public protest for increased employment opportunity with federal
defense contractors mobilized Black St. Louis to such an extent that their activism
for jobs caused a ripple effect throughout the city, resulting in a select number of
jobs in public utilities, desegregation at a prominent area university and a
professional baseball stadium, and a summer of sit‐ins forcing the improvement of
food service at some department stores. The legacy is one of local people engaged in
direct action and protest politics that aimed at completing the New Deal’s
unfinished business resolving racial inequality.
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Table 1
List of MOWM Chapters and Local Chairpersons
Washington, D.C.
Chicago
St. Louis
New York City
Jacksonville
Tampa
Savannah
Jersey City, NJ
Newark*
Trenton, NJ
Boston
Los Angeles
Buffalo
New Orleans
Cincinnati
Flint, Michigan*
Cleveland
Pittsburgh
Salt Lake City
Richmond, VA
Birmingham
Nashville
Denver
Mobile
Chattanooga
Montgomery
Albany, NY
Atlanta, GA
Akron
Indianapolis
Macon, GA
Kansas City, MO
Memphis, TN
Milwaukee
Baltimore, MD
St. Paul, MN
Philadelphia, PA

Thurman Dodson, Eugene Davidson
Charles W. Burton, Milton P. Webster
Sidney Redmond, T.D. McNeal**
Colden Brown
S. Harper, Miss E.M. White
Matthew Gregory**
Mr. Johnson
Mrs. Lillian L. Williams, C.A. Johnson
Harold A. Lett, Mrs. Georgia Boone
Miss Susie Steele, Jasper Brown
Robert A. Williams**
Philip Peterson, Oscar Soares**
Otis Thomas**
C.J. Pharr & Ollie Webb
James Smith
Harrison Johnson
Sidney R. Williams, C.S. Wells**
Rev. R.H. Johnson
Henry Dumas**
Senora Lawson, Rev. Joseph T. Hill
Hartford Knight
Mrs. Davie Della Phillips
Thelma Freeman & Barry Slater
J.F. Gilcrease
R.H. Craig
Edgar D. Nixon
Mrs. J.B. (Wardell) Robinson
William Y. Bell
Norman Gowens
Mr. Butts
A.L. Thomas
Thomas A. Webster
L.J. Searcy
William V. Kelley
Edward Lewis
N.A. Evans
G. James Fleming
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Data compiled from “Lists of Locals and Chairmen,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal
Papers; also found in “Local Units – March on Washington Movement,” Revised May
24, 1943, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers; “Negro‐March‐on‐Washington‐
Committee Bulletin,” Vol. 1, No. 1, May 22, 1941, Reel 22, The Papers of the NAACP,
Part 13
* Indicates that this city was not listed as a city with an active BSCP division
** Indicates that MOWM chairperson was also an Officer in BSCP as indicated in
“Officers of the Local Divisions of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters: Train
Porters and Colored Firemen,” June, 1943, Reel 11, A. Philip Randolph Papers;
Kersten, Race, Jobs, and the War, p. 71 mentions a “short‐lived” MOWM branch
founded by William V. Kelley of the Milwaukee Urban League and James W. Dorsey
of the city’s NAACP; Akron MOMW is only documented in Norman Gowens to Dear
Friend and Marcher, [n.d.], Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers.
A brief note of women’s activism in Albany MOWM is found in Chicago
Defender, February 12, 1944; correspondence between the branch and Randolph is
found in Box 25, MOWM Correspondence, 1944, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers;
Indianapolis MOWM officers are named in Priscilla Dean Lewis to Bennie Smith,
June 14, 1943, Reel 7, A. Philip Randolph Papers; and a complete list of this chapter’s
members is in “March on Washington Movement: Indianapolis, Indiana 1941‐1946,”
Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers; Macon, GA branch is mentioned in A.L. Thomas
to A. Philip Randolph, February 2, 1944, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers.
Fee Milo Manly resume, December 1946, Reel 15, A. Philip Randolph Papers.
Mentions an organization called Philadelphia Committee for Equal Job Opportunity
that morphed into the Philadelphia MOWM but I found no details of this branch.
Hill, RACON, p. 462‐463 lists MOWM chapters but does not mention
leadership of the branches. Meridian, Mississippi, Miami, Florida, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, and West Medford, Massachusetts, are listed but there is no
corroborating evidence that these branches existed beyond notation from this same
source that J.A. Burns of Meridian and Rev. M.C. Strachen on MOWM’s national
committee.
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Table 2
Approximate Racial Composition of Major St. Louis Defense Contractors
Company

Total
Workforce

Atlas Powder
Company*

5,000

Broderick and
Bacon Wire
Rope Company

700 (50
women)

African
American
Employees
(Women)
280

African
Americans
in Skilled
Production
16

1 (0 women)

0

Percentage of
African
American
Employees
.056

.001

Carter
Carburetor
Corporation**
Curtis Wright
Corporation***

3,000 (1,000
women)

0

0

.000

14,000‐16,000
(33% women)

Yes

.016 ‐
.031

Emerson
Electric
Company
Gaylord
Container
Corporation
McDonald Air
Craft
Corporation
McQuay –
Norris Home
Plant
McQuay‐Norris
plant 1
McQuay‐Norris
plant 2

10,000
(33% women)

225‐500
225‐300
women
>350

yes

> .035

1,000 (400
women)

0

0

.000

2,500 (33%
women)

30‐35

0

.014

2,000 (50%
women)

14‐15

0

.008

3,500 (900
women)
3,000 – 4,000
(1,500 women)

300
(0 women)
400 (0
women)

0

.086

0

.133 –
.100

National Lead
Company
Robertson Air
Craft
Corporation

700

160

Not Disclosed .228

450

4‐5

Not Disclosed .011
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St. Louis Air
Craft
Corporation
Southwestern
Bell Telephone

500

1 (0 women)

0

600

15 (0 women)

Not Disclosed .025

Amertorp
Corporation
U.S.
Cartridge****

3,500 – 4,000
(33% women)
20,000‐
30,000

165
(0 women)
600 (women
not
disclosed)‐
3500
(700 women)

Yes
Yes

.002

.048 –
.041
.030 –
.117

Figures compiled from:
“Untitled Document,” [n.d., 1942 likely because of surrounding documents in
collection], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
“Job Situation For Women Here Serious,” [n.d., 1944 likely because sit‐ins are
mentioned], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor regarding
Fair Employment Practices, June 6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
* Atlas Powder Company, 7 Point Letter, May 29, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers
notes that as of October 1942 the company had 36 African Americans working on
production, a number that fluctuated to zero at one point but rebounded to 16 when
re‐hiring was possible.
MOWM’s investigation revealed a dual wage scale, with White porters
earning ninety cents per hour while African Americans doing the same work capped
out at seventy‐five cents per hour. This admittedly partisan investigation also
revealed inequitable working conditions, with African Americans not having access
to showers, lockers to store possessions, lunch breaks, and less sanitary toilet
facilities. St. Louis MOWM never launched a full‐fledged campaign against the
company but it was antagonistic towards Atlas Powder.
“Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers
documents a skit played at a MOWM meeting featured scenes from the daily lives of
African Americans in St. Louis. One of these scenes features a son, age 21, with
college experience in chemistry that cannot gain employment with Atlas Powder.
** St. Louis Argus, August 28, 1942.
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*** Photographs of African American women working in this plant were published
in St. Louis Post Dispatch, February 5, 1945.
**** High end figures from David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives
Committee on Labor, June 6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; lower figure is from
Pittsburgh Courier, June 27, 1942; yet another statistic is from St. Louis Argus, June
20, 1942, which reports yet another of 23,500 workers, 8,000 of whom were
women. African Americans on the payroll were limited to 300, none of whom were
women and all of which were unskilled workers. A final figure from this plant is
reported in St. Louis American, June 25, 1942 reports 600 African Americans
employed in the 20,000 person plant.
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liberals in Harlem,” making the book full of “inaccuracies and misrepresentations.”
The Black Worker, February 1946.
166

David Grant interview by Barbara Woods, June 2, 1979, Folder 9, SL 552.

“David Marshall Grant: 1961 Memoir Draft,” Folder 1, SL 552, David Grant Papers
indicates that Grant’s first public protest in St. Louis occurred in 1930, when he
picketed the newly built Woolworth’s to obtain jobs for African American clerks.

167

“Commencement Address, Stowe Teachers College,” June 12, 1944, David Grant
Papers. David Grant to A. Philip Randolph, November 18, 1955, Reel 1, A. Philip
Randolph Papers hints at Grant’s sensitivity to suffering. In private correspondence,
Grant remarked that “ever since leaving Memphis I have been haunted by the close‐
up knowledge I gained of the plight of the Mississippi farmer,” and he worked to
establish a trust fund for alleviating their economic depravity.

168

169 St.

Louis American, June 1, 1944 documents Grant’s twenty‐five dollar
contribution to MOWM. Contributions of this sort were not uncommon, as T.D.
McNeal, E.J. Bradley, and Leyton Weston often made large donations from St. Louis,
while C.L. Dellums did the same from Oakland. All of these individuals were BSCP
members who made personal contributions that reinforced money given to MOWM
directly from the union.
For a summary of Grant’s role in this successful case, which resulted in
substantial raises for several African American teachers see “Addendum to Vita,”
Folder 1, SL 552, David Grant Papers. Grant was not working on any high profile
cases during St. Louis MOWM’s heyday but he was an accomplished lawyer who was
on the Supreme Court Bar by 1948 and a Senior Counselor of the Missouri Bar, the
state’s highest honor for the legal profession, see “Missouri Bar Certificate,” Folder
1, SL 552, David Grant Papers.

170

171

St. Louis Argus, August 20, 1943.

David Grant interview by Barbara Woods, June 2, 1979, Folder 9, SL 552, p. 61,
David Grant Papers.

172

St. Louis Argus, September 12, 1941; a similar analysis is found in Grant, The St.
Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 32. Grant correctly argued “The
great bulk of Negroes are laborers…and their difficulty in becoming affiliated with
the labor unions effectively excludes them from opportunities to work.”

173

David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

174

339

David Grant, “Why Not a Negro Fifth Column?” St. Louis Argus, May 31, 1940; St.
Louis Argus, September 20, 1940; St. Louis Argus, September 27, 1940 reports Grant
delivering a similar message of supporting Black‐owned businesses to civic groups
in the area.

175

In one particularly belligerent two‐page hand‐written letter, the word “nigger”
was used fifteen times by an anonymous author who condemned African American
workers for failing to perform their duties when the inspector was away. This
charge directly attacked Grant’s work to economically integrate African American
workers into the mainstream of industrial St. Louis. According to this writer, “The
only good nigger is the one that has a trace chain around his neck and hanging from
the limb of as tree.”
Threats to the lives of African Americans often corresponded with attacks on
their work ethic, morality, and biology. Presumably writing with estimated figures,
the author of another anonymous letter attacked African Americans for having
syphilis, being “100% liars, 100% thieves…98% adulterers including bucks and
wenches.” Grant also received encouragement from sympathizers and followers
including a social studies teacher who congratulated Grant on a recent oration and
requested a copy for pedagogical purposes. “Con,” [n.d.] and “Pro,” May 4, 1943,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

176

This is evidenced by the fact that Grant was a sought after orator during the
1940s, appearing at events ranging from political rallies to meetings of the Barbers
and Beauticians Association. See St. Louis Argus, March 12, 1943; “David Marshall
Grant: 1961 Memoir Draft,” Folder 1, SL 552, David Grant Papers.

177

“David Marshall Grant: 1961 Memoir Draft,” Folder 1, SL 552, David Grant
Papers.

178

St. Louis American, September 18, 1975; Kirkendall, A History of Missouri, p. 73.
The professionals working in People’s Finance building were the kind of people
Grant wanted to have at St. Louis MOWM events, and he worked to ensure that there
were “as many prominent Negroes as possible in line.” David Grant to Layle Lane,
July 13, 1943, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers; Wesley, Price, and Morris, Lift
Every Voice and Sing, p. 7; Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 23, 47. Ironically,
People’s Finance was built by White contractors who refused to hire African
American tradesmen, see Jolly, It Happened Here Too, p. 39‐40. The financial
institution for which this business was named collapsed during the 1930s; see
Greene, Published in the Interest of Colored People, p. 117‐119.
Eminent historian Darlene Clark Hine argues the type of men and women
who worked in People’s Finance were “Uniquely positioned by virtue of their
education, respectability, and expertise and the authority that they enjoyed in the
black community, only the professionals could open the crack in the edifice of white
supremacy that the black community later poured through during the 1950s and
1960s.” Hine, “Black Professionals and Race Consciousness,” p. 128. Stephanie

179

340

Shaw argues that professionals such as Vaughn and Grant were also bound by an
understanding that they were held in high esteem among the city’s Black population
but that individuals from outside this community had little or no regard for them,
see Shaw, What a Woman Ought To Be and To Do, p. 213.
For more on Gaines refer to Daniel T. Kelleher, “The Case of Lloyd Lionel
Gaines: The Demise of Separate But Equal Doctrine,” Journal of Negro History, Vol.
62 (1977), p. 262‐271; Robert McLaren Sawyer, The Gaines Case: Its Background and
Influence on the University of Missouri and Lincoln University, 19361950, Ph.D.
Dissertation (University of Missouri, Columbia, 1966); Greene, Kremer, and Holland,
Missouri’s Black Heritage, p. 155‐156.
Vaughn was an archetypical “race man,” who championed improving the
conditions of segregated schools during the 1920s, a campaign that ultimately led to
St. Louis constructing Vashon High School in 1927. After the war, Vaughn argued
the on the landmark Supreme Court case Shelley v. Kraemer, which legally smashed
the walls retaining African Americans in urban ghettos. He was also brother of
Arthur N. Vaughn, president of National Medical Association, an organization that
led the push to desegregate medical departments in the U.S. armed forces.
Kimbrough and Dagen, Victory Without Violence, p. 15; Peter Irons, Courage of Their
Convictions: Sixteen Americans Who Fought Their Way to the Supreme Court, (New
York: Penguin, 1990), p. 65‐79; Kirkendalll, A History of Missouri, p. 106; Hine, “Black
Professionals and Race Consciousness, p. 1283.
“March on Washington opens 1944 Financial Drive,” May 12, 1944, press release,
T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis Argus, June 25, 1944; St. Louis American, May 18, 1944
reprinted this release verbatim.

180

181

St. Louis Argus, May 29, 1942; St. Louis American, June 4, 1942.

Fraser M. Ottanelli, The Communist Party of the United States: From the
Depression to World War II (New Brunswick, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991),
p. 44‐45 argues that a similar arrangement contributed to the Communist Party’s
low enrollment even though single issue campaigns that it sponsored were wildly
popular.

182

Meier and Rudwick, CORE, p. 9; Kimbrough and Dagen, Victory Without Violence,
p. 105‐108; Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 70; Bert Spector, “Early Interracial
Protests: St. Louis Congress of Racial Equality, 1948‐1955,” Community College
Social Science Quarterly 2 (1974), p. 14‐17.

183

“How to Organize a Unit March on Washington Movement,” [n.d., likely 1942
because Pauline Myers is listed as national secretary], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
This pamphlet lists MOWM’s objectives as “(1) To crystallize the mass
consciousness of grievances and injustices against Negroes and project it into a
Cause for which Negroes themselves will gladly and willingly suffer and sacrifice,”
(2) “To re‐educate white America on the question of equality for Negroes,” (3) “To

184

341

enlist the support of liberal and Christian white America in an all‐out struggle for
unadulterated democracy at home as well as abroad,” (4) “To operate by means of
mass maneuvers and demonstrations.”
“How to Organize a Unit March on Washington Movement,” [n.d., likely 1942
because Pauline Myers is listed as national secretary], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
Note that NAACP is not explicitly mentioned but can be included under the heading
“community organizations that are in sympathy with the objectives of the
movement.”

185

186

“Hints for Setting up Uniform Local Units,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.

“Hints for Setting up Uniform Local Units,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers. The
potential for MOWM to solicit NAACP branches understandably irked NAACP
officials. By summer 1943 MOWM’s dues rose to one dollar per person, which was
only half of what NAACP asked. Many branches had difficulty gathering dues,
especially after the fee was raised tenfold; “Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,”
[n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers; T.D. McNeal to Wade L. Childress, November 16,
1943, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers; “National Program of Action: March on
Washington Movement – August 1943 to July 31, 1944,” Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers;
A. Philip Randolph and Charles Wesley Burton to Dear Friend, November 10, 1944,
Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

187

“Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers; Bennie
Smith to A. Philip Randolph, October 10, 1942, Reel 7, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

188

189

St. Louis American, June 4, 1942.

190

Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement, p. 26.

191

St. Louis American, June 11, 1942.

“Constitution and By Laws: St. Louis Unit, March on Washington Movement,”
Adopted October 28, 1942m Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; “Certificate of Social
Action,” membership card [n.d.], Box 5, BSCP Collection, NYPL.

192

St. Louis MOWM’s income was supplemented by voluntary contributions from
the generosity of members, many of who made donations that were tenfold or more
than membership dues.

193

“Constitution and By Laws: St. Louis Unit, March on Washington Movement,”
Adopted October 28, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; James Cone, For My People:
Black Theology and the Black Church (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984).

194

342

St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 16, 1942, McNeal announced that there were no
immediate plans to march the capitol but “we keep the name because it is known
and respected in Washington.”

195

196

St. Louis Argus, June 11, 1942.

“Statement made by Mr. McNeal, Emancipation Proclamation, 9‐22‐43: Special to
St. Louis American,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

197

A “large American flag” was always carried at the head of a demonstration
followed immediately by the local director. In back of him were demonstrators
carrying “appropriate signs and placards.” These symbols communicated a message
of critical patriotism that was common throughout the organization’s campaigns.
David Grant to Layle Lane, July 13, 1943, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers. Lang,
Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 146 writes that MOMW’s use of the stars and stripes
was “simultaneously an embrace and a rebuke.”

198

St. Louis American, April 8, 1943. Kimbrough and Dagen, Victory Without
Violence, p. 29 and Greene, Published in the Interest of Colored People, p. 138 and
Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 57 list Wheeler’s occupation as a postman.

199

Crisis, July 1918, reprinted in David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995), p. 697; also see David Levering Lewis,
W.E.B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868‐1919 (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1993), p. 555‐557.

200

“Statement made by Mr. McNeal, Emancipation Proclamation, 9‐22‐43: Special to
St. Louis American,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

201

A. Philip Randolph, “Keynote Address to the Policy Conference of the March on
Washington Movement,” reprinted in Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on
Washington Movement, p. 126; also reprinted in John H. Bracey, Jr., August Meier,
and Elliot Rudwick (editors), Black Nationalism in America (Indianapolis: The
Bobbs‐Merrill Company, 1970), p. 391‐396.

202

203

St. Louis American, May 11, 1944.

“Statement made by Mr. McNeal, Emancipation Proclamation, 9‐22‐43: Special to
St. Louis American,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

204

“Full Text of Timely Speech Delivered By Hon. W.H. Hastie at Emancipation
Celebration,” September 22, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American,
September 23, 1943.

205

343

“March on Washington Opens 1944 Financial Drive,” press release May 12, 1944,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, May 18, 1944. Nationally, wages
earned by African American nearly quadrupled during the war from $457 annually
to $1976. In comparison, data for White workers over the same period indicates
that their annual wages rose from $1,064 to $2600. For this and more economic
data refer to Newman, The Civil Rights Movement, p. 35.

206

St. Louis Argus, May 19, 1944; a useful comparison to MOWM’s fundraising is a
1940 NAACP fundraiser for a community center that brought in over $1,800,
St. Louis Argus, April 12, 1940.

207

T.D. McNeal to Beulah Harris, December 29, 1942, T.D. McNeal Papers; E.J.
Bradley to A. Philip Randolph, January 4, 1943, Reel 5, A. Philip Randolph Papers
indicate that Randolph asked Bradley, Grant, McNeal, and Weston to donate at least
five dollars every month to keep MOWM solvent. These smaller donations from
African American laborers could not sustain the organization’s expenses but they
indicate that blue‐collar Black workers supported the organization.

208

St. Louis American, May 11, 1944; Charles Kennedy and Eugene Wood, Letter
Sent to all March Members, April 1, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers argues that
“every informed colored person who is racially conscious and wants the respect of
his fellow Americans” should donate to MOWM. I take the conception of African
American media outlets being reflective of, and responsive to, the Black
communities that supported them from Steven F. Lawson, Running for Freedom:
Civil Rights and Black Politics in America since 1941 2nd edition (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1997), p. 7.

209

T.D. McNeal to Fellow Negro Citizens, March 25, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers
summarizes the situation in mid‐war St. Louis and MOWM’s campaigns: “Twenty
thousand Negroes still anxiously await calls for placement, while white workers are
culled over and over again. The war effort is being impeded by refusal to utilize the
willing hands of black workers. Public utilities in St. Louis refuse to hire Negroes for
skilled and semi‐skilled jobs, notwithstanding existing shortages of needed labor,
and at the same time wax fat on the patronage of the Negro public. Jim Crow rides
rampant in the saddle at Jefferson Barracks where our boys are preparing to fight
for democracy. These are but a few of the many deplorable conditions existing
which must be eliminated.”

210

T.D. McNeal to Fellow Negro Citizens, March 25, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers; Pamphlet distributed by solicitors, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

211

Bracy and Goins were active in the St. Louis County NAACP and they brought
their experience in membership drives to MOWM. The “team” concept was
extremely effective in NAACP’s record‐setting wartime membership drives, see
St. Louis Argus, May 30, 1941; St. Louis Argus, February 11, 1944.

212

344

St. Louis Argus, June 25, 1943; “March on Washington Opens 1944 Financial
Drive,” press release May 12, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

213

A. Philip Randolph to T.D. McNeal, April 25, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St.
Louis American, July 6, 1944; St. Louis Argus, January 14, 1944. As a figure that
accrued political capitol through the labor movement, Randolph was probably
aware of the CIO’s push to form union members into an unattached voting block,
The Militant, June 26, 1943. It is debatable whether creating a non‐partisan voting
block of African Americans was practicable but contemporary evidence and
historical monographs suggest that Randolph’s proposal was out of touch with an
African American electorate that was overwhelmingly Democratic midway through
Roosevelt’s second term. As early as 1940, the Black media reported on a Gallup
Poll indicating Roosevelt’s popularity and predicting that this would be translated
into loyalty to the Democratic Party. St. Louis Argus, February 9, 1940; African
American intellectuals made cases for Roosevelt and Dewey, refer to essays by
Channing Tobias and C.B. Powell in St. Louis Argus, September 1, 1944.
The Republican Party’s case against Roosevelt and four more years of a
Democratic White House was summarized in an advertisement featuring African
Americans fighting and dying overseas while racial violence and segregation
persisted in the United States. The Democratic party countered with amore positive
campaign, using photo collages of African American men and women at work in
defense industries with a bold caption reading “Would you vote against this? A vote
for Roosevelt is a vote for jobs.” St. Louis Argus, October 13, 1944. Political historian
Kari Frederickson notes that MOWM’s push for a non‐partisan voting bloc reflects
the organization’s bias towards activism in the north because non‐partisan politics
were inconceivable in the mono‐party South. Kari Frederickson, The Dixiecrat
Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 19321968 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2001).
For studies of shifting partisan support among African Americans locally and
nationally see Gerald H. Gamm, The Making of New Deal Democrats: Voting Behavior
and Realignment in Boston, 19201940 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1989),
p. 91‐104; John M. Allswang, “The Chicago Negro Voter and the Democratic
Consensus: A Case Study, 1918‐1936,” Journal of Illinois State Historical Society, LX
(Summer 1967), p. 145‐175 reprinted in Sternsher, The Negro in Depression and
War, p. 234‐256; Ernest M. Collins, “Cincinnati Negroes and Presidential Politics,”
Journal of Negro History, XLI (April 1956), p. 131‐137 reprinted in Sternsher, The
Negro in Depression and War, p. 258‐263; Weiss, Farewell to the Party of Lincoln,
209‐235; Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 25.

214

T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, December 29, 1944, Reel 21, A. Philip
Randolph Papers indicates that a $700 check sent to the national office care of
Randolph. The figure of 1,400 members is reached by presuming that dues, which
were $2 by now, were split evenly by the national office and local chapter. This
figure represents a maximum amount of members because it does not factor in

215

345

larger individual donations, consolidated giving from social groups such as the Elks,
or corporate sponsorships from Black‐owned businesses in the area.
St. Louis Argus, May 26, 1944 reports that even though the war was waning,
pickets were expected to “develop into the all‐out stage…now that the weather is
pleasant and it is possible to engage in actual marches on these plants.”

216

“March on Washington Opens 1944 Financial Drive,” press release May 12, 1944,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, June 1, 1944; St. Louis Argus, May 26,
1944; “MOWM Drive Off to a Good Start,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

217

“March on Washington Opens 1944 Financial Drive,” press release May 12, 1944,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, May 18, 1944; St. Louis American,
June 1, 1944; St. Louis Argus, May 19, 1944; St. Louis Argus, May 26, 1944; “MOWM
Drive Off to a Good Start,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers. In comparison,
MOWM’s national office had a $16,000 budget for operating expenses in fiscal year
1943‐1944, certainly a factor in annual dues multiplying tenfold from a dime to a
dollar. “National Program of Action: March on Washington Movement – August 1943
to July 31, 1944,” Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.

218

Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement, p. 137‐142; Joanne Grant,
Ella Baker: Freedom Bound (New York: Wiley, 1998); Enda Chappell McKenzie,
“Daisy Limpkin,” in Darlene Clark Hine, Elsa Markley Brown, and Rosalyn Tarboro‐
Penn (editors), Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia, Volume 1
(Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1993), p. 690‐693.

219

St. Louis American, June 1, 1944; St. Louis Argus, May 26, 1944; “MOWM Drive Off
to a Good Start,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers indicate that more than $400
came in combined contributions from the local BSCP and Dining Car Employees
Local 354; “Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters Contributes $1000 to Help
Memphis Church Where Randolph Spoke and Boss Crump Condemned,” press
release, June 1, 1944, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers demonstrates that MOWM was not
the only African American institution financially assisted by the BSCP.

220

E.J. Bradley to A. Philip Randolph, January 4, 1943, Reel 5, A. Philip Randolph
Papers; E.J. Bradley to A. Philip Randolph, April 17, 1943, Reel 5, A. Philip Randolph
Papers. This was around the same time BSCP stalwart C.L. Dellums made a ten‐
dollar contribution to MOWM and advised Randolph to solicit the entire BSCP
Oakland division for funds to support the upcoming Chicago conference. C.L.
Dellums to A. Philip Randolph, February 2, 1943; C.L. Dellums to A. Philip Randolph
May 31, 1943; A. Philip Randolph to C.L. Dellums, July 11, 1943, E.J. Bradley to A.
Philip Randolph, January 4, 1943, Reel 5, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

221

St. Louis Argus, June 15, 1944, David Grant and Milton Webster shared the stage
with Randolph that evening. Randolph discussed “a broad picture of the present

222

346

status of Negroes in America with specific emphasis on matters concerning
employment, our status in the armed forces, and the present fight for freedom
throughout the nation.” Webster talked about “the current fight for equal job
opportunities in war industries and governmental agencies” and David Grant
reported on his recent trip to the Capitol, where he testified on behalf of the
Dawson‐Scanlin‐LaFollettee bill for a Permanent FEPC. Randolph missed the
fundraiser’s opening rally because he was working in the American west for May
and most of June. A.P. Randolph to T.D. McNeal, April 20, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers.
St. Louis American, June 1, 1944; St. Louis Argus, May 26, 1944; “MOWM Drive Off
to a Good Start,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

223

Chapter 5
1

Hill, RACON, p. 467.

2

Hill, RACON, p. 491 reports that St. Louis MOWM had a $940.00 budget.

Harold Ross and T.D. McNeal, “Letter Sent to Negro Organizations,” July 8, 1942,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; Kirkendalll, A History of Missouri, p. 249.

3

W.E.B. Du Bois, “Of the Training of Black Men,” Atlantic Monthly 90 (September
1902), p. 296; W.E.B. Du Bois, “The Talented Tenth: A Memorial Address,” Boule
Journal 15 (October 1948) reprinted in Lewis, W.E.B. Du Bois: A Reader, p. 347‐353;
W.EB. Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk (1903), reprinted in Eric J. Sundquist (editor), The
Oxford W.E.B. Du Bois Reader (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 155;
Paula Giddings, When and Where I Enter: The Impact of Black Women on Race and
Sex in America (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), p. 95‐102.

4

St. Louis American, August 13, 1942. Report of mass meeting for an anti‐lynching
bill in Sikeston’s aftermath found in St. Louis Argus, January 30, 1942. Sidney
Redmond led the NAACP’s campaign for anti‐lynching legislation. He used the Black
press to summarize an article in the Washington University Law Quarterly about a
“Federal Right Not to Be Lynched,” St. Louis Argus, March 7, 1943.

5

St. Louis MOWM often used Kiel Auditorium, a municipally owned property, at a
cost of $450. In this instance, the BSCP fronted a deposit with the expectation that
the money would be repaid through collections at the rally. T.D. McNeal to A. Philip
Randolph, June 29, 1942; T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, July 14, 1942, Reel 6, A.
Philip Randolph Papers; “Program for March on Washington Movement Mass
Meeting” August 14, 1942, Reel 22, The Papers of the NAACP, Part 13.

6

347

Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 4 calls the mass
layoff as the “crystallizing event” for St. Louis MOWM.

7

8

“Wake Up Negro America!” August 14, 1942 (handbill), Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

St. Louis Argus, July 3, 1942; “Wake Up Negro America!” August 14, 1942
(handbill), Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers. The figure of 25,000 is clearly exaggerated
because Kiel Municipal Auditorium’s capacity was 15,000. Harold Ross and T.D.
McNeal, “Letter Sent to Negro Organizations,” July 8, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers. Overstating the size of a necessary critical mass was one of McNeal’s
tendencies as an organizer, a fault that was regularly cited by White newspapers
when pointing out the obvious disparity between MOWM handbills and actual
attendance. This was done to downplay St. Louis’ MOWM’s appeal and marginalize
the organization’s threat in the minds of a predominantly White readership.

9

“Wake Up Negro America!” August 14, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers lists “1.
Jim‐Crow St. Louis labor unions and war plants, 2. Lynchings at Sikeston and
Texarcana, 3. Mobbing and shooting or boys in Uncle Sam’s uniform, 4. Violation of
Pres. Roosevelt’s Order No. 8802, 5. Jim‐Crow policy of the Navy, Army, and U.S.
Marines, 6. Insult of the Red Cross segregating Negro blood.”

10

Interview with Theodore McNeal by Richard Resh and Franklin Rother, July 22,
1970, Oral History T‐024, Western Historical Manuscript Collection. The ability of
St. Louis MOWM to secure appropriate permits and be protected by federal
authority demonstrates that St. Louis was not a closed society that forbade
discussion of or protest against racial discrimination.

11

Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942; “The McNeal Story,” April 1, 1966, Reel 1,
T.D. McNeal Papers. In Chicago, the vehicle parade for publicity of MOWM events
was even more dramatic because they occurred in the evening and used torches to
draw attention. Chicago Defender, September 20, 1941.

12

Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 6 reports that
“The Executive Committee and members of the Movement felt elated over the
success which the advertisement had brought.”

13

“Program for March on Washington Movement Mass Meeting,” August 14, 1942,
Reel 22, The Papers of the NAACP, Part 13. It is worth noting that St. Louis MOWM
Treasurer Jordan Chambers was a nightclub owner known for a “large bankroll,
expensive cigars, and diamond ring,” Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 25; Greene,
Published in the Interest of Colored People, p. 110.

14

15

Hill, RACON, p. 492.

16

Hine, “Black Professionals and Race Consciousness,” p. 1280.
348

Chicago Defender, August 22, 1942; Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942; St. Louis
Argus, August 21, 1942; low estimate of 9,000 from St. Louis StarTimes, August 15,
1942 and 8,000 from Hill, RACON, p. 238. The auditorium held 15,000, see Harold
Ross and T.D. McNeal, “Letter Sent to Negro Organizations,” July 8, 1942, Reel 1,
T.D. McNeal Papers.

17

For full text of Walter White’s speech see “Speech of Walter White delivered at St.
Louis Municipal Auditorium,” August 14, 1942, Reel 22, The Papers of the NAACP,
Part 13.

18

Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942 reports that other speakers included E.J.
Bradley, Miss Ollie Miller, C. Hayden Wilson of the Negro Musician’s Association, and
actor Kenneth Spencer. St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942 reports White charged
Southern Congressmen with sabotaging national interest to White supremacy and
said “We are here to let the world know that we Negroes are tired of being
dominated and exploited and we want something done about it.” This account
indicates McNeal’s message was that “We pledge ourselves to fight against the Axis
powers and at the same time dedicate our efforts to burying Jim‐crowism.”

19

“Wake Up Negro America” August 14, 1942 handbill, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers;
St. Louis Argus, July 3, 1942; St. Louis StarTimes, August 15, 1942 reports that
William Smith, Jr., played the lead role well “with well‐delivered lines telling how
reluctant he was to ‘join an army that send you down south in Jim Crow coaches.’”
Plays and skits were an important outlet for MOWM to broadcast its tactics,
ideology, and accomplishments. Also see “Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,”
[n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers. Randolph called Campbell’s playlet “the highlight
of our Madison Square Garden meeting” see A. Philip Randolph to Dick Campbell,
June 23, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

20

A. Philip Randolph to T.D. McNeal, August 18, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
Randolph requested that press accounts of the rally in St. Louis be distributed to the
national office and MOWM units in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Chicago.
Spreading this information implied that the tactics and message seen in St. Louis
should be emulated elsewhere.

21

22

Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 51.

A. Philip Randolph, “March on Washington Movement Presents Program for the
Negro,” in Rayford Logan (editor), What the Negro Wants (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 154‐155.

23

24

Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942.

25

Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942.
349

St. Louis StarTimes, August 15, 1942; Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 134‐
167; Sullivan, Days of Hope, p. 133‐168; Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks, p. 244‐267.

26

“Program for March on Washington Movement Mass Meeting,” August 14, 1942,
Reel 22, The Papers of the NAACP, Part 13.

27

“Verbatim Transcript: Conference on Scope and Powers of Committee on Fair
Employment Practice reported by Office of Emergency Management,” February 19,
1943, p. 10‐13, Reel 14, A. Philip Randolph Papers offers a more secular variant of
critical patriotism is seen in a meeting between Secretary of War Paul McNutt and
heads of a dozen racial and ethnic organizations. At this meeting, Randolph
articulated a similar strand of critical patriotism that affirmed his organization’s
commitment to democratic principles while locating African Americans “in the
position of having to fight their own government, and that is a very frank statement
of the issue, because the government today is the primary factor in this country in
propagating discrimination against Negroes.” A summary of the aim and scope of
the meeting can be found in Paul McNutt to A. Philip Randolph, February 11, 1943,
Reel 14, A. Philip Randolph Papers. Sacred cultural forms appearing in secular
political protest among African Americans in St. Louis dates back at least to a
Depression‐era pecan nut‐sheller strike see Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway,
p. 29‐31.

28

St. Louis Daily GlobeDemocrat, August 15, 1942; Chicago Defender, August 22,
1942. A transcript of Grant’s address entitles his oration “St. Louis Negroes and the
March,” refer to Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement,
p. 136‐142.

29

St. Louis GlobeDemocrat, August 15, 1942; Grant, “St. Louis Negroes and the War
Effort,” in Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement,
p. 136‐142.

30

31

St. Louis StarTimes, August 15, 1942.

Chicago Defender, August 22, 1942; David Grant, “St. Louis Negroes and the War
Effort,” Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 136‐142.
Use of “new Negro” to designate those who thought that the Second World War was
an opportune moment to shatter racial inequality through mass mobilization was
common at the time, for a discussion of the term in a 1940s context see Powell,
Marching Blacks, p. 5‐7.

32

St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942; Grant, “St. Louis Negroes and the War Effort,” in
Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 136‐142; Elliot
Rudwick, Race Riot at East St. Louis, July 2, 1917 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1982 – originally published 1964).

33

350

Randolph’s critical patriotism is best encapsulated in his call to march on the
Capitol, when he denounced “all dictatorships, Fascist, Nazi, Communist. We are
patriotic Americans all.” See “Call to Negro America,” in Grant, The St. Louis Unit of
the March on Washington Movement, p. 45. Wilson, Tearing Down the Color Bar,
p. 28‐29 argues that Randolph’s anti‐Communism and hyper‐patriotism gave him
“more credibility with the political establishment.”

34

Grant, “St. Louis Negroes and the War Effort,” in Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the
March on Washington Movement, p. 136‐142, also see p. 28‐30. Grant gives an
interpretation of African American civic identity that was uncompromisingly
patriotic and maintained a strong racial consciousness. Like David Grant, she sets
up a dialectic of patriotism and loyalty that juxtaposes an affirmation of duty to
country with resentment of racial inequality in civic, political, and economic
spheres.
A similar understanding of this duality is in Pauli Murray, Proud Shoes: The
Story of an American Family (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. 273‐276 in
which Murray uses the United States flag as a symbol of hope and hatred when
reminiscing about planting an American flag on the grave of her Civil War veteran
grandfather’s grave every Memorial Day. Murray contrasts this personal moment
with the historical reality of longstanding racial violence and inequality that is
illustrated by the metaphor of George Washington as both a patriot and a slave
owner.

35

Chicago Defender, August 15, 1942; Chicago Defender, August 22, 1942; African
American women who dedicated their careers or volunteered their time to protest
organizations tended to work as secretary, a position that, according to one African
American newspaper that was very supportive of MOWM, demanded relatively little
time or skill. St. Louis MOWM’s secretary Nita Blackwell read an “interesting and
marvelous report of the accomplishments” in a voice that was “par excellent‐an
unusual accomplishment for a secretary.” St. Louis American, January 28, 1943.

36

St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942. The only public information about women’s
roles in the Kiel Auditorium rally is buried in a column by T.D. McNeal thanking
individuals who supported and planned the event. In the final paragraph, “Special
thanks” were extended to “the fine group of young women” including Ollie Miller,
Fannie Pitts, and Fannie Torian “who made the meeting possible through hard and
intensive work in the financial drive to raise money with which to finance the affair.”

37

38

Chicago Defender, August 22, 1942.

39

St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942.

St. Louis Daily GlobeDemocrat, August 15, 1942; St. Louis StarTimes, August 15,
1942; Walter White could not be blamed for the program running unexpectedly late.

40

351

In Du Boisian tradition, White closely followed his own script and was known for
rigidly adhering to self‐imposed time limits. In fact, White remarked in a postscript
of a letter to McNeal that “I have received your telegram that I am to speak for thirty
minutes, but I will only take 20 minutes to deliver my talk.” Walter White to T.D.
McNeal, August 11, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
St. Louis GlobeDemocrat, August 15, 1942; St Louis StarTimes, August 15, 1942;
Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942. Randolph alerted the crowd that another rally
was scheduled at Griffith Park, home of the Washington Senators’ baseball club.
This location was chosen because MOWM could not secure a permit to demonstrate
at the Lincoln Memorial. In the end, Randolph probably regretted announcing this
event so brazenly because it was later cancelled.
Griffith Stadium was booked last minute, and Randolph was concerned that
“It is going to take a whole lot of high‐powered propaganda and advertising to get
25,000 Negroes” to arrive on short notice for the September 4th event. Randolph
thought that failure to have a successful rally in the Capitol “will do more harm than
good” and he recognized that there was not enough money to pay for the stadium.
Additionally, Randolph thought that the threat of Communist influence during an
active FBI investigation for sedition could give MOWM “unnecessary trouble.” For
documents pertaining to MOWM’s intent to use Griffith Stadium see A. Philip
Randolph to Thurman Dodson, June 19, 1942; A. Philip Randolph to Thurman
Dodson, August 23, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

41

“We join in a PROTEST BLACKOUT for Negro Rights – August 14, 9:00 to 9:15 pm
– Attend Protest Meeting, Municipal Auditorium, Aug. 14, 7pm” handbill, Reel 1, T.D.
McNeal Papers; St. Louis StarTimes, August 15, 1942; Pittsburgh Courier, August 22,
1942; Chicago Defender, August 1, 1942; Chicago Defender, August 15, 1942; Pfeffer,
A. Philip Randolph, p. 50‐52 and Klinker and Smith, The Unsteady March, p. 165 note
blackouts in Chicago and Harlem but overlook this occurrence in St. Louis.
Kirkendalll, A History of Missouri, p. 252 reports that the Citizens Defense Corps
coordinated blackouts in Missouri cities. Kirkendalll does not make a connection
between Missourians seeing themselves under siege and MOWM’s suggestive
appropriation of this activity.

42

Eugenie Settles to A. Philip Randolph, July 23, 1942, Reel 7, A. Philip Randolph
Papers.

43

Randolph to Burton, June 9, 1942, Reel 1, A. Philip Randolph Papers; “Calling all
Negro Chicago to Join All Out Blackout,” flyer, June 26, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip
Randolph Papers.

44

O’Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 8‐19 indicates that FBI officials exaggerated MOWM’s
threat as a subversive threat to secutity.

45

352

Pittsburgh Courier, August 22, 1942, McNeal knew that federal investigators tailed
him during the Second World War, Interview with Theodore McNeal by Richard
Resh and Franklin Rother, July 22, 1970, T‐024, Western Historical Manuscript
Collection.

46

T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, August 22, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph
Papers.

47

St. Louis MOWM distanced itself from “foreign agents” in the PMEW by
emphasizing its patriotism and loyalty to the United States government. In a skit
used at one of MOWM’S Block Captain meetings, one character ties the organization
to the PMEW. The actor‐block captain Miss Adams dismisses these rumors as the
work of “people who don’t want the Negro to fight for his rights” and who fail to
recognize that “we are fighting for the opportunity for the Negro to participate
equally in every phase of American life – and that will make our country stronger
and better.” See “Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal
Papers; for additional MOWM criticism of pro‐Japanese movements among African
Americans see “Report on Committee on Resolutions to National Policy Conference,”
reprinted in Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 115.
For notes on the trial of “Black Hitler” and PMEW leader Robert Jordan see St.
Louis Argus, January 22, 1943. For Black American media reactions in other cities to
pro‐Japanese groups see cartoon in California Eagle, October 1, 1942, which depicts
Tojo as a grotesque caricature with bloody knife in hand and the caption “The savior
of the darker races.”
For scholarly inquiry of pro‐Japanese sentiment among African Americans in
Missouri see Ernest Allen, Jr., “Waiting for Tojo: The Pro‐Japan Vigil of Black
Missourians, 1932‐1943,” Gateway Heritage 16 (Fall 1995), p. 38‐55; also of interest
is Ernest Allen, Jr., “When Japan Was Champion of the Darker Races: Satokata
Takahashi and the Flowering of Black Messianic Nationalism,” Black Scholar 24
(Winter 1994), p. 23‐46; Gill, AfroAmerican Opposition to the United States’ Wars of
the Twentieth Century, p. 63‐65, 535‐541.

48

St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942. The We Group was based in the YWCA and they
performed at Black functions throughout the city including public NAACP rallies and
the BSCP‐sponsored 1940 Mid‐Western Labor Conference. See St. Louis Argus,
March 8, 1940; Mid‐Western Labor Conference, St. Louis, Missouri, March 31‐April
6, 1940, Reel 11, A. Philip Randolph Papers. A sympathetic but cautiously
ambivalent voice in the St. Louis media unaffiliated with the Black press can be
found in St. Louis Labor Tribune, August 19, 1942. The Labor Tribune asserted that,
“On the whole, the negro has received much fairer treatment in St. Louis than in
most metropolitan areas, although manifestly there is room for improvement.” In
an interesting inversion of racial thought that became more pronounced in the late
twentieth century, this AFL affiliated newspaper continued, “we might point out that
similar discrimination is extended to white workers, most of them skilled and
qualified who are residents of St. Louis and who are union members. Certain war

49

353

plants have deliberately adopted a policy of giving job preference to out‐of‐towners”
top keep open‐shop wages lower. The result, in this source’s opinion, was that
“Union members have been discriminated against, even more so than negroes.”
50

St. Louis Argus, August 7, 1942.

51

St. Louis Argus, August 21, 1942.

St. Louis American, September 3, 1942 cited MOWM’s figure of the plant having
3,200 employees but the Pittsburgh Courier, September 5, 1942 placed the number
at 2,600; figure of Carter’s contract from Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 50.

52

53

St. Louis Argus, August 28, 1942.

Chicago Defender, September 5, 1942; Pittsburgh Courier, September 5, 1942; and
St. Louis American, September 3, 1942 all report 500; St. Louis GlobeDemocrat,
August 30, 1942 estimated 400; St. Louis PostDispatch, August 29, 1942 estimated
300; and the city’s most widely circulated White‐controlled media outlet provided
the low estimate of 200 St. Louis StarTimes, September 5, 1942. A scholarly
estimate of attendance contemporary with the demonstration placed the number at
250, see Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 7.

54

55

St. Louis American, September 3, 1942.

Robin D.G. Kelley, Race Rebels: Culture, Politics, and the Black Working Class (New
York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 7, Paul Laurence Dunbar, “We Wear the Mask” in
Lyrics of Lowly Life (1896) reprinted in John Edgar Wideman (editor), My Soul Has
Grown Deep: Classics of Early AfricanAmerican Literature (Philadelphia: Running
Press, 2001), p. 1248.

56

Pittsburgh Courier, September 12, 1942 has a photograph of the March on Carter
with youth writer Walter Dixon leading the procession. Dixon is carrying an
American flag and he is closely followed by Jordan Chambers and T.D. McNeal. The
caption indicates that to their left in the background are “feminine lovers of
democracy.”

57

Chicago Defender, September 5, 1942; Pittsburgh Courier, September 5, 1942; St.
Louis American, September 3, 1942; St. Louis American, September 21, 1944; David
Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6, 1944,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

58

59

St. Louis Argus, August 28, 1942; St. Louis Globe Democrat, August 30, 1942.

St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 28, 1942; St. Louis Argus, August 29, 1942; “St.
Louis Negroes!!” flyer distributed Aug 24‐29, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

60

354

61

Citizen’s Protector, September 3, 1942; St. Louis GlobeDemocrat, August 30, 1942.

62

St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 28, 1942.

For other accounts of MOWM’s “March on Carter” and the company’s ability to
resist MOWM’s pressure see Kersten, Race, Jobs, and the War, p. 118‐119, Grant, The
St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington, p. 136‐142, Patricia L. Adams, “Fighting
for Democracy in St. Louis: Civil Rights during World War II,” Missouri Historical
Review 80 (October 1985), p. 63; Betty Burnett, St. Louis at War: The Story of a City,
19411945 (St. Louis: Patrice Press, 1987), p. 41‐43.

63

St. Louis StarTimes, August 29, 1942; St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 29, 1942.
Police were often present at St. Louis MOWM events because “We notified the police
department before every demonstration in writing, told them we were going to
obey the law.” Interview with Theodore McNeal by Richard Resh and Franklin
Rother, July 22, 1970, T‐024, Western Historical Manuscript Collection.

64

65

Pittsburgh Courier, September 5, 1942.

Supportive residents were probably in favor of messages emblazoned on placards
carried on the procession bearing slogans such as “Racial discrimination is
sabotage,” and “Barring Negroes from war industries makes Axis propaganda,” Fight
the Axis – Don’t fight Us,” “Our Bond Dollars Help Pay Carter’s Payroll; Why Can’t
We Work There?” Photograph of marchers with signs found in St. Louis StarTimes,
August 29, 1942.

66

St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 29, 1942; St. Louis Globe Democrat, August 30,
1942; Citizen’s Protector, September 3, 1942 reports that “Carter Management took
no notice of the orderly petition of loyal citizens who too long have been denied thru
prejudice and bias, their analienable [sic] rights as citizens.”

67

St. Louis StarTimes, August 29, 1942 reports Grant “cautioned each of the
marchers to be silent throughout the parade, to engage in no arguments with
bystanders and to refer questions to parade monitors” that were present at this and
all subsequent public demonstrations. David Grant to Layle Lane, July 13, 1943,
Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

68

69

Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 7.

Chicago Defender, September 5, 1942; St. Louis Post Dispatch, August 28, 1942
explains McNeal’s high estimate of 10,000 attendees, “We tested the sentiment of St
Louis Negros on the subject at a mass meeting…and found we could figure on ample
support for this undertaking.”

70

355

71

St. Louis Globe Democrat, August 30, 1942.

For an example of this phenomenon in another locale see Mitch Kachun, ““A
Beacon to Oppressed Peoples Everywhere”: Major Richard R. Wright Senior,
National Freedom Day, and the Rhetoric of Freedom in the 1940s,” The Journal of
American History, Vol. 91, No. 4 (March 2005), p. 1233‐1263.

72

This is evident in commentary on MOWM’s Madison Square Garden rally in which
one writer noted, “the most significant thing about the Rally is that this historic
gathering was genuinely American. The leaders of the movement have no spiritual,
intellectual, or political ties with any foreign land or ideology.” Interracial Review
Vol. XV, No. 7, (July 1942), Reel 22, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

73

“St. Louis Negroes!”, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; Chicago Defender, September 5,
1942.

74

Mass Prayer Service, Sunday October 18 – 3:00pm broadside, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers; duplicate copy found in MOWM: Miscellaneous Items, 1941‐1945 & undated
folder, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers; St. Louis Argus, September 4, 1942 – early
announcements were for September but for unknown reasons the event was moved
back to October 18.

75

“The March,” Vol. 1, No. 1, October 17, 1942, March on Washington Movement,
1941‐1945, Sc Micro F‐1 FSN Sc 002, 968‐2, Schomburg Clipping File.

76

A. Philip Randolph to Charles Wesley Burton, October 26, 1942, Reel 3, A. Philip
Randolph Papers. Harlem MOWM joined the Chicago chapter that same day with a
public prayer on city hall’s steps. Attendance in Harlem was a low as 50 but Merritt
Hedgeman, husband of Anna, led a praiseworthy YMCA choir, see Program of the
Public Prayer, City Hall Steps, November 9, 1942, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph
Papers; Taylor, A. Philip Randolph, p. 157‐158.

77

78

Pittsburgh Courier, September 12, 1942; St. Louis American, September 10, 1942.

79

St. Louis American, October 15, 1942.

Mass Prayer Service, Sunday October 18 – 3:00pm broadside, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers.

80

St. Louis American, October 15, 1942; St. Louis Argus, October 16, 1942; St. Louis
Argus, September 4, 1942. Taylor, A. Philip Randolph, p. 175 argues that “all the
religious strategies,” used by MOWM including its prayer protests, liberation
theology, and sacred civil disobedience were part of a longstanding tradition of civic
engagement in African American religious culture that “was resurrected in the
modern civil rights movement.”

81

356

82

“All Saints Church Broadcast,” October 18, 1942, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

83

Pittsburgh Courier, October 17, 1942.

84

St. Louis American, October 15, 1942.

St. Louis Argus, October 23, 1942; T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, October 28,
1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph Papers; Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on
Washington Movement, p. 66‐67.

85

Eugenie Settles to A. Philip Randolph, November 10, 1942, Reel 7, A. Philip
Randolph Papers.

86

T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, October 28, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph
Papers; Eugenie Settles to A. Philip Randolph, November 10, 1942, Reel 7, A. Philip
Randolph Papers.

87

88

St. Louis American, September 3, 1942; St. Louis Argus, September 4, 1942.

89

St. Louis Argus, October 16, 1942.

St. Louis Argus, October 16, 1942; St. Louis Argus, October 23, 1942. Newspaper
accounts depict African American religious institutions as responding in complete
unity and solidarity to MOWM’s prayer meeting but a scholarly account from an
eyewitness portrays ministers as “lukewarm…but they felt obliged to lend their
cooperation.” Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement,
p. 66‐67.

90

91

St. Louis Argus, October 16, 1942; Pittsburgh Courier, October 17, 1942.

92

“Mass Prayer Service,” October 18, 1942, Reel 21, A. Philip Randolph Papers.

“Statement of T.D. McNeal, Chairman of St. Louis Unit, March on Washington
Committee, Mass Prayer Meeting Oct. 18th, St. Louis Memorial Plaza,” Reel 1, T.D.
McNeal Papers; T.D. McNeal to A. Philip Randolph, October 28, 1942, Reel 20, A.
Philip Randolph Papers.

93

“Statement of T.D. McNeal, Chairman of St. Louis Unit, March on Washington
Committee, Mass Prayer Meeting Oct. 18th, St. Louis Memorial Plaza,” Reel 1,
T.D. McNeal Papers. “National Program of Action: March on Washington Movement
– August 1943 to July 31, 1944,” Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers indicates that annual
membership dues rose to one dollar in 1943.

94

357

“Statement of T.D. McNeal, Chairman of St. Louis Unit, March on Washington
Committee, Mass Prayer Meeting Oct. 18th, St. Louis Memorial Plaza,” Reel 1,
T.D. McNeal Papers.

95

96

St. Louis Argus, February 19, 1942; Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 47‐49.

97

“The McNeal Story,” April 1, 1966, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

Robert C. Weaver, “Racial Employment Trends in National Defense,” Phylon Vol.
III, No. 1, 3rd Quarter 1942 noted that recently expanded plants were more likely to
employ African American workers. Weaver attributes this to newer plants not
having an entrenched racial order.

98

99

St. Louis Argus, February 19, 1942.

David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; “Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,” [n.d.], Reel
2, T.D. McNeal Papers, places the number at 21,000 total employees. Also see Table
2 in this dissertation. Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 47 reports that U.S.
Cartridge employed 600 African Americans among its workforce of 20,500.

100

101

St. Louis PostDispatch, June 21, 1942.

102

Pamphlet distributed by solicitors, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

David Grant, “Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor,” June
6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

103

St. Louis American, August 24, 1944; “Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,”
[n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.

104

St. Louis American, August 24, 1944; Black workers in wartime St. Louis existed
on the periphery of defense work and rarely entered into direct production of
armaments. This pattern was consistent throughout the nation, where one historian
concluded, “the greater the degree of skill involved, the higher the degree of
exclusion.” A notable exception was Ford Motor Company, where 11,000 African
Americans were utilized for war work, many of whom performed tasks requiring a
high degree of skill specialization. Weaver, Negro Labor, p. 24, 63.

105

106

St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 16, 1942; St. Louis American, June 25, 1942.

St. Louis Argus, February 28, 1941; St. Louis Argus, July 4, 1941; Kersten, Race,
Jobs, and the War, p. 114‐115.

107

358

The situation at U.S. Cartridge was similar to that as African American workers at
Ameritorp, where a MOWM member wrote to encourage the organization to “march
on this place just as soon as you can” to confront of racially exclusive promotions
and the wholesale lack of Black woman employees.” Herman Hester to David Grant,
May 17, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

108

St. Louis American, June 4, 1942; St. Louis Argus, June 12, 1942; Pittsburgh
Courier, June 27, 1942; St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis Globe Democrat,
June 17, 1942, St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 16, 1942; St. Louis Argus, June 19, 1942;
The Militant, July 4, 1942; “Pamphlet distributed by solicitors,” 1943, Reel 1, T.D.
McNeal Papers.

109

David Grant, “Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor,” June
6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

110

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 48‐49. The
broad class spectrum of African Americans who embraced St. Louis MOWM is
evidenced by letters from members to the organization and by the array of
advertisers appearing in the program for MOWM’s 1942 rally at Kiel Auditorium.
For example, one correspondent, an employee at U.S. Cartridge, wrote to advise the
organization about working conditions at U.S. Cartridge even though “I feel very
uncapable [sp] of giving my advice as I am a member of the working class.” The
writer, whose signature is indecipherable, told of extremely limited upward
mobility within the plant. He advised Grant to cultivate greater support for the
movement among African American clerics and educators.
Although it is difficult to accurately quantify, the profound psychological
transformation that some working class African Americans experienced as a result
of their participation in MOWM was as important as the organization’s campaigns.
“Letters from Members of MOWM,” May 25, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers;
“March on Washington Movement Mass Meeting,” program August 14, 1942, Reel
22, The Papers of the NAACP, Part 13.
Reed, Not Alms But Opportunity, p. 28‐29 suggests that the plurality of African
American experiences based on class status may have been over looked by White
observers. Reed argues that typical Urban League members “believed that a
pernicious mix of prejudice and ignorance prevented whites from distinguishing
between respectable and dissolute blacks.”

111

Chicago Defender, June 27, 1942; St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 16, 1942; St. Louis
American, June 25, 1942; Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington
Movement, p. 9.

112

A. Philip Randolph to T.D. McNeal, July 21, 1942, Reel 20, A. Philip Randolph
Papers.

113

359

St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942; David Grant, Testimony to House of
Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers
comments on the “complete cross‐section” of “doctors and lawyers and teachers and
preachers and fathers of boys who then were in the armed forces, and the wives of
those men and their children.”

114

Chicago Defender, June 27, 1942; St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; Pittsburgh
Courier, June 27, 1942. Photographs in the Courier portray demonstrators waving
“VV” signs with middle and index fingers of both hands. Boston Celtics captain Paul
Pierce used a similar gesture during the 2007‐2008 NBA playoffs. Pierce, a father
and Celtic fan favorite for nearly a decade, was criticized in the Boston sports media
for displaying what was thought to be gang signs even though Pierce had no history
involvement with activity of the sort. Boston Globe, April 30, 2008.

115

The picket and parade was “orderly, peaceable and in conformity with the laws
of our City and Country,” as McNeal promised St. Louis’ police chief in a letter
requesting “Police protection as may be adequate for the occasion.” McNeal
promised authorities that its mass meeting at Kiel in August 1942 would have a
“patriotic atmosphere.” T.D. McNeal to John H. Glassco, June 18, 1942, Reel 1, T.D.
McNeal Papers.

116

David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; Chateauvert, Marching Together, p. 101; for an
overview of NAACP’s silent march against lynching see Philip Dray, At the Hands of
Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America (New York: Modern Library,
2002), p. 235‐237.

117

David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

118

Placards Carried in March on June 20th, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis
American, June 25, 1942. Other placards authorized by the St. Louis unit of the
MOWM were: “We are fighting for Democracy, why not practice it”; “Negro Dollars
for Bullets? Yes! Bullet job dollars for Negroes? Take another guess!!”; “We fight for
the right to work as well as die for victory for the United Nations”; “Negro Robert
Brookes Dies First on the Firing Line at Pearl Harbor, Why must we be last on the
production line at St. Louis?”; “Racial discrimination is SABOTAGE”; “We are helping
to stop Hitler in Europe – We demand that his practices be stopped here too”;
“Where is your conscience fellow Americans?”; “20,500 workers at Small Arms – Not
one Negro in Production. Is this democracy?”; “Pres. Roosevelt says ‘No
Discrimination” Small Arms management replies ‘Says You!’”; “Fight the Axis – Don’t
fight US!”; “8000 Women employed – Not one Negro Woman”; “Not one Black
American in production her – Is that Democracy or Hitlerism?”; “We denounce and
condemn humiliating and degrading Jim Crow policy inside small arms plant”; “and

119

360

We’ll rind axes ‘gainst the Axis in Europe or Japan and also grind them at the Small
Arms Plant!”
Biondi, To Stand and Fight, p. 1 adroitly comments, “African Americans turned
the war against fascism into a war against white supremacy at home.”

120

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis PostDispatch, June 21, 1942 was less
enthusiastic, calling the demonstration “anti‐climactic” because it came two hours
after a company announcement that a program to train Black workers would be
started in the “immediate future.”

121

122

Pittsburgh Courier, June 27, 1942.

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942. For motives that may have been genuine or
provocative, the United States Employment Service placed advertisements in both of
the city’s mainstream White newspapers announcing “War Production Jobs for
Colored Workers.” St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 27‐July 3, 1942; St. Louis StarTimes,
June 26‐July 3, 1942.

123

St. Louis Post Dispatch, June 16, 1942, St. Louis Argus, June 12, 1942 reports that
St. Louis MOMW telegrammed the FEPC office in Washington, “The St. Louis Unit of
the march on Washington Committee and thousands of Negro citizens of this
community wish to inform you that we protest today’s dismissal of some two
hundred Negroes employed at the Small Arms Plant. We urge that you look into this
matter immediately, due to the fact that this great defense plant has refused to hire
Negro skilled workers, and now fires most of its Negro porters.”

124

David Grant, “Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor,” June
6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

125

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942; Grant, The St.
Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 98.

126

127

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis Argus, September 5, 1941.

Shaw, What a Woman Ought To Be and To Do, p. 14, 119 argues that “Black
women’s incomes were often critical to the family economy” and the instances of
African American women who did not perform work in support of a family were
exceptional.

128

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942; The Militant, July
4, 1942.

129

361

For statistics on women’s employment see National Urban League, “A Summary
Report of the Industrial Relations Laboratory: Part 1 – Performance of Negro
Workers in Three Hundred War Plants,” June 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

130

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942; St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942; The Militant, July
4, 1942.

131

Takaki, Double Victory, p. 42‐50; Honey, Bitter Fruit, p. 7‐8, 12; Barbara Dianne
Savage, Broadcasting Freedom: Radio, War, and the Politics of Race, 19381948,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), p. 168‐177.

132

“Pamphlet distributed by solicitors,” 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; Grant, The
St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p. 9, 19 interprets the U.S.
Cartridge campaign as evidence of “the social productiveness of conflict.”

133

St. Louis Star Times, June 18, 1942. Even though MOWM was a mass protest
organization that thrived on direct action and pickets, negotiating with plant
management was a seminal component of MOWM protest tactics. McNeal’s
experience in the labor movement influenced MOWM’s program, which was to
broker public pressure into political capital that could be wielded to make
management capitulate to the organization’s demands.

134

David Grant, “Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor,” June
6, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

135

136

St. Louis Globe Democrat, June 17, 1942.

137

St. Louis Argus, June 12, 1942.

138

St. Louis American, June 25, 1942.

139

“Skit read at meeting – Block Captains,” [n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.

140

St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942; St. Louis Argus, July 24, 1942.

St. Louis Argus, June 26, 1942 reports that pickets were in “abeyance for a short
time to determine whether or not the company intends to carry out” the spirit of
E.O. 8802.

141

David Grant, Testimony to House of Representatives Committee on Labor, June 6,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, May 6, 1943 corroborates
Grant’s stance, writing that MOWM “is not fighting the War Industries, the Public
Service Company or Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. It is trying to open the
eyes of our fellow Americans that their bigoted attitude is jeopardizing our
Republic’s liberty.”

142

362

“Pamphlet distributed by solicitors, 1943,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers estimates
that the $30.00 weekly income of U.S. Cartridge’s Black workforce totaled
$2,652,000 “flowing into the pockets of St. Louis Negroes.”

143

St. Louis Argus, April 30, 1943; St. Louis Globe Democrat, May 11, 1943; St. Louis
Post Dispatch, May 10, 1943 placed attendance at 4,000 and gives a more
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uniform is prescribed for workers, comply with the rule. If hair nets hide your
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Change In Policy On Proposed Lily‐White Stuyvesant Town,” press release May 28,
1943, Reel 22, A. Philip Randolph Papers; “A. Philip Randolph Leads Picket Line
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“Pamphlet passed out to public at March on Bell telephone Co,” June 12, 1943, Reel
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Philip Randolph Papers; Chicago Defender, October 7, 1944 mentions Randolph’s
presence at a picket line organized by Harlem MOWM for jobs at Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company.
Also see Grant, The St. Louis Unit of the March on Washington Movement, p.
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(Spring/Summer 1994), p. 66‐88; Andor Skontes, “‘Buy Where You Can Work’:
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“The Position of the March on Washington Committee Concerning Employment of
Negroes by the Southwest Bell Telephone Company,” October 23, 1943, Reel 2, T.D.
McNeal Papers.
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Card Sent to all MOWM, June 9, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers, argues “If we
cannot work we cannot live as free citizens. No man is free who is economically in
slavery.”
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Chicago Defender, May 1, 1943. For more on New York City’s MOWM campaign
against employment discrimination at Metropolitan Life Insurance see “Randolph
Says Negroes Should Picket Metropolitan Insurance Company To Force Change in
Policy on Proposed Lily‐White Stuyvesant Town,” press release May 28, 1943, Reel
2, T.D. McNeal Papers; Folder ‐ MOWM Metropolitan Life Insurance Case, 1944, Reel
21, A. Philip Randolph Papers.
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York, Wiley College professor and African American poet Melvin Tolson got “the
biggest kick…in writing slogans for the March on Washington to use to picket the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.” The Harlem Met Life campaign tapped a
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practices best exemplified by one person’s complaint that “I have been writing that
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them see now.” L.F. Coles to A. Philip Randolph, November 21, 1944, Reel 21, A.
Philip Randolph Papers.
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MOWM, June 9, 1943, T.D. McNeal Papers.
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Pittsburgh Courier, June 5, 1943; “Pamphlet passed out to public at March on Bell
telephone Co,” June 12, 1943, T.D. McNeal Papers. In a press release, St. Louis
MOWM also named Baltimore as a city that began integrating African American
workers into public utilities. This example was incisive because Baltimore was
comparable to St. Louis in terms of its geography, demographics, and “mores and
employment patterns,” see “The Position of the March on Washington Committee
Concerning Employment of Negroes by the Southwest Bell Telephone Company,”
October 23, 1943, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.
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For example, A. Philip Randolph shared this assessment with T.D. McNeal. In a
widely circulated essay outlining MOWM’s philosophy, Randolph sketched the
character of the times as one in which members of the “so‐called master white
race…are re‐examining their own moral, spiritual and intellectual armament.”
Chicago Defender, June 19, 1943.
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“Pamphlet passed out to public at March on Bell Telephone Co,” June 12, 1943,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, June 10, 1943 and St. Louis Argus,
June 11, 1943 report that McNeal’s faith may have been vindicated by “a large
number of both colored and white organizations…fully behind the effort” to
integrate Southwestern Bell’s workforce.
Meier and Rudwick, CORE, p. 4 substantiates St. Louis MOWM’s optimistic
appraisal of mainstream White opinion during the Second World War as, “a time
when growing segments of the white public, stimulated by the ideological concerns
of the New Deal for America’s dispossessed citizens and by the irony of fighting the
racist Nazis while tolerating domestic racism, were gradually becoming more
sensitive to the black man’s plight.”
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St. Louis American, July 29 1943; St. Louis Argus, August 13, 1943 has a picture of
the sticker on an envelope; “Fellowship News,” August 1943 reports that Nita
Blackwell will be at St. Louis FOR’s next meeting and the stamps will be available.
St. Louis American, September 23, 1943 called on MOWM to broaden awareness of
the campaign by dispersing the stickers through existing social clubs. Kersten, Race,
Jobs, and the War, p. 120 adds that stickers were placed on billing envelopes in lieu
of payment. This is unlikely because Kersten and I use the same sources and I found
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demonstration urging African Americans to pay their bills en masse at the phone
company’s collecting office to dramatize the spending power of Black utility
consumers.
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PERMANENT for Jobs and Justice – March on Washington Movement.” This sticker
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nature.” Benjamin McLaurin’s lobbying convinced assistant postmaster general
Ramsey Black to reverse the decision, in part, because McLaurin argued that there
was no plan to compromise national security by actually marching on the capitol.
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“The Strange Enigma of Racism in Contemporary America” (lecture) reprinted in
Paula S. Rothenberg (editor), Race, Class, and Gender in the United States: An
Integrated Study, 7th edition (New York: Worth, 2007), p. 132.
Eleanor Green, “Report on Meeting with Bell Telephone Company,” April 14, 1943,
Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; St. Louis American, May 27, 1943 reports that “a number
of local well qualified young Negro women have made application to the Telephone
Company and that none of these have been given jobs while the company continues
to beg for workers” and place advertisements announcing positions. A similar
account is found in Pittsburgh Courier, June 5, 1943.
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19

20

St. Louis American, June 17, 1943.
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Card Sent to all MOWM, June 9, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers. St. Louis
American, June 17, 1943 and Pittsburgh Courier, June 12, 1943 report over 300
attended but St. Louis Argus, June 18, 1943 estimated the crowd at 150 and has a
good picture of women marching single file holding placards; Chicago Defender, June
19, 1943 reports 175 attending. “Pamphlet passed out to public at March on Bell
Telephone Co,” June 12, 1943, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers lists placard slogans
including: “$4,000 spent daily by St. Louis Negroes for phones! Yet not one decent
job for us”; “Negro operators working in other cities, why not in St. Louis?”; “We
sought a conference. Bell’s refusal forced us into the streets.”; “Why harm us? We
are your fellow Americans! Where is your conscience?”; and “Negroes are helping
stop Hitler abroad. Let’s stop would‐be Hitlers at home.” For commentary that
African Americans should work in public utilities in proportion to their buying
power see “The Position of the March on Washington Committee Concerning
Employment of Negroes by the Southwest Bell Telephone Company,” October 23,
1943, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.
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Dispatch, June 13, 1943; St. Louis Star, June 12, 1943; there is no mention of how
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responded about picket placards proclaiming “Four thousand dollars spent daily by
St. Louis Negroes for phones, not one decent job for us,” and MOWM literature that
job opportunity beyond “those of moping floors and the like.” Implicit in this
protest rhetoric is an implication that custodial work was less than “descent” and
unimportant. According to McNeal, some college graduates applied for positions and
were not interviewed. Unfortunately, no data exists to substantiate or quantify this
claim.
Higginbotham, Righteous Discontent, p. 14, 195, 211 notes that “politics of
respectability…equated public behavior with self‐respect and with the advancement
of African Americans as a group” and that this impulse often coincided with a
“valorization of work.”
Pittsburgh Courier, June 5, 1943. Comments from White observers were favorable
or fairly benign: “Why shouldn’t they work here, they have telephones!” and “What
is it about? I can’t see what the signs say.” See St. Louis American, June 17, 1943.
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reaching for a phone and a caption reading, “Please, Mister, can this call wait? This
is the busy hour.” Even though the text specified that the advertisement was about
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suggests that Bell Telephone was attempting to portray MOWM’s campaign as
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American, June 17, 1943. These sources indicate that McNeal urged demonstrators
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for a flare‐up between protestors and spectators.
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St. Louis American, June 17, 1943. Note that White mainstream media in St. Louis
covered MOWM much more fairly than Alabama newspapers did the 1942
Birmingham FEPC hearings. “President’s Committee on Fair Employment Practice
Press Clippings Digest,” No. 4, July 6, 1942, p. 14‐24, Reel 10, The Papers of the
NAACP, Part 13.
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Louis Argus, September 4, 1943; St. Louis Argus, September 24, 1943; for more on
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Through Mass Payment of Telephone Bills,” press release, September 1943, Reel 2,
T.D. McNeal Papers; Chicago Defender, September 25, 1943.
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March on Washington Movement Press Release, December 9, 1943, Reel 2, T.D.
McNeal Papers; St. Louis Argus, December 17, 1943. Although initial projections
forecasted this branch’s opening to occur in two months, it took twice that amount
of time. In May 1944, the Vandeventer Avenue office opened with little fanfare and
guarded praise from the Black media, see St. Louis Argus, May 26, 1944; St. Louis
American, July 19, 1944; Chicago Defender, July 20, 1944.
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Not all companies cracked under dual pressure from that summer’s FEPC
Hearings and MOWM lobbying. The other two of the four public service companies
MOWM targeted were Union Electric Company and LaClede Gas Light. Both of these
companies had separate conferences with McNeal in December 1943 “for the
purpose of exploring the possibilities of integrating the Negro citizens into all
branches of your employment.” Neither company took action in the next several
months despite reaching an “understanding” that “white‐collar jobs” would be
integrated. T.D. McNeal to LaClade Gas Light Company, July 5, 1944; T.D. McNeal to
Union Electric Company of Missouri, July 5, 1944; T.D. McNeal to LaClade Gas
Company, November 16, 1943; J.W. McAfee to T.D. McNeal, November 18, 1943, Reel
2, T.D. McNeal Papers.
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the North, (New York: Random House, 2008), p. 403 argues “Most civil rights and
radical organizations in the postwar years had male heads but depended on the
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Savage, Broadcasting Freedom, p. 276.
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“Job Situation for Women here Serious,” [n.d], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.

St. Louis Argus, July 14, 1944; “Job Situation for Women here Serious,” [n.d.], Reel
1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
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“The Spider’s Web,” a weekly column by Henry Winfield Wheeler, lists the
following as participating at sit‐ins at Stix‐Baer and Fuller, Famous‐Barr Co., and
Scruggs Vandervorts: Pearl S. Maddox, Thelma Grant, Modestine Crute Thornton,
Milton Thompson, Florence McCluskey, Birdie Beal Anderson, Myrtle Walker, Lillian
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Sawyer, Anabel Mayfield, Ross Smith, Rogers Smith, Shermine Smith, Vora
Thompson, Evelyn Roberts, Ethel Haywood, Essie Martin, Ruth Mattie Wheeler, Mrs.
Milton Thompson, Maggie White, Florence Harrison, Helen Elam, Hattie Bobo,
Margaret Battles, Eula Evans, Jessie McMillan, and Juanita Ivory.
“Job Situation for Women here Serious,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers.
Greene, Published in the Interest of Colored People, p. 138‐139 mentions the sit‐ins
but only mentions Pearl Maddox, Henry Wheeler, David Grant, and T.D. McNeal.
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“Job Situation for Women here Serious,” [n.d.], Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers; for
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Black Feminism,” Journal of Women’s History, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 212‐
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18941994 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999).
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David Grant, “Race Problems in Our Community,” in “St. Louis – White and Black:
Two Addresses Delivered at the Institute on Race Relations and Non‐Violent
Solutions,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers, echoes this sentiment, “It is my belief that the
depression years produced the best race relations St. Louis has ever known” as
White citizens across the social spectrum became more sympathetic to African
Americans.
No cynic, Grant remained hopeful that “the currents of hate and
prejudice…directed at the Negro people” could be challenged and defeated by the
kind of “determination, persistence, leadership, fortitude, courage, and vision” that
Moses had and African Americans could use in his day. David Grant, “A Biblical
Narration from the Second Book of Moses,” Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers. Also see St.
Louis Post Dispatch, April 10, 1943; Chicago Defender, May 1, 1943 which suggest
that McNeal shared Grant’s pessimism at the time. The Defender reported this
“grave situation” in St. Louis, where “the fight for true democracy at home is being
lost although the fight for democracy on foreign shores is in the process of being
won.” This glum assessment was echoed yet again in the Chicago Defender, April 17,
1943, when reporting on “Assertions that many St. Louis Negroes have become
unenthusiastic regarding the nation’s war effort because they found themselves
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“demurred in serving a young Colored soldier with his white comrades from Scott
Field.”
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the sins of the so‐called superior race, whom we call the Nazis?” Sugrue, Sweet Land
of Liberty, p. 78‐82 arguers that equating Nazi extremes with racial apartheid was
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St. Louis Argus, July 14, 1944 reports that this woman was Eula Harris; “Job
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“St. Louis Race Relations Commission: Executive and Committee personnel,”
[n.d.], Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers; As a member of the Mayor’s Interracial Committee
and director of the St. Louis MOWM with a responsibility to advise the CCRC, McNeal
“voiced the opinion that to accept the proposal to eat in basement cafeterias would
be to dig another pit of segregation for Negroes who already burdened to the
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breaking point in St. Louis.” St. Louis Argus, September 8, 1944; Chicago Defender,
April 29, 1944. Lang, Grassroots at the Gateway, p. 60 argues, Lacking any legal
powers, such committees gave the appearance of activity while doing little to change
the city’s social landscape.
T.D. McNeal to A.P. Kauffman, September 17, 1943, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers;
Charles Riley to T.D. McNeal, September 20, 1943, Reel 2, T.D. McNeal Papers.
McNeal labeled Chairman Meissner “one of the principal causes of racial tension and
ill will.” Meissner’s reputation as antagonistic persisted two years later, when a
Defender columnist called him “a first class you know what.” While Mayor Kauffman
was certainly a pro‐active official, his leadership style was to use committees in
order to distance himself from unpopular or controversial decisions. His political
capitol among African Americans in St. Louis was in decline before the Mayor’s
Committee on Race Relations announced its compromise.
Less than a month earlier, he was criticized by appointing a thirty‐six
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School Board. The influence of four African Americans on this committee was
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Washington, only his metaphor of the separate fingers on one hand – another one of
those inexorable paradoxes. These good leading citizens who are without any real
contact with the present‐day aspiration of Negro Americans serve on a committee
with good intentions but are no guarantee of providing Negro Americans with first‐
class citizenship.”
St. Louis Race Relation’s Commission Minutes, April 18, 1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal
Papers; Housing and Living Conditions Committee: Progress Report, March 17,
1944, Reel 1, T.D. McNeal Papers. Artificial shortages of housing were an issue in
wartime St. Louis. A third‐party survey found that an average of 20% of African
American income went to rent, the most significant expenditure among Black
residents in the city. For more on MOWM and NAACP attempts to lift Restrictive
Covenants in St. Louis see St. Louis Argus, September 5, 1941; St. Louis Argus,
November 13, 1942.
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April 7, 1944 and St. Louis Globe Democrat, April 6, 1944 report on the Board of
Alderman’s 22‐4 vote to desegregate all concessions operating on city property
including the lunch rooms at City Hall and the Municipal Courts Building with
penalties of $25 to $500 for violating the ordinance. Ten African American pastors
and a cadre of “interested citizens” including Pearl Maddox, Birdie Beal Anderson,
and Henry Winfred Wheeler attended the meeting, as did a group of students from a
local high school. Although not named, McNeal and Grant were conspicuously
absent. The American noted with disdain that “such leaders who are supposed to be
anti‐Jim Crow adherents, somehow were too busy to be seen at this meeting.”
Among this group were “Leaders in the march on Washington, the N.A.A.C.P., the
Mound City Bar, the Business League, the Medical Forum, the Postal Alliance, and
the Ward Committeemen who claim to be such Race Men.” News of the ordinance’s
introduction for debate is in St. Louis Post Dispatch, January 14, 1944.
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St. Louis American, September 28, 1944. A clear upper class bias is evident later
in the column when the writer continues, “We believe that only by accepting it
[segregation] temporarily can greater gains be made. We further believe that such
temporary acceptance, by well behaved, neatly dressed individuals…will certainly
result in the opening of other doors to our people.” Surveyors privately recognized
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their bias but did not allude to it in press releases that cheered artificially inflated
numbers of progressive White citizens in St. Louis. Anna Astroth to Leyton Weston,
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